arXiv subjects

Dusit Niyato

Publications and source records attributed to Dusit Niyato.

At least 757 records · Page 42Linked to original sources

arXiv2019

Re-route Package Pickup and Delivery Planning with Random Demands

Recently, a higher competition in logistics business introduces new challenges to the vehicle routing problem (VRP). Re-route planning, also known as dynamic VRP, is one of the important challenges. The re-route planning has to be performed when new customers request for deliveries while the delivery vehicles, i.e., trucks, are serving other customers. While the re-route planning has been studied in the literature, most of the existing works do not consider different uncertainties. Therefore, in this paper, we propose two systems, i.e., (i) an offline package pickup and delivery planning with stochastic demands (PDPSD) and (ii) a re-route package pickup and delivery planning with stochastic demands (Re-route PDPSD). Accordingly, we formulate the PDPSD system as a two-stage stochastic optimization. We then extend the PDPSD system to the Re-route PDPSD system with a re-route algorithm. Furthermore, we evaluate performance of the proposed systems by using the dataset from Solomon Benchmark suite and a real data from a Singapore logistics 1company. The results show that the PDPSD system can achieve the lower cost than that of the baseline model. In addition, the Re-route PDPSD system can help the supplier efficiently and successfully to serve more customers while the trucks are already on the road.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2019

Task Allocation and Mobile Base Station Deployment in Wireless Powered Spatial Crowdsourcing

Wireless power transfer (WPT) is a promising technology to prolong the lifetime of sensor and communication devices, i.e., workers, in completing crowdsourcing tasks by providing continuous and cost-effective energy supplies. In this paper, we propose a wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing (SC) framework which consists of two mutual dependent phases: task allocation phase and data crowdsourcing phase. In the task allocation phase, we propose a Stackelberg game based mechanism for the SC platform to efficiently allocate spatial tasks and wireless charging power to each worker. In the data crowdsourcing phase, the workers may have an incentive to misreport its real working location to improve its own utility, which manipulates the SC platform. To address this issue, we present a strategyproof deployment mechanism for the SC platform to deploy its mobile base station. We apply the Moulin's generalized median mechanism and analyze the worst-case performance in maximizing the SC platform's utility. Finally, numerical experiments reveal the effectiveness of the proposed framework in allocating tasks and charging power to workers while avoiding the dishonest worker's manipulation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

On Cyber Risk Management of Blockchain Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols are vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as double-spending. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. In particular, we adopt the cyber-insurance as an economic tool for neutralizing cyber risks due to attacks in blockchain networks. We consider a blockchain service market, which is composed of the infrastructure provider, the blockchain provider, the cyber-insurer, and the users. The blockchain provider purchases from the infrastructure provider, e.g., a cloud, the computing resources to maintain the blockchain consensus, and then offers blockchain services to the users. The blockchain provider strategizes its investment in the infrastructure and the service price charged to the users, in order to improve the security of the blockchain and thus optimize its profit. Meanwhile, the blockchain provider also purchases a cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer to protect itself from the potential damage due to the attacks. In return, the cyber-insurer adjusts the insurance premium according to the perceived risk level of the blockchain service. Based on the assumption of rationality for the market entities, we model the interaction among the blockchain provider, the users, and the cyber-insurer as a two-level Stackelberg game. Namely, the blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies, and then the users follow to determine their demand of the blockchain service. Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide a series of analytical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the market game.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

A Survey on Applications of Game Theory in Blockchain

In the past decades, the blockchain technology has attracted tremendous attention from both academia and industry. The popularity of blockchain networks was originated from a crypto-currency to serve as a decentralized and tamperproof transaction data ledger. Nowadays, blockchain as the key framework in the decentralized public data-ledger, has been applied to a wide range of scenarios far beyond crypto-currencies, such as Internet of Things (IoT), healthcare, and insurance. This survey aims to fill the gap between the large number of studies on blockchain network, where game theory emerges as an analytical tool, and the lack of a comprehensive survey on the game theoretical approaches applied in blockchain related issues. In this paper, we review game models proposed to address common issues in the blockchain network. The issues include security issues, e.g., selfish mining, majority attack and Denial of Service (DoS) attack, issues regard mining management, e.g., computational power allocation, reward allocation, and pool selection, as well as issues regarding blockchain economic and energy trading. Additionally, we discuss advantages and disadvantages of these selected game models and solutions. Finally, we highlight important challenges and future research directions of applying game theoretical approaches to incentive mechanism design, and the combination of blockchain with other technologies.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

A Survey on Consensus Mechanisms and Mining Strategy Management in Blockchain Networks

The past decade has witnessed the rapid evolution in blockchain technologies, which has attracted tremendous interests from both the research communities and industries. The blockchain network was originated from the Internet financial sector as a decentralized, immutable ledger system for transactional data ordering. Nowadays, it is envisioned as a powerful backbone/framework for decentralized data processing and data-driven self-organization in flat, open-access networks. In particular, the plausible characteristics of decentralization, immutability and self-organization are primarily owing to the unique decentralized consensus mechanisms introduced by blockchain networks. This survey is motivated by the lack of a comprehensive literature review on the development of decentralized consensus mechanisms in blockchain networks. In this survey, we provide a systematic vision of the organization of blockchain networks. By emphasizing the unique characteristics of incentivized consensus in blockchain networks, our in-depth review of the state-of-the-art consensus protocols is focused on both the perspective of distributed consensus system design and the perspective of incentive mechanism design. From a game-theoretic point of view, we also provide a thorough review on the strategy adoption for self-organization by the individual nodes in the blockchain backbone networks. Consequently, we provide a comprehensive survey on the emerging applications of the blockchain networks in a wide range of areas. We highlight our special interest in how the consensus mechanisms impact these applications. Finally, we discuss several open issues in the protocol design for blockchain consensus and the related potential research directions.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

Distributed Learning for Channel Allocation Over a Shared Spectrum

Channel allocation is the task of assigning channels to users such that some objective (e.g., sum-rate) is maximized. In centralized networks such as cellular networks, this task is carried by the base station which gathers the channel state information (CSI) from the users and computes the optimal solution. In distributed networks such as ad-hoc and device-to-device (D2D) networks, no base station exists and conveying global CSI between users is costly or simply impractical. When the CSI is time varying and unknown to the users, the users face the challenge of both learning the channel statistics online and converge to a good channel allocation. This introduces a multi-armed bandit (MAB) scenario with multiple decision makers. If two users or more choose the same channel, a collision occurs and they all receive zero reward. We propose a distributed channel allocation algorithm that each user runs and converges to the optimal allocation while achieving an order optimal regret of O\left(\log T\right). The algorithm is based on a carrier sensing multiple access (CSMA) implementation of the distributed auction algorithm. It does not require any exchange of information between users. Users need only to observe a single channel at a time and sense if there is a transmission on that channel, without decoding the transmissions or identifying the transmitting users. We demonstrate the performance of our algorithm using simulated LTE and 5G channels.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2018

Distributed Deep Learning at the Edge: A Novel Proactive and Cooperative Caching Framework for Mobile Edge Networks

This letter proposes two novel proactive cooperative caching approaches using deep learning (DL) to predict users' content demand in a mobile edge caching network. In the first approach, a (central) content server takes responsibilities to collect information from all mobile edge nodes (MENs) in the network and then performs our proposed deep learning (DL) algorithm to predict the content demand for the whole network. However, such a centralized approach may disclose the private information because MENs have to share their local users' data with the content server. Thus, in the second approach, we propose a novel distributed deep learning (DDL) based framework. The DDL allows MENs in the network to collaborate and exchange information to reduce the error of content demand prediction without revealing the private information of mobile users. Through simulation results, we show that our proposed approaches can enhance the accuracy by reducing the root mean squared error (RMSE) up to 33.7% and reduce the service delay by 36.1% compared with other machine learning algorithms.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2018

Efficient Training Management for Mobile Crowd-Machine Learning: A Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach

In this letter, we consider the concept of Mobile Crowd-Machine Learning (MCML) for a federated learning model. The MCML enables mobile devices in a mobile network to collaboratively train neural network models required by a server while keeping data on the mobile devices. The MCML thus addresses data privacy issues of traditional machine learning. However, the mobile devices are constrained by energy, CPU, and wireless bandwidth. Thus, to minimize the energy consumption, training time and communication cost, the server needs to determine proper amounts of data and energy that the mobile devices use for training. However, under the dynamics and uncertainty of the mobile environment, it is challenging for the server to determine the optimal decisions on mobile device resource management. In this letter, we propose to adopt a deep- Q learning algorithm that allows the server to learn and find optimal decisions without any a priori knowledge of network dynamics. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm outperforms the static algorithms in terms of energy consumption and training latency.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2018

Deep Q-Learning for Dynamic Reliability Aware NFV-Based Service Provisioning

Network function virtualization (NFV) is referred to the technology in which softwarized network functions virtually run on commodity servers. Such functions are called virtual network functions (VNFs). A specific service is composed of a set of VNFs. This is a paradigm shift for service provisioning in telecom networks which introduces new design and implementation challenges. One of these challenges is to meet the reliability requirement of the requested services considering the reliability of the commodity servers. VNF placement which is the problem of assigning commodity servers to the VNFs becomes crucial under such circumstances. To address such an issue, in this paper, we employ Deep Q-Network (DQN) to model NFV placement problem considering the reliability requirement of the services. The output of the introduced model determines what placement will be optimal in each state. Numerical evaluations show that the introduced model can significantly improve the performance of the network operator.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2018

Joint Service Pricing and Cooperative Relay Communication for Federated Learning

For the sake of protecting data privacy and due to the rapid development of mobile devices, e.g., powerful central processing unit (CPU) and nascent neural processing unit (NPU), collaborative machine learning on mobile devices, e.g., federated learning, has been envisioned as a new AI approach with broad application prospects. However, the learning process of the existing federated learning platforms rely on the direct communication between the model owner, e.g., central cloud or edge server, and the mobile devices for transferring the model update. Such a direct communication may be energy inefficient or even unavailable in mobile environments. In this paper, we consider adopting the relay network to construct a cooperative communication platform for supporting model update transfer and trading. In the system, the mobile devices generate model updates based on their training data. The model updates are then forwarded to the model owner through the cooperative relay network. The model owner enjoys the learning service provided by the mobile devices. In return, the mobile devices charge the model owner certain prices. Due to the coupled interference of wireless transmission among the mobile devices that use the same relay node, the rational mobile devices have to choose their relay nodes as well as deciding on their transmission powers. Thus, we formulate a Stackelberg game model to investigate the interaction among the mobile devices and that between the mobile devices and the model owner. The Stackelberg equilibrium is investigated by capitalizing on the exterior point method. Moreover, we provide a series of insightful analytical and numerical results on the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2018

Cloud/fog computing resource management and pricing for blockchain networks

The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time, consider edge computing as an enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we study edge computing resource management and pricing to support mobile blockchain applications in which the mining process of miners can be offloaded to an edge computing service provider. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the profit of the edge computing service provider and the individual utilities of the miners. In the first stage, the service provider sets the price of edge computing nodes. In the second stage, the miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices. We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For the uniform pricing where the same price is applied to all miners, the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the miners. For the discriminatory pricing where the different prices are applied to different miners, the Stackelberg equilibrium is proved to exist and be unique by capitalizing on the Variational Inequality theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our proposed model.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2018

Evolutionary Game for Consensus Provision in Permissionless Blockchain Networks with Shard

With the development of decentralized consensus protocols, permissionless blockchains have been envisioned as a promising enabler for the general-purpose transaction-driven, autonomous systems. However, most of the prevalent blockchain networks are built upon the consensus protocols under the crypto-puzzle framework known as proof-of-work. Such protocols face the inherent problem of transaction-processing bottleneck, as the networks achieve the decentralized consensus for transaction confirmation at the cost of very high latency. In this paper, we study the problem of consensus formation in a system of multiple throughput-scalable blockchains with sharded consensus. Specifically, the protocol design of sharded consensus not only enables parallelizing the process of transaction validation with sub-groups of processors, but also introduces the Byzantine consensus protocols for accelerating the consensus processes. By allowing different blockchains to impose different levels of processing fees and to have different transaction-generating rate, we aim to simulate the multi-service provision eco-systems based on blockchains in real world. We focus on the dynamics of blockchain-selection in the condition of a large population of consensus processors. Hence, we model the evolution of blockchain selection by the individual processors as an evolutionary game. Both the theoretical and the numerical analysis are provided regarding the evolutionary equilibria and the stability of the processors' strategies in a general case.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Deep Reinforcement Learning based Modulation and Coding Scheme Selection in Cognitive Heterogeneous Networks

We consider a cognitive heterogeneous network (HetNet), in which multiple pairs of secondary users adopt sensing-based approaches to coexist with a pair of primary users on a certain spectrum band. Due to imperfect spectrum sensing, secondary transmitters (STs) may cause interference to the primary receiver (PR) and make it difficult for the PR to select a proper modulation and/or coding scheme (MCS). To deal with this issue, we exploit deep reinforcement learning (DRL) and propose an intelligent MCS selection algorithm for the primary transmission. To reduce the system overhead caused by MCS switchings, we further introduce a switching cost factor in the proposed algorithm. Simulation results show that the primary transmission rate of the proposed algorithm without the switching cost factor is 90 percent to 100 percent of the optimal MCS selection scheme, which assumes that the interference from the STs is perfectly known at the PR as prior information, and is 30 percent to 100 percent higher than those of the benchmark algorithms. Meanwhile, the proposed algorithm with the switching cost factor can achieve a better balance between the primary transmission rate and system overheads than both the optimal algorithm and benchmark algorithms.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2018

Network Slicing with Mobile Edge Computing for Micro-Operator Networks in Beyond 5G

We model the scenarios of network slicing allocation for the micro-operator (MO) network. The MO creates the slices "as a service" of wireless resource and then allocates these slices to multiple mobile network operators (MNOs). We propose the slice allocation problem of multiple MNOs with the goal of maximizing the social welfare of the network defined as sum rate of all MNOs. The many-to-one matching game framework is adopted to solve this problem. Then, the generic Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method is introduced for the computation of game theoretical solution. After the MNOs obtain the slices, for each small cell base station (SBS), we investigate the role of power allocation using Q-learning and uniform power. We numerically show that the solution of the matching game leads to two-sided stable matching. Furthermore, for each MNO, we explore the problem of infrastructure cost minimization constrained on the latency at the user equipment (UE). The optimal solution is given by a greedy fractional knapsack algorithm. We illustrate that it is sufficient for the MNO to use a small fraction of the SBS to serve the UE while satisfying the latency constraint. For the problem of overall data rate maximization, we numerically show that the power allocation has significant effect on the social welfare of the system.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2018

A Stackelberg Game Approach Towards Socially-Aware Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing (Online report)

Mobile crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive satisfactory reward. In this paper, to effectively and efficiently recruit sufficient number of mobile users, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal incentive mechanism of a crowdsensing service provider. We apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze the participation level of the mobile users and the optimal incentive mechanism of the crowdsensing service provider using backward induction. In order to motivate the participants, the incentive is designed by taking into account the social network effects from the underlying mobile social domain. For example, in a crowdsensing-based road traffic information sharing application, a user can get a better and accurate traffic report if more users join and share their road information. We derive the analytical expressions for the discriminatory incentive as well as the uniform incentive mechanisms. To fit into practical scenarios, we further formulate a Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information to analyze the interaction between the crowdsensing service provider and mobile users, where the social structure information (the social network effects) is uncertain. The existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the mobile users. Numerical results corroborate the fact that the network effects tremendously stimulate higher mobile participation level and greater revenue of the crowdsensing service provider. In addition, the social structure information helps the crowdsensing service provider to achieve greater revenue gain.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Joint Transaction Transmission and Channel Selection in Cognitive Radio Based Blockchain Networks: A Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach

To ensure that the data aggregation, data storage, and data processing are all performed in a decentralized but trusted manner, we propose to use the blockchain with the mining pool to support IoT services based on cognitive radio networks. As such, the secondary user can send its sensing data, i.e., transactions, to the mining pools. After being verified by miners, the transactions are added to the blocks. However, under the dynamics of the primary channel and the uncertainty of the mempool state of the mining pool, it is challenging for the secondary user to determine an optimal transaction transmission policy. In this paper, we propose to use the deep reinforcement learning algorithm to derive an optimal transaction transmission policy for the secondary user. Specifically, we adopt a Double Deep-Q Network (DDQN) that allows the secondary user to learn the optimal policy. The simulation results clearly show that the proposed deep reinforcement learning algorithm outperforms the conventional Q-learning scheme in terms of reward and learning speed.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2018

Applications of Deep Reinforcement Learning in Communications and Networking: A Survey

This paper presents a comprehensive literature review on applications of deep reinforcement learning in communications and networking. Modern networks, e.g., Internet of Things (IoT) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) networks, become more decentralized and autonomous. In such networks, network entities need to make decisions locally to maximize the network performance under uncertainty of network environment. Reinforcement learning has been efficiently used to enable the network entities to obtain the optimal policy including, e.g., decisions or actions, given their states when the state and action spaces are small. However, in complex and large-scale networks, the state and action spaces are usually large, and the reinforcement learning may not be able to find the optimal policy in reasonable time. Therefore, deep reinforcement learning, a combination of reinforcement learning with deep learning, has been developed to overcome the shortcomings. In this survey, we first give a tutorial of deep reinforcement learning from fundamental concepts to advanced models. Then, we review deep reinforcement learning approaches proposed to address emerging issues in communications and networking. The issues include dynamic network access, data rate control, wireless caching, data offloading, network security, and connectivity preservation which are all important to next generation networks such as 5G and beyond. Furthermore, we present applications of deep reinforcement learning for traffic routing, resource sharing, and data collection. Finally, we highlight important challenges, open issues, and future research directions of applying deep reinforcement learning.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2018

Robust Transmissions in Wireless Powered Multi-Relay Networks with Chance Interference Constraints

In this paper, we consider a wireless powered multi-relay network in which a multi-antenna hybrid access point underlaying a cellular system transmits information to distant receivers. Multiple relays capable of energy harvesting are deployed in the network to assist the information transmission. The hybrid access point can wirelessly supply energy to the relays, achieving multi-user gains from signal and energy cooperation. We propose a joint optimization for signal beamforming of the hybrid access point as well as wireless energy harvesting and collaborative beamforming strategies of the relays. The objective is to maximize network throughput subject to probabilistic interference constraints at the cellular user equipment. We formulate the throughput maximization with both the time-switching and power-splitting schemes, which impose very different couplings between the operating parameters for wireless power and information transfer. Although the optimization problems are inherently non-convex, they share similar structural properties that can be leveraged for efficient algorithm design. In particular, by exploiting monotonicity in the throughput, we maximize it iteratively via customized polyblock approximation with reduced complexity. The numerical results show that the proposed algorithms can achieve close to optimal performance in terms of the energy efficiency and throughput.

cs.IT↗