arXiv subjects

E. Glen Weyl

Publications and source records attributed to E. Glen Weyl.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Community by Design

Social media empower distributed content creation by algorithmically harnessing "the social fabric" (explicit and implicit signals of association) to serve this content. While this overcomes the bottlenecks and biases of traditional gatekeepers, many believe it has unsustainably eroded the very social fabric it depends on by maximizing engagement for advertising revenue. This paper participates in open and ongoing considerations to translate social and political values and conventions, specifically social cohesion, into platform design. We propose an alternative platform model that includes the social fabric an explicit output as well as input. Citizens are members of communities defined by explicit affiliation or clusters of shared attitudes. Both have internal divisions, as citizens are members of intersecting communities, which are themselves internally diverse. Each is understood to value content that bridge (viz. achieve consensus across) and balance (viz. represent fairly) this internal diversity, consistent with the principles of the Hutchins Commission (1947). Content is labeled with social provenance, indicating for which community or citizen it is bridging or balancing. Subscription payments allow citizens and communities to increase the algorithmic weight on the content they value in the content serving algorithm. Advertisers may, with consent of citizen or community counterparties, target them in exchange for payment or increase in that party's algorithmic weight. Underserved and emerging communities and citizens are optimally subsidized/supported to develop into paying participants. Content creators and communities that curate content are rewarded for their contributions with algorithmic weight and/or revenue. We discuss applications to productivity (e.g. LinkedIn), political (e.g. X), and cultural (e.g. TikTok) platforms.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

(Working Paper) Good Faith Design: Religion as a Resource for Technologists

Previous work has found a lack of research in HCI on religion, partly driven by misunderstandings of values and practices between religious and technical communities. To bridge this divide in an empirically rigorous way, we conducted an interview study with 48 religious people and/or experts from 11 faiths, and we document how religious people experience, understand, and imagine technologies. We show that religious stakeholders find non-neutral secular embeddings in technologies and the firms and people that design them, and how these manifest in unintended harms for religious and nonreligious users. Our findings reveal how users navigate technoreligious practices with religiously informed mental models and what they desire from technologies. Informed by this, we distill six design values -- wonder, humility, space, embodiedness, community, and eternity -- to guide technologists in considering and leveraging religion as an additional, valid sociocultural resource when designing for a holistic user. We further spell out directions for future research.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Fair Decisions through Plurality: Results from a Crowdfunding Platform

We discuss an algorithmic intervention aimed at increasing equity and economic efficiency at a crowdfunding platform that gives cash subsidies to grantees. Through a blend of technical and qualitative methods, we show that the previous algorithm used by the platform -- Quadratic Funding (QF) -- suffered problems because its design was rooted in a model of individuals as isolated and selfish. We present an alternative algorithm -- Connection-Oriented Quadratic Funding (CO-QF) -- rooted in a theory of plurality and prosocial utilities, and show that it qualitatively and quantitatively performs better than QF. CO-QF has achieved an 89% adoption rate at the platform and has distributed over $4 Million to date. In simulations we show that it provides better social welfare than QF. While our design for CO-QF was responsive to the needs of a specific community, we also extrapolate out of this context to show that CO-QF is a potentially helpful tool for general-purpose public decision making.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Prospecting a Possible Quadratic Wormhole Between Quantum Mechanics and Plurality

We illustrate some formal symmetries between Quadratic Funding (Buterin et al., 2019), a mechanism for the (approximately optimal) determination of public good funding levels, and the Born (1926) rule in Quantum Mechanics, which converts the wave representation into a probability distribution, through a bridging formulation we call "Quantum Quartic Finance". We suggest further directions for investigating the practical utility of these symmetries. We discuss potential interpretations in greater depth in a companion blog post.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2020

A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods

We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly-funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from Quadratic Voting to a funding mechanism for endogenous community formation. Individuals make public goods contributions to projects of value to them. The amount received by the project is (proportional to) the square of the sum of the square roots of contributions received. Under the "standard model" this yields first best public goods provision. Variations can limit the cost, help protect against collusion and aid coordination. We discuss applications to campaign finance, open source software ecosystems, news media finance and urban public projects. More broadly, we offer a resolution to the classic liberal-communitarian debate in political philosophy by providing neutral and non-authoritarian rules that nonetheless support collective organization.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2019

Nash Equilbria for Quadratic Voting

Voters making a binary decision purchase votes from a centralized clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased. The net payoff to an agent with utility $u$ who purchases $v$ votes is $Ψ(S_{n+1})u-v^{2}$, where $Ψ$ is a monotone function taking values between -1 and +1 and $S_{n+1}$ is the sum of all votes purchased by the $n+1$ voters participating in the election. The utilities of the voters are assumed to arise by random sampling from a probability distribution $F_{U}$ with compact support; each voter knows her own utility, but not those of the other voters, although she does know the sampling distribution $F_{U}$. Nash equilibria for this game are described. These results imply that the expected inefficiency of any Nash equilibrium decays like $1/n$.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Functional Forms for Tractable Economic Models and the Cost Structure of International Trade

We present functional forms allowing a broader range of analytic solutions to common economic equilibrium problems. These can increase the realism of pen-and-paper solutions or speed large-scale numerical solutions as computational subroutines. We use the latter approach to build a tractable heterogeneous firm model of international trade accommodating economies of scale in export and diseconomies of scale in production, providing a natural, unified solution to several puzzles concerning trade costs. We briefly highlight applications in a range of other fields. Our method of generating analytic solutions is a discrete approximation to a logarithmically modified Laplace transform of equilibrium conditions.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2016

Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search

Investigating potential purchases is often a substantial investment under uncertainty. Standard market designs, such as simultaneous or English auctions, compound this with uncertainty about the price a bidder will have to pay in order to win. As a result they tend to confuse the process of search both by leading to wasteful information acquisition on goods that have already found a good purchaser and by discouraging needed investigations of objects, potentially eliminating all gains from trade. In contrast, we show that the Dutch auction preserves all of its properties from a standard setting without information costs because it guarantees, at the time of information acquisition, a price at which the good can be purchased. Calibrations to start-up acquisition and timber auctions suggest that in practice the social losses through poor search coordination in standard formats are an order of magnitude or two larger than the (negligible) inefficiencies arising from ex-ante bidder asymmetries.

cs.GT↗