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Dušan Knop

Publications and source records attributed to Dušan Knop.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Equitable Connected Partition and Structural Parameters Revisited: N-fold Beats Lenstra

We study the Equitable Connected Partition (ECP for short) problem, where we are given a graph G=(V,E) together with an integer p, and our goal is to find a partition of V into p parts such that each part induces a connected sub-graph of G and the size of each two parts differs by at most 1. On the one hand, the problem is known to be NP-hard in general and W[1]-hard with respect to the path-width, the feedback-vertex set, and the number of parts p combined. On the other hand, fixed-parameter algorithms are known for parameters the vertex-integrity and the max leaf number. As our main contribution, we resolve a long-standing open question [Enciso et al.; IWPEC '09] regarding the parameterisation by the tree-depth of the underlying graph. In particular, we show that ECP is W[1]-hard with respect to the 4-path vertex cover number, which is an even more restrictive structural parameter than the tree-depth. In addition to that, we show W[1]-hardness of the problem with respect to the feedback-edge set, the distance to disjoint paths, and NP-hardness with respect to the shrub-depth and the clique-width. On a positive note, we propose several novel fixed-parameter algorithms for various parameters that are bounded for dense graphs.

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Individual Rationality in Topological Distance Games is Surprisingly Hard

In the recently introduced topological distance games, strategic agents need to be assigned to a subset of vertices of a topology. In the assignment, the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for other agents and its distance from them on the topology. We study the computational complexity of finding individually rational outcomes; this notion is widely assumed to be the very minimal stability requirement and requires that the utility of every agent in a solution is non-negative. We perform a comprehensive study of the problem's complexity, and we prove that even in very basic cases, deciding whether an individually rational solution exists is intractable. To reach at least some tractability, one needs to combine multiple restrictions of the input instance, including the number of agents and the topology and the influence of distant agents on the utility.

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Hedonic Diversity Games: A Complexity Picture with More than Two Colors

Hedonic diversity games are a variant of the classical Hedonic games designed to better model a variety of questions concerning diversity and fairness. Previous works mainly targeted the case with two diversity classes (represented as colors in the model) and provided some initial complexity-theoretic and existential results concerning Nash and individually stable outcomes. Here, we design new algorithms accompanied with lower bounds which provide a complete parameterized-complexity picture for computing Nash and individually stable outcomes with respect to the most natural parameterizations of the problem. Crucially, our results hold for general Hedonic diversity games where the number of colors is not necessarily restricted to two, and show that -- apart from two trivial cases -- a necessary condition for tractability in this setting is that the number of colors is bounded by the parameter. Moreover, for the special case of two colors we resolve an open question asked in previous work (Boehmer and Elkind, AAAI 2020).

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Bribery Can Get Harder in Structured Multiwinner Approval Election

We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping approvals, where each such action comes at a cost and we are limited by a budget. We assume our elections to either have the candidate interval or the voter interval property, and we require the property to hold also after the bribery. While structured elections usually make manipulative attacks significantly easier, our work also shows examples of the opposite behavior. We conclude by presenting preliminary insights regarding the destructive variant of our problem.

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High-Multiplicity Fair Allocation Using Parametric Integer Linear Programming

Using insights from parametric integer linear programming, we significantly improve on our previous work [Proc. ACM EC 2019] on high-multiplicity fair allocation. Therein, answering an open question from previous work, we proved that the problem of finding envy-free Pareto-efficient allocations of indivisible items is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the combined parameter "number of agents" plus "number of item types." Our central improvement, compared to this result, is to break the condition that the corresponding utility and multiplicity values have to be encoded in unary required there. Concretely, we show that, while preserving fixed-parameter tractability, these values can be encoded in binary, thus greatly expanding the range of feasible values.

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Exact Algorithms and Lowerbounds for Multiagent Pathfinding: Power of Treelike Topology

In the Multiagent Path Finding problem (MAPF for short), we focus on efficiently finding non-colliding paths for a set of $k$ agents on a given graph $G$, where each agent seeks a path from its source vertex to a target. An important measure of the quality of the solution is the length of the proposed schedule $\ell$, that is, the length of a longest path (including the waiting time). In this work, we propose a systematic study under the parameterized complexity framework. The hardness results we provide align with many heuristics used for this problem, whose running time could potentially be improved based on our fixed-parameter tractability results. We show that MAPF is W[1]-hard with respect to $k$ (even if $k$ is combined with the maximum degree of the input graph). The problem remains NP-hard in planar graphs even if the maximum degree and the makespan$\ell$ are fixed constants. On the positive side, we show an FPT algorithm for $k+\ell$. As we delve further, the structure of~$G$ comes into play. We give an FPT algorithm for parameter $k$ plus the diameter of the graph~$G$. The MAPF problem is W[1]-hard for cliquewidth of $G$ plus $\ell$ while it is FPT for treewidth of $G$ plus $\ell$.

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Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

Social distance games have been extensively studied as a coalition formation model where the utilities of agents in each coalition were captured using a utility function $u$ that took into account distances in a given social network. In this paper, we consider a non-normalized score-based definition of social distance games where the utility function $u^s$ depends on a generic scoring vector $s$, which may be customized to match the specifics of each individual application scenario. As our main technical contribution, we establish the tractability of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning of the agents into coalitions on tree-like networks, for every score-based function $u^s$. We provide more efficient algorithms when dealing with specific choices of $u^s$ or simpler networks, and also extend all of these results to computing coalitions that are Nash stable or individually rational. We view these results as a further strong indication of the usefulness of the proposed score-based utility function: even on very simple networks, the problem of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning into coalitions remains open for the originally considered canonical function $u$.

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Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

Social distance games have been extensively studied as a coalition formation model where the utilities of agents in each coalition were captured using a utility function u that took into account distances in a given social network. In this paper, we consider a non-normalized score-based definition of social distance games where the utility function u_v depends on a generic scoring vector v, which may be customized to match the specifics of each individual application scenario. As our main technical contribution, we establish the tractability of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning of the agents into coalitions on tree-like networks, for every score-based function u_v. We provide more efficient algorithms when dealing with specific choices of u_v or simpler networks, and also extend all of these results to computing coalitions that are Nash stable or individually rational. We view these results as a further strong indication of the usefulness of the proposed score-based utility function: even on very simple networks, the problem of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning into coalitions remains open for the originally considered canonical function u.

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Treewidth is NP-Complete on Cubic Graphs (and related results)

In this paper, we give a very simple proof that Treewidth is NP-complete; this proof also shows NP-completeness on the class of co-bipartite graphs. We then improve the result by Bodlaender and Thilikos from 1997 that Treewidth is NP-complete on graphs with maximum degree at most 9, by showing that Treewidth is NP-complete on cubic graphs.

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On Polynomial Kernels for Traveling Salesperson Problem and its Generalizations

For many problems, the important instances from practice possess certain structure that one should reflect in the design of specific algorithms. As data reduction is an important and inextricable part of today's computation, we employ one of the most successful models of such precomputation -- the kernelization. Within this framework, we focus on Traveling Salesperson Problem (TSP) and some of its generalizations. We provide a kernel for TSP with size polynomial in either the feedback edge set number or the size of a modulator to constant-sized components. For its generalizations, we also consider other structural parameters such as the vertex cover number and the size of a modulator to constant-sized paths. We complement our results from the negative side by showing that the existence of a polynomial-sized kernel with respect to the fractioning number, the combined parameter maximum degree and treewidth, and, in the case of Subset-TSP, modulator to disjoint cycles (i.e., the treewidth two graphs) is unlikely.

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Constant Factor Approximation for Tracking Paths and Fault Tolerant Feedback Vertex Set

Consider a vertex-weighted graph $G$ with a source $s$ and a target $t$. Tracking Paths requires finding a minimum weight set of vertices (trackers) such that the sequence of trackers in each path from $s$ to $t$ is unique. In this work, we derive a factor $6$-approximation algorithm for Tracking Paths in weighted graphs and a factor $4$-approximation algorithm if the input is unweighted. This is the first constant factor approximation for this problem. While doing so, we also study approximation of the closely related $r$-Fault Tolerant Feedback Vertex Set problem. There, for a fixed integer $r$ and a given vertex-weighted graph $G$, the task is to find a minimum weight set of vertices intersecting every cycle of $G$ in at least $r+1$ vertices. We give a factor $\mathcal{O}(r)$ approximation algorithm for $r$-Fault Tolerant Feedback Vertex Set if $r$ is a constant.

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Polynomial Kernels for Tracking Shortest Paths

Given an undirected graph $G=(V,E)$, vertices $s,t\in V$, and an integer $k$, Tracking Shortest Paths requires deciding whether there exists a set of $k$ vertices $T\subseteq V$ such that for any two distinct shortest paths between $s$ and $t$, say $P_1$ and $P_2$, we have $T\cap V(P_1)\neq T\cap V(P_2)$. In this paper, we give the first polynomial size kernel for the problem. Specifically we show the existence of a kernel with $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$ vertices and edges in general graphs and a kernel with $\mathcal{O}(k)$ vertices and edges in planar graphs for the Tracking Paths in DAG problem. This problem admits a polynomial parameter transformation to Tracking Shortest Paths, and this implies a kernel with $\mathcal{O}(k^4)$ vertices and edges for Tracking Shortest Paths in general graphs and a kernel with $\mathcal{O}(k^2)$ vertices and edges in planar graphs. Based on the above we also give a single exponential algorithm for Tracking Shortest Paths in planar graphs.

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Multivariate Algorithmics for Eliminating Envy by Donating Goods

Fairly dividing a set of indivisible resources to a set of agents is of utmost importance in some applications. However, after an allocation has been implemented the preferences of agents might change and envy might arise. We study the following problem to cope with such situations: Given an allocation of indivisible resources to agents with additive utility-based preferences, is it possible to socially donate some of the resources (which means removing these resources from the allocation instance) such that the resulting modified allocation is envy-free (up to one good). We require that the number of deleted resources and/or the caused utilitarian welfare loss of the allocation are bounded. We conduct a thorough study of the (parameterized) computational complexity of this problem considering various natural and problem-specific parameters (e.g., the number of agents, the number of deleted resources, or the maximum number of resources assigned to an agent in the initial allocation) and different preference models, including unary and 0/1-valuations. In our studies, we obtain a rich set of (parameterized) tractability and intractability results and discover several surprising contrasts, for instance, between the two closely related fairness concepts envy-freeness and envy-freeness up to one good and between the influence of the parameters maximum number and welfare of the deleted resources.

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Fine-Grained View on Bribery for Group Identification

Given a set of agents qualifying or disqualifying each other, group identification is the task of identifying a socially qualified subgroup of agents. Social qualification depends on the specific rule used to aggregate individual qualifications. The classical bribery problem in this context asks how many agents need to change their qualifications in order to change the outcome in a certain way. Complementing previous results showing polynomial-time solvability or NP-hardness of bribery for various social rules in the constructive (aiming at making specific agents socially qualified) or destructive (aiming at making specific agents socially disqualified) setting, we provide a comprehensive picture of the parameterized computational complexity landscape. Conceptually, we also consider a more fine-grained concept of bribery cost, where we ask how many single qualifications need to be changed, nonunit prices for different bribery actions, and a more general bribery goal that combines the constructive and destructive setting.

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Finding Small Multi-Demand Set Covers with Ubiquitous Elements and Large Sets is Fixed-Parameter Tractable

We study a variant of Set Cover where each element of the universe has some demand that determines how many times the element needs to be covered. Moreover, we examine two generalizations of this problem when a set can be included multiple times and when sets have different prices. We prove that all three problems are fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the combined parameter budget, the maximum number of elements missing in one of the sets, and the maximum number of sets in which one of the elements does not occur. Lastly, we point out how our fixed-parameter tractability algorithm can be applied in the context of bribery for the (collective-decision) group identification problem.

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Multidimensional Stable Roommates with Master List

Since the early days of research in algorithms and complexity, the computation of stable matchings is a core topic. While in the classic setting the goal is to match up two agents (either from different "gender" (this is Stable Marriage) or "unrestricted" (this is Stable Roommates)), Knuth [1976] triggered the study of three- or multidimensional cases. Here, we focus on the study of Multidimensional Stable Roommates, known to be NP-hard since the early 1990's. Many NP-hardness results, however, rely on very general input instances that do not occur in at least some of the specific application scenarios. With the quest for identifying islands of tractability for Multidimensional Stable Roommates, we study the case of master lists. Here, as natural in applications where agents express their preferences based on "objective" scores, one roughly speaking assumes that all agent preferences are "derived from" a central master list, implying that the individual agent preferences shall be similar. Master lists have been frequently studied in the two-dimensional (classic) stable matching case, but seemingly almost never for the multidimensional case. This work, also relying on methods from parameterized algorithm design and complexity analysis, performs a first systematic study of Multidimensional Stable Roommates under the assumption of master lists.

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Parameterized Complexity of Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists Through the Lens of Graph Parameters

We continue and extend previous work on the parameterized complexity analysis of the NP-hard Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists problem, thereby strengthening earlier results both on the side of parameterized hardness as well as on the side of fixed-parameter tractability. Other than for its famous sister problem Stable Marriage which focuses on a bipartite scenario, Stable Roommates with Incomplete Lists allows for arbitrary acceptability graphs whose edges specify the possible matchings of each two agents (agents are represented by graph vertices). Herein, incomplete lists and ties reflect the fact that in realistic application scenarios the agents cannot bring all other agents into a linear order. Among our main contributions is to show that it is W[1]-hard to compute a maximum-cardinality stable matching for acceptability graphs of bounded treedepth, bounded tree-cut width, and bounded disjoint paths modulator number (these are each time the respective parameters). However, if we `only' ask for perfect stable matchings or the mere existence of a stable matching, then we obtain fixed-parameter tractability with respect to tree-cut width but not with respect to treedepth. On the positive side, we also provide fixed-parameter tractability results for the parameter feedback edge set number.

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Integer Programming and Incidence Treedepth

Recently a strong connection has been shown between the tractability of integer programming (IP) with bounded coefficients on the one side and the structure of its constraint matrix on the other side. To that end, integer linear programming is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the primal (or dual) treedepth of the Gaifman graph of its constraint matrix and the largest coefficient (in absolute value). Motivated by this, Koutecký, Levin, and Onn [ICALP 2018] asked whether it is possible to extend these result to a more broader class of integer linear programs. More formally, is integer linear programming fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the incidence treedepth of its constraint matrix and the largest coefficient (in absolute value)? We answer this question in negative. In particular, we prove that deciding the feasibility of a system in the standard form, ${A\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{b}}, {\mathbf{l} \le \mathbf{x} \le \mathbf{u}}$, is $\mathsf{NP}$-hard even when the absolute value of any coefficient in $A$ is 1 and the incidence treedepth of $A$ is 5. Consequently, it is not possible to decide feasibility in polynomial time even if both the assumed parameters are constant, unless $\mathsf{P}=\mathsf{NP}$. Moreover, we complement this intractability result by showing tractability for natural and only slightly more restrictive settings, namely: (1) treedepth with an additional bound on either the maximum arity of constraints or the maximum number of occurrences of variables and (2) the vertex cover number.

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