arXiv subjects

Eddy Keming Chen

Publications and source records attributed to Eddy Keming Chen.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Algorithmic Randomness and Physical Typicality

Appeals to typicality are common in physics, but it is often unclear what it means for a physical state to be typical relative to a probability measure, and correspondingly unclear what a law that appeals to typicality asserts. Here we consider how one might characterize physical typicality using ideas from the theory of algorithmic randomness. As a concrete example, we show how taking a physical state to be typical relative to a computable measure when it is Martin-L\"of random allows one to formulate the distribution postulate in Bohmian mechanics as a statistical constraining law of the theory. Using a toy model, we show how this constraint guarantees the standard Born statistics for computable experimental protocols. Algorithmic Bohmian mechanics (aBM) thus illustrates how algorithmic randomness may be used to provide precise content to a statistical law.

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arXiv2026

The Distribution Postulate in Algorithmic Bohmian Mechanics

In order to make the right empirical predictions Bohmian mechanics requires a special statistical boundary condition -- the distribution postulate -- but it is unclear how best to understand this condition. We show how one might use the theory of algorithmic randomness to formulate the distribution postulate as an objective constraining law. The framework requires us to say something about admissible quantum-mechanical states and measurements. In return, algorithmic Bohmian mechanics (aBM) guarantees the standard Born statistics for a collection of canonical quantum experiments in the limit, not just with high probability. The algorithmic distribution postulate provides a sharp typicality condition, clarifies the status of quantum probabilities in the deterministic theory, and provides a concrete example of how notions provided by the theory of algorithmic randomness can aid in specifying the content of a physical law.

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arXiv2025

Algorithmic Randomness, Exchangeability, and the Principal Principle

We introduce a framework uniting algorithmic randomness with exchangeable credences to address foundational questions in philosophy of probability and philosophy of science. To demonstrate its power, we show how one might use the framework to derive the Principal Principle -- the norm that rational credence should match known objective chance -- without circularity. The derivation brings together de Finetti's exchangeability, Martin-L\"of randomness, Lewis's and Skyrms's chance-credence norms, and statistical constraining laws (arXiv:2303.01411). Laws that constrain histories to algorithmically random sequences naturally pair with exchangeable credences encoding inductive symmetries. Using the de Finetti representation theorem, we show that this pairing directly entails the Principal Principle of this framework. We extend the proof to partial exchangeability and provide finite-history bounds that vanish in the infinite limit. The Principal Principle thus emerges as a mathematical consequence of the alignment between nomological constraints and inductive learning. This reveals how algorithmic randomness and exchangeability can illuminate foundational questions about chance, frequency, and rational belief.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2025

Algorithmic Randomness and Probabilistic Laws

We apply recent ideas about complexity and randomness to the philosophy of laws and chances. We develop two ways to use algorithmic randomness to characterize probabilistic laws of nature. The first, a generative chance* law, employs a nonstandard notion of chance. The second, a probabilistic* constraining law, impose relative frequency and randomness constraints that every physically possible world must satisfy. The constraining notion removes a major obstacle to a unified governing account of non-Humean laws, on which laws govern by constraining physical possibilities; it also provides independently motivated solutions to familiar problems for the Humean best-system account (the Big Bad Bug and the zero-fit problem). On either approach, probabilistic laws are tied more tightly to corresponding sets of possible worlds: some histories permitted by traditional probabilistic laws are now ruled out as physically impossible. Consequently, the framework avoids one variety of empirical underdetermination while bringing to light others that are typically overlooked.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2025

Decoherence, Branching, and the Born Rule in a Mixed-State Everettian Multiverse

In Everettian quantum mechanics, justifications for the Born rule appeal to self-locating uncertainty or decision theory. Such justifications have focused exclusively on a pure-state Everettian multiverse, represented by a wave function. Recent works in quantum foundations suggest that it is viable to consider a mixed-state Everettian multiverse, represented by a (mixed-state) density matrix. Here, we develop the conceptual foundations for decoherence and branching in a mixed-state multiverse, and extend arguments for the Born rule to this setting. This extended framework provides a unification of 'classical' and 'quantum' probabilities, and additional theoretical benefits, for the Everettian picture.

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arXiv2025

The Simplicity of Physical Laws

Physical laws are strikingly simple, yet there is no a priori reason for them to be so. I propose that nomic realists -- Humeans and non-Humeans -- should recognize simplicity as a fundamental epistemic guide for discovering and evaluating candidate physical laws. This proposal helps resolve several longstanding problems of nomic realism and simplicity. A key consequence is that the presumed epistemic advantage of Humeanism over non-Humeanism dissolves, undermining a prominent epistemological argument for Humeanism. Moreover, simplicity is shown to be more connected to lawhood than to mere truth.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2024

Density Matrix Realism

Realism about quantum theory naturally leads to realism about the quantum state of the universe. It leaves open whether it is a pure state represented by a wave function, or an impure (mixed) one represented by a density matrix. I characterize and elaborate on Density Matrix Realism, the thesis that the universal quantum state is objective but can be impure. To clarify the thesis, I compare it with Wave Function Realism, explain the conditions under which they are empirically equivalent, consider two generalizations of Density Matrix Realism, and answer some frequently asked questions. I end by highlighting an implication for scientific realism.

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arXiv2024

Typical Quantum States of the Universe are Observationally Indistinguishable

We establish three impossibility results regarding our knowledge of the quantum state of the universe. Suppose the universal quantum state is a typical unit vector in a high-dimensional subspace $\mathscr{H}_0$ of Hilbert space $\mathscr{H}$, such as the low-entropy subspace defined by the Past Hypothesis. We show that: (1) Any particular observation is incapable of identifying the universal state vector in $\mathscr{H}_0$ or substantially reducing the set of possibilities. In other words, the overwhelming majority of possible state vectors are observationally indistinguishable from each other. (2) For any reasonably probable measurement outcome and for most pairs of vectors in $\mathscr{H}_0$, that outcome will not appreciably favor one vector over the other. (3) Bayesian updating on any measurement result, unless it is extraordinarily improbable, has a negligible effect on the initial uniform probability distribution over the states in $\mathscr{H}_0$. These findings represent the most stringent epistemic constraints known for a quantum universe and are derived from a typicality theorem in quantum statistical mechanics. We close by considering how theoretical considerations beyond empirical evidence might inform our understanding of this fact and our knowledge of the universal quantum state.

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arXiv2024

The Decoherent Arrow of Time and the Entanglement Past Hypothesis

If an asymmetry in time does not arise from the fundamental dynamical laws of physics, it may be found in special boundary conditions. The argument normally goes that since thermodynamic entropy in the past is lower than in the future according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, then tracing this back to the time around the Big Bang means the universe must have started off in a state of very low thermodynamic entropy: the Thermodynamic Past Hypothesis. In this paper, we consider another boundary condition that plays a similar role, but for the decoherent arrow of time, i.e. the quantum state of the universe is more mixed in the future than in the past. According to what we call the Entanglement Past Hypothesis, the initial quantum state of the universe had very low entanglement entropy. We clarify the content of the Entanglement Past Hypothesis, compare it with the Thermodynamic Past Hypothesis, and identify some challenges and open questions for future research.

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arXiv2024

Strong Determinism

A strongly deterministic theory of physics is one that permits exactly one possible history of the universe. In the words of Penrose (1989), ''it is not just a matter of the future being determined by the past; the entire history of the universe is fixed, according to some precise mathematical scheme, for all time.'' Such an extraordinary feature may appear unattainable in a world like ours. In this paper, I show that it can be achieved in a simple way and discuss its implications for metaphysics and philosophy of science, including natural properties, free will, explanation, and modality. First, I propose a precise definition of strong determinism. Next, I discuss its philosophical ramifications and a toy example. Finally, I provide a realistic example of a strongly deterministic (and simple) physical theory -- the Everettian Wentaculus. A surprising consequence is that whether or not our world is strongly deterministic may be empirically underdetermined.

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arXiv2023

Laws of Physics

Despite its apparent complexity, our world seems to be governed by simple laws of physics. This volume provides a philosophical introduction to such laws. I explain how they are connected to some of the central issues in philosophy, such as ontology, possibility, explanation, induction, counterfactuals, time, determinism, and fundamentality. I suggest that laws are fundamental facts that govern the world by constraining its physical possibilities. I examine three hallmarks of laws--simplicity, exactness, and objectivity--and discuss whether and how they may be associated with laws of physics.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2022

The Wentaculus: Density Matrix Realism Meets the Arrow of Time

Two of the most difficult problems in the foundations of physics are (1) what gives rise to the arrow of time and (2) what the ontology of quantum mechanics is. They are difficult because the fundamental dynamical laws of physics do not privilege an arrow of time, and the quantum-mechanical wave function describes a high-dimensional reality that is radically different from our ordinary experiences. In this paper, I characterize and elaborate on the ''Wentaculus'' theory, a new approach to time's arrow in a quantum universe that offers a unified solution to both problems. Central to the Wentaculus are (i) Density Matrix Realism, the idea that the quantum state of the universe is objective but can be impure, and (ii) the Initial Projection Hypothesis, a new law of nature that selects a unique initial quantum state. On the Wentaculus, the quantum state of the universe is sufficiently simple to be a law, and the arrow of time can be traced back to an exact boundary condition. It removes the intrinsic vagueness of the Past Hypothesis, eliminates the Statistical Postulate, provides a higher degree of theoretical unity, and contains a natural realization of ''strong determinism.'' I end by responding to four recent objections. In a companion paper, I elaborate on Density Matrix Realism.

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arXiv2022

Quantum Mechanics in a Time-Asymmetric Universe: On the Nature of the Initial Quantum State

In a quantum universe with a strong arrow of time, we postulate a low-entropy boundary condition (the Past Hypothesis) to account for the temporal asymmetry. In this paper, I show that the Past Hypothesis also contains enough information to simplify the quantum ontology and define a natural initial condition. First, I introduce Density Matrix Realism, the thesis that the quantum state of the universe is objective and impure. This stands in sharp contrast to Wave Function Realism, the thesis that the quantum state of the universe is objective and pure. Second, I suggest that the Past Hypothesis is sufficient to determine a natural density matrix, which is simple and unique. This is achieved by what I call the Initial Projection Hypothesis: the initial density matrix of the universe is the (normalized) projection onto the Past Hypothesis subspace (in the Hilbert space). Third, because the initial quantum state is unique and simple, we have a strong case for the Nomological Thesis: the initial quantum state of the universe is on a par with laws of nature. This new package of ideas has several interesting implications, including on the harmony between statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, theoretical unity of the universe and the subsystems, and the alleged conflict between Humean supervenience and quantum entanglement.

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arXiv2021

Surreal Decisions

Although expected utility theory has proven a fruitful and elegant theory in the finite realm, attempts to generalize it to infinite values have resulted in many paradoxes. In this paper, we argue that the use of John Conway's surreal numbers shall provide a firm mathematical foundation for transfinite decision theory. To that end, we prove a surreal representation theorem and show that our surreal decision theory respects dominance reasoning even in the case of infinite values. We then bring our theory to bear on one of the more venerable decision problems in the literature: Pascal's Wager. Analyzing the wager showcases our theory's virtues and advantages. To that end, we analyze two objections against the wager: Mixed Strategies and Many Gods. After formulating the two objections in the framework of surreal utilities and probabilities, our theory correctly predicts that (1) the pure Pascalian strategy beats all mixed strategies, and (2) what one should do in a Pascalian decision problem depends on what one's credence function is like. Our analysis therefore suggests that although Pascal's Wager is mathematically coherent, it does not deliver what it purports to, a rationally compelling argument that people should lead a religious life regardless of how confident they are in theism and its alternatives.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy (Book Review)

In this thought-provoking book, Richard Healey proposes a new interpretation of quantum theory inspired by pragmatist philosophy. Healey puts forward the interpretation as an alternative to realist quantum theories on the one hand such as Bohmian mechanics, spontaneous collapse theories, and many-worlds interpretations, which are different proposals for describing what the quantum world is like and what the basic laws of physics are, and non-realist interpretations on the other hand such as quantum Bayesianism, which proposes to understand quantum theory as describing agents' subjective epistemic states. The central idea of Healey's proposal is to understand quantum theory as providing not a description of the physical world but a set of authoritative and objectively correct prescriptions about how agents should act. The book provides a detailed development and defense of that idea, and it contains interesting discussions about a wide range of philosophical issues such as representation, probability, explanation, causation, objectivity, meaning, and fundamentality. Healey's project is at the intersection of physics and philosophy. The book is divided into two parts. Part I of the book discusses the foundational questions in quantum theory from the perspective of the prescriptive interpretation. In Part II, Healey discusses the philosophical implications of the view. Both parts are written in a way that is largely accessible to non-specialists. In this brief book review, I will focus on two questions: (1) How does Healey's idea work? (2) What reasons are there to believe in it?

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arXiv2021

The Cosmic Void

What exists at the fundamental level of reality? On the standard picture, the fundamental reality contains (among other things) fundamental matter, such as particles, fields, or even the quantum state. Non-fundamental facts are explained by facts about fundamental matter, at least in part. In this paper, I introduce a non-standard picture called the "cosmic void" in which the universe is devoid of any fundamental material ontology. Facts about tables and chairs are recovered from a special kind of laws that satisfy strong determinism. All non-fundamental facts are completely explained by nomic facts. I discuss a concrete example of this picture in a strongly deterministic version of the many-worlds theory of quantum mechanics. I discuss some philosophical and scientific challenges to this view, as well as some connections to ontological nihilism.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2021

Time's Arrow and Self-Locating Probability

One of the most difficult problems in the foundations of physics is what gives rise to the arrow of time. Since the fundamental dynamical laws of physics are (essentially) symmetric in time, the explanation for time's arrow must come from elsewhere. A promising explanation introduces a special cosmological initial condition, now called the Past Hypothesis: the universe started in a low-entropy state. Unfortunately, in a universe where there are many copies of us (in the distant "past" or the distant "future"), the Past Hypothesis is not enough; we also need to postulate self-locating (de se) probabilities. However, I show that we can similarly use self-locating probabilities to strengthen its rival -- the Fluctuation Hypothesis, leading to in-principle empirical underdetermination and radical epistemological skepticism. The underdetermination is robust in the sense that it is not resolved by the usual appeal to 'empirical coherence' or 'simplicity.' That is a serious problem for the vision of providing a completely scientific explanation of time's arrow.

physics.hist-ph↗

arXiv2021

Our Fundamental Physical Space: An Essay on the Metaphysics of the Wave Function

The mathematical structure of realist quantum theories has given rise to a debate about how our ordinary 3-dimensional space is related to the 3N-dimensional configuration space on which the wave function is defined. Which of the two spaces is our (more) fundamental physical space? I review the debate between 3N-Fundamentalists and 3D-Fundamentalists and evaluate it based on three criteria. I argue that when we consider which view leads to a deeper understanding of the physical world, especially given the deeper topological explanation from the unordered configurations to the Symmetrization Postulate, we have strong reasons in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism. I conclude that our evidence favors the view that our fundamental physical space in a quantum world is 3-dimensional rather than 3N-dimensional. I outline lines of future research where the evidential balance can be restored or reversed. Finally, I draw lessons from this case study to the debate about theoretical equivalence.

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