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Dung Thuy Nguyen

Publications and source records attributed to Dung Thuy Nguyen.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

LOGSAFE: Logic-Guided Verification for Trustworthy Federated Time-Series Learning

This paper introduces LOGSAFE, a defense mechanism for federated learning in time series settings, particularly within cyber-physical systems. It addresses poisoning attacks by moving beyond traditional update-similarity methods and instead using logical reasoning to evaluate client reliability. LOGSAFE extracts client-specific temporal properties, infers global patterns, and verifies clients against them to detect and exclude malicious participants. Experiments show that it significantly outperforms existing methods, achieving up to 93.27% error reduction over the next best baseline. Our code is available at https://github.com/judydnguyen/LOGSAFE-Robust-FTS.

cs.CR↗

PBP: Post-training Backdoor Purification for Malware Classifiers

In recent years, the rise of machine learning (ML) in cybersecurity has brought new challenges, including the increasing threat of backdoor poisoning attacks on ML malware classifiers. For instance, adversaries could inject malicious samples into public malware repositories, contaminating the training data and potentially misclassifying malware by the ML model. Current countermeasures predominantly focus on detecting poisoned samples by leveraging disagreements within the outputs of a diverse set of ensemble models on training data points. However, these methods are not suitable for scenarios where Machine Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) is used or when users aim to remove backdoors from a model after it has been trained. Addressing this scenario, we introduce PBP, a post-training defense for malware classifiers that mitigates various types of backdoor embeddings without assuming any specific backdoor embedding mechanism. Our method exploits the influence of backdoor attacks on the activation distribution of neural networks, independent of the trigger-embedding method. In the presence of a backdoor attack, the activation distribution of each layer is distorted into a mixture of distributions. By regulating the statistics of the batch normalization layers, we can guide a backdoored model to perform similarly to a clean one. Our method demonstrates substantial advantages over several state-of-the-art methods, as evidenced by experiments on two datasets, two types of backdoor methods, and various attack configurations. Notably, our approach requires only a small portion of the training data -- only 1\% -- to purify the backdoor and reduce the attack success rate from 100\% to almost 0\%, a 100-fold improvement over the baseline methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/judydnguyen/pbp-backdoor-purification-official.

cs.LG↗

SUGAR: A Sweeter Spot for Generative Unlearning of Many Identities

Recent advances in 3D-aware generative models have enabled high-fidelity image synthesis of human identities. However, this progress raises urgent questions around user consent and the ability to remove specific individuals from a model's output space. We address this by introducing SUGAR, a framework for scalable generative unlearning that enables the removal of many identities (simultaneously or sequentially) without retraining the entire model. Rather than projecting unwanted identities to unrealistic outputs or relying on static template faces, SUGAR learns a personalized surrogate latent for each identity, diverting reconstructions to visually coherent alternatives while preserving the model's quality and diversity. We further introduce a continual utility preservation objective that guards against degradation as more identities are forgotten. SUGAR achieves state-of-the-art performance in removing up to 200 identities, while delivering up to a 700% improvement in retention utility compared to existing baselines. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/judydnguyen/SUGAR-Generative-Unlearn.

cs.CV↗

BackFed: An Efficient & Standardized Benchmark Suite for Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning

Research on backdoor attacks in Federated Learning (FL) has accelerated in recent years, with new attacks and defenses continually proposed in an escalating arms race. However, the evaluation of these methods remains neither standardized nor reliable. First, there are severe inconsistencies in the evaluation settings across studies, and many rely on unrealistic threat models. Second, our code review uncovers semantic bugs in the official codebases of several attacks that artificially inflate their reported performance. These issues raise fundamental questions about whether current methods are truly effective or simply overfitted to narrow experimental setups. We introduce \textbf{BackFed}, a benchmark designed to standardize and stress-test FL backdoor evaluation by unifying attacks and defenses under a common evaluation framework that mirrors realistic FL deployments. Our benchmark on three representative datasets with three distinct architectures reveals critical limitations of existing methods. Malicious clients often require excessive training time and computation, making them vulnerable to server-enforced time constraints. Meanwhile, several defenses incur severe accuracy degradation or aggregation overhead. Popular defenses and attacks achieve limited performance in our benchmark, which challenges their previous efficacy claims. We establish BackFed as a rigorous and fair evaluation framework that enables more reliable progress in FL backdoor research.

cs.CR↗

Enhancing Code LLM Training with Programmer Attention

Human attention provides valuable yet underexploited signals for code LLM training, offering a perspective beyond purely machine-driven attention. Despite the complexity and cost of collecting eye-tracking data, there has also been limited progress in systematically using these signals for code LLM training. To address both issues, we propose a cohesive pipeline spanning augmentation and reward-based fine-tuning. Specifically, we introduce (1) an eye-tracking path augmentation method to expand programmer attention datasets, (2) a pattern abstraction step that refines raw fixations into learnable attention motifs, and (3) a reward-guided strategy for integrating these insights directly into a CodeT5 supervised fine-tuning process. Our experiments yield +7.16 in CodeBLEU on the CodeXGlue benchmark for code summarization, underscoring how uniting human and machine attention can boost code intelligence. We hope this work encourages broader exploration of human-centric methods in next-generation AI4SE.

cs.SE↗

PARDON: Privacy-Aware and Robust Federated Domain Generalization

Federated Learning (FL) shows promise in preserving privacy and enabling collaborative learning. However, most current solutions focus on private data collected from a single domain. A significant challenge arises when client data comes from diverse domains (i.e., domain shift), leading to poor performance on unseen domains. Existing Federated Domain Generalization approaches address this problem but assume each client holds data for an entire domain, limiting their practicality in real-world scenarios with domain-based heterogeneity and client sampling. In addition, certain methods enable information sharing among clients, raising privacy concerns as this information could be used to reconstruct sensitive private data. To overcome this, we introduce FISC, a novel FedDG paradigm designed to robustly handle more complicated domain distributions between clients while ensuring security. FISC enables learning across domains by extracting an interpolative style from local styles and employing contrastive learning. This strategy gives clients multi-domain representations and unbiased convergent targets. Empirical results on multiple datasets, including PACS, Office-Home, and IWildCam, show FISC outperforms state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods. Our method achieves accuracy on unseen domains, with improvements ranging from 3.64% to 57.22% on unseen domains. Our code is available at https://github.com/judydnguyen/PARDON-FedDG.

cs.LG↗

Non-Cooperative Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning: A New Threat Landscape

Despite the promise of Federated Learning (FL) for privacy-preserving model training on distributed data, it remains susceptible to backdoor attacks. These attacks manipulate models by embedding triggers (specific input patterns) in the training data, forcing misclassification as predefined classes during deployment. Traditional single-trigger attacks and recent work on cooperative multiple-trigger attacks, where clients collaborate, highlight limitations in attack realism due to coordination requirements. We investigate a more alarming scenario: non-cooperative multiple-trigger attacks. Here, independent adversaries introduce distinct triggers targeting unique classes. These parallel attacks exploit FL's decentralized nature, making detection difficult. Our experiments demonstrate the alarming vulnerability of FL to such attacks, where individual backdoors can be successfully learned without impacting the main task. This research emphasizes the critical need for robust defenses against diverse backdoor attacks in the evolving FL landscape. While our focus is on empirical analysis, we believe it can guide backdoor research toward more realistic settings, highlighting the crucial role of FL in building robust defenses against diverse backdoor threats. The code is available at \url{https://anonymous.4open.science/r/nba-980F/}.

cs.CR↗