arXiv subjects

Edward W. Felten

Publications and source records attributed to Edward W. Felten.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

MEV Capture Through Time-Advantaged Arbitrage

As blockchains begin processing significant economic activity, the ability to include and order transactions inevitably becomes highly valuable, a concept known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). This makes effective mechanisms for transaction inclusion and ordering, and thereby the extraction of MEV, a key aspect of blockchain design. Beyond traditional approaches such as ordering in a first-come-first-serve manner or using priority fees, a recent proposal suggests auctioning off a time advantage for transaction inclusion. In this paper, we investigate this time advantage mechanism, focusing specifically on arbitrage opportunities on Automated Market Makers (AMMs), one of the largest sources of MEV today. We analyze the optimal strategy for a time-advantaged arbitrageur and compare the profits generated by various MEV extraction methods. Finally, we explore how AMMs can be adapted in the time advantage setting to capture a portion of the MEV.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2025

Economic Censorship Games in Fraud Proofs

Optimistic rollups rely on fraud proofs -- interactive protocols executed on Ethereum to resolve conflicting claims about the rollup's state -- to scale Ethereum securely. To mitigate against potential censorship of protocol moves, fraud proofs grant participants a significant time window, known as the challenge period, to ensure their moves are processed on chain. Major optimistic rollups today set this period at roughly one week, mainly to guard against strong censorship that undermines Ethereum's own crypto-economic security. However, other forms of censorship are possible, and their implication on optimistic rollup security is not well understood. This paper considers economic censorship attacks, where an attacker censors the defender's transactions by bribing block proposers. At each step, the attacker can either censor the defender -- depleting the defender's time allowance at the cost of the bribe -- or allow the current transaction through while conserving funds for future censorship. We analyze three game theoretic models of these dynamics and determine the challenge period length required to ensure the defender's success, as a function of the number of required protocol moves and the players' available budgets.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report

The first International AI Safety Report comprehensively synthesizes the current evidence on the capabilities, risks, and safety of advanced AI systems. The report was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. Thirty nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. A total of 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

BoLD: Fast and Cheap Dispute Resolution

BoLD is a new dispute resolution protocol that is designed to replace the originally deployed Arbitrum dispute resolution protocol. Unlike that protocol, BoLD is resistant to delay attacks. It achieves this resistance without a significant increase in onchain computation costs and with reduced staking costs.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

EIP-4844 Economics and Rollup Strategies

We study the economics of the Ethereum improvement proposal 4844 and its effect on rollups' data posting strategies. Rollups' cost consists of two parts: data posting and delay. In the new proposal, the data posting cost corresponds to a blob posting cost and is fixed in each block, no matter how much of the blob is utilized by the rollup. The tradeoff is clear: the rollup prefers to post a full blob, but if its transaction arrival rate is low, filling up a blob space causes too large delay cost. The first result of the paper shows that if a rollup transaction arrival rate is too low, it prefers to use the regular blockspace market for data posting, as it offers a more flexible cost structure. Second, we show that shared blob posting is not always beneficial for participating rollups and change in the aggregate blob posting cost in the equilibrium depends on the types of participating rollups. In the end, we discuss blob cost-sharing rules from an axiomatic angle.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Buying Time: Latency Racing vs. Bidding in Transaction Ordering

We design TimeBoost: a practical transaction ordering policy for rollup sequencers that takes into account both transaction timestamps and bids; it works by creating a score from timestamps and bids, and orders transactions based on this score. TimeBoost is transaction-data-independent (i.e., can work with encrypted transactions) and supports low transaction finalization times similar to a first-come first-serve (FCFS or pure-latency) ordering policy. At the same time, it avoids the inefficient latency competition created by an FCFS policy. It further satisfies useful economic properties of first-price auctions that come with a pure-bidding policy. We show through rigorous economic analyses how TimeBoost allows players to compete on arbitrage opportunities in a way that results in better guarantees compared to both pure-latency and pure-bidding approaches.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators

We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game without outside parties exists by a simple argument. We then proceed to calculate the security of the system in the mixed Nash equilibrium, as a function of the number of validators and their stake sizes. Our results provide lower and upper bounds on the optimal number of validators. More concretely, a minimal feasible number of validators minimizes the probability of failure. The framework also allows to calculate optimum stake sizes, depending on the target function. In the end, we discuss optimal design of rewards by the protocol for validators.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Efficient Rollup Batch Posting Strategy on Base Layer

We design efficient and robust algorithms for the batch posting of rollup chain calldata on the base layer chain, using tools from operations research. We relate the costs of posting and delaying, by converting them to the same units and adding them up. The algorithm that keeps the average and maximum queued number of batches tolerable enough improves the posting costs of the trivial algorithm, which posts batches immediately when they are created, by 8%. On the other hand, the algorithm that only cares moderately about the batch queue length can improve the trivial algorithm posting costs by 29%. Our findings can be used by layer two projects that post data to the base layer at some regular rate.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Watching the watchers: bias and vulnerability in remote proctoring software

Educators are rapidly switching to remote proctoring and examination software for their testing needs, both due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the expanding virtualization of the education sector. State boards are increasingly utilizing these software for high stakes legal and medical licensing exams. Three key concerns arise with the use of these complex software: exam integrity, exam procedural fairness, and exam-taker security and privacy. We conduct the first technical analysis of each of these concerns through a case study of four primary proctoring suites used in U.S. law school and state attorney licensing exams. We reverse engineer these proctoring suites and find that despite promises of high-security, all their anti-cheating measures can be trivially bypassed and can pose significant user security risks. We evaluate current facial recognition classifiers alongside the classifier used by Examplify, the legal exam proctoring suite with the largest market share, to ascertain their accuracy and determine whether faces with certain skin tones are more readily flagged for cheating. Finally, we offer recommendations to improve the integrity and fairness of the remotely proctored exam experience.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2018

A Cryptographic Escrow for Treaty Declarations and Step-by-Step Verification

The verification of arms-control and disarmament agreements requires states to provide declarations, including information on sensitive military sites and assets. There are important cases, however, where negotiations of these agreements are impeded because states are reluctant to provide any such data, because of concerns about prematurely handing over militarily significant information. To address this challenge, we present a cryptographic escrow that allows a state to make a complete declaration of sites and assets at the outset and commit to its content, but only reveal the sensitive information therein sequentially. Combined with an inspection regime, our escrow allows for step-by-step verification of the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration so that the information release and inspections keep pace with parallel diplomatic and political processes. We apply this approach to the possible denuclearization of North Korea. Such approach can be applied, however, to any agreement requiring the sharing of sensitive information.

cs.CR↗