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Ee-Chien Chang

Publications and source records attributed to Ee-Chien Chang.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Signals and Symptoms: ICS Attack Dataset From Railway Cyber Range

The prevalence of cyberattacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) has highlighted the necessity for robust security measures and incident response to protect critical infrastructure. This is prominent when Operational Technology (OT) systems undergo digital transformation by integrating with Information Technology (IT) systems to enhance operational efficiency, adaptability, and safety. To support analysts in staying abreast of emerging attack patterns, there is a need for ICS datasets that reflect indicators representative of contemporary cyber threats. To address this, we conduct two ICS cyberattack simulations to showcase the impact of trending ICS cyberattacks on a railway cyber range that resembles the railway infrastructure. The attack scenario is designed to blend trending attack trends with attack patterns observed from historical ICS incidents. The resulting evidence is collected as datasets, serving as an essential resource for cyberattack analysis. This captures key indicators that are relevant to the current threat landscape, augmenting the effectiveness of security systems and analysts to protect against ICS cyber threats.

cs.CR↗

SafeMobile: Chain-level Jailbreak Detection and Automated Evaluation for Multimodal Mobile Agents

With the wide application of multimodal foundation models in intelligent agent systems, scenarios such as mobile device control, intelligent assistant interaction, and multimodal task execution are gradually relying on such large model-driven agents. However, the related systems are also increasingly exposed to potential jailbreak risks. Attackers may induce the agents to bypass the original behavioral constraints through specific inputs, and then trigger certain risky and sensitive operations, such as modifying settings, executing unauthorized commands, or impersonating user identities, which brings new challenges to system security. Existing security measures for intelligent agents still have limitations when facing complex interactions, especially in detecting potentially risky behaviors across multiple rounds of conversations or sequences of tasks. In addition, an efficient and consistent automated methodology to assist in assessing and determining the impact of such risks is currently lacking. This work explores the security issues surrounding mobile multimodal agents, attempts to construct a risk discrimination mechanism by incorporating behavioral sequence information, and designs an automated assisted assessment scheme based on a large language model. Through preliminary validation in several representative high-risk tasks, the results show that the method can improve the recognition of risky behaviors to some extent and assist in reducing the probability of agents being jailbroken. We hope that this study can provide some valuable references for the security risk modeling and protection of multimodal intelligent agent systems.

cs.AI↗

Lie Detector: Unified Backdoor Detection via Cross-Examination Framework

Institutions with limited data and computing resources often outsource model training to third-party providers in a semi-honest setting, assuming adherence to prescribed training protocols with pre-defined learning paradigm (e.g., supervised or semi-supervised learning). However, this practice can introduce severe security risks, as adversaries may poison the training data to embed backdoors into the resulting model. Existing detection approaches predominantly rely on statistical analyses, which often fail to maintain universally accurate detection accuracy across different learning paradigms. To address this challenge, we propose a unified backdoor detection framework in the semi-honest setting that exploits cross-examination of model inconsistencies between two independent service providers. Specifically, we integrate central kernel alignment to enable robust feature similarity measurements across different model architectures and learning paradigms, thereby facilitating precise recovery and identification of backdoor triggers. We further introduce backdoor fine-tuning sensitivity analysis to distinguish backdoor triggers from adversarial perturbations, substantially reducing false positives. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves superior detection performance, improving accuracy by 5.4%, 1.6%, and 11.9% over SoTA baselines across supervised, semi-supervised, and autoregressive learning tasks, respectively. Notably, it is the first to effectively detect backdoors in multimodal large language models, further highlighting its broad applicability and advancing secure deep learning.

cs.LG↗

T-Edge: Trusted Heterogeneous Edge Computing

Heterogeneous computing, which incorporates GPUs, NPUs, and FPGAs, is increasingly utilized to improve the efficiency of computer systems. However, this shift has given rise to significant security and privacy concerns, especially when the execution platform is remote. One way to tackle these challenges is to establish a trusted and isolated environment for remote program execution, while maintaining minimal overhead and flexibility. While CPU-based trusted execution has been extensively explored and found commercial success, extension to heterogeneous computing systems remains a challenge. This paper proposes a practical trusted execution environment design for ARM/FPGA System-on-Chip platforms, leveraging TrustZone's unique characteristics. The design features a dedicated security controller within the ARM TrustZone, overseeing FPGA reconfiguration and managing communication between CPU cores and FPGA fabrics. This design involves a provisioning service that enables application users to establish trust in the FPGA fabric within cloud-based computing resources provided by the platform owner, running applications developed by third-party developers and hardware manufactured by the device manufacturer. To ensure the security of our proposed system, we employ an automated protocol verifier, ProVerif, to validate its compliance with essential security requirements. Furthermore, we demonstrate the practicality of our system model by implementing a prototype application on the Xilinx MPSoC development board.

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WFCAT: Augmenting Website Fingerprinting with Channel-wise Attention on Timing Features

Website Fingerprinting (WF) aims to deanonymize users on the Tor network by analyzing encrypted network traffic. Recent deep-learning-based attacks show high accuracy on undefended traces. However, they struggle against modern defenses that use tactics like injecting dummy packets and delaying real packets, which significantly degrade classification performance. Our analysis reveals that current attacks inadequately leverage the timing information inherent in traffic traces, which persists as a source of leakage even under robust defenses. Addressing this shortfall, we introduce a novel feature representation named the Inter-Arrival Time (IAT) histogram, which quantifies the frequencies of packet inter-arrival times across predetermined time slots. Complementing this feature, we propose a new CNN-based attack, WFCAT, enhanced with two innovative architectural blocks designed to optimally extract and utilize timing information. Our approach uses kernels of varying sizes to capture multi-scale features, which are then integrated using a weighted sum across all feature channels to enhance the model's efficacy in identifying temporal patterns. Our experiments validate that WFCAT substantially outperforms existing methods on defended traces in both closed- and open-world scenarios. Notably, WFCAT achieves over 59% accuracy against Surakav, a recently developed robust defense, marking an improvement of over 28% and 48% against the state-of-the-art attacks RF and Tik-Tok, respectively, in the closed-world scenario.

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AttacKG+:Boosting Attack Knowledge Graph Construction with Large Language Models

Attack knowledge graph construction seeks to convert textual cyber threat intelligence (CTI) reports into structured representations, portraying the evolutionary traces of cyber attacks. Even though previous research has proposed various methods to construct attack knowledge graphs, they generally suffer from limited generalization capability to diverse knowledge types as well as requirement of expertise in model design and tuning. Addressing these limitations, we seek to utilize Large Language Models (LLMs), which have achieved enormous success in a broad range of tasks given exceptional capabilities in both language understanding and zero-shot task fulfillment. Thus, we propose a fully automatic LLM-based framework to construct attack knowledge graphs named: AttacKG+. Our framework consists of four consecutive modules: rewriter, parser, identifier, and summarizer, each of which is implemented by instruction prompting and in-context learning empowered by LLMs. Furthermore, we upgrade the existing attack knowledge schema and propose a comprehensive version. We represent a cyber attack as a temporally unfolding event, each temporal step of which encapsulates three layers of representation, including behavior graph, MITRE TTP labels, and state summary. Extensive evaluation demonstrates that: 1) our formulation seamlessly satisfies the information needs in threat event analysis, 2) our construction framework is effective in faithfully and accurately extracting the information defined by AttacKG+, and 3) our attack graph directly benefits downstream security practices such as attack reconstruction. All the code and datasets will be released upon acceptance.

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Object Detectors in the Open Environment: Challenges, Solutions, and Outlook

With the emergence of foundation models, deep learning-based object detectors have shown practical usability in closed set scenarios. However, for real-world tasks, object detectors often operate in open environments, where crucial factors (e.g., data distribution, objective) that influence model learning are often changing. The dynamic and intricate nature of the open environment poses novel and formidable challenges to object detectors. Unfortunately, current research on object detectors in open environments lacks a comprehensive analysis of their distinctive characteristics, challenges, and corresponding solutions, which hinders their secure deployment in critical real-world scenarios. This paper aims to bridge this gap by conducting a comprehensive review and analysis of object detectors in open environments. We initially identified limitations of key structural components within the existing detection pipeline and propose the open environment object detector challenge framework that includes four quadrants (i.e., out-of-domain, out-of-category, robust learning, and incremental learning) based on the dimensions of the data / target changes. For each quadrant of challenges in the proposed framework, we present a detailed description and systematic analysis of the overarching goals and core difficulties, systematically review the corresponding solutions, and benchmark their performance over multiple widely adopted datasets. In addition, we engage in a discussion of open problems and potential avenues for future research. This paper aims to provide a fresh, comprehensive, and systematic understanding of the challenges and solutions associated with open-environment object detectors, thus catalyzing the development of more solid applications in real-world scenarios. A project related to this survey can be found at https://github.com/LiangSiyuan21/OEOD_Survey.

cs.CV↗

Unlearning Backdoor Threats: Enhancing Backdoor Defense in Multimodal Contrastive Learning via Local Token Unlearning

Multimodal contrastive learning has emerged as a powerful paradigm for building high-quality features using the complementary strengths of various data modalities. However, the open nature of such systems inadvertently increases the possibility of backdoor attacks. These attacks subtly embed malicious behaviors within the model during training, which can be activated by specific triggers in the inference phase, posing significant security risks. Despite existing countermeasures through fine-tuning that reduce the adverse impacts of such attacks, these defenses often degrade the clean accuracy and necessitate the construction of extensive clean training pairs. In this paper, we explore the possibility of a less-cost defense from the perspective of model unlearning, that is, whether the model can be made to quickly \textbf{u}nlearn \textbf{b}ackdoor \textbf{t}hreats (UBT) by constructing a small set of poisoned samples. Specifically, we strengthen the backdoor shortcuts to discover suspicious samples through overfitting training prioritized by weak similarity samples. Building on the initial identification of suspicious samples, we introduce an innovative token-based localized forgetting training regime. This technique specifically targets the poisoned aspects of the model, applying a focused effort to unlearn the backdoor associations and trying not to damage the integrity of the overall model. Experimental results show that our method not only ensures a minimal success rate for attacks, but also preserves the model's high clean accuracy.

cs.CV↗

On Practicality of Using ARM TrustZone Trusted Execution Environment for Securing Programmable Logic Controllers

Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are crucial devices for implementing automated control in various industrial control systems (ICS), such as smart power grids, water treatment systems, manufacturing, and transportation systems. Owing to their importance, PLCs are often the target of cyber attackers that are aiming at disrupting the operation of ICS, including the nation's critical infrastructure, by compromising the integrity of control logic execution. While a wide range of cybersecurity solutions for ICS have been proposed, they cannot counter strong adversaries with a foothold on the PLC devices, which could manipulate memory, I/O interface, or PLC logic itself. These days, many ICS devices in the market, including PLCs, run on ARM-based processors, and there is a promising security technology called ARM TrustZone, to offer a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) on embedded devices. Envisioning that such a hardware-assisted security feature becomes available for ICS devices in the near future, this paper investigates the application of the ARM TrustZone TEE technology for enhancing the security of PLC. Our aim is to evaluate the feasibility and practicality of the TEE-based PLCs through the proof-of-concept design and implementation using open-source software such as OP-TEE and OpenPLC. Our evaluation assesses the performance and resource consumption in real-world ICS configurations, and based on the results, we discuss bottlenecks in the OP-TEE secure OS towards a large-scale ICS and desired changes for its application on ICS devices. Our implementation is made available to public for further study and research.

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BadCLIP: Dual-Embedding Guided Backdoor Attack on Multimodal Contrastive Learning

Studying backdoor attacks is valuable for model copyright protection and enhancing defenses. While existing backdoor attacks have successfully infected multimodal contrastive learning models such as CLIP, they can be easily countered by specialized backdoor defenses for MCL models. This paper reveals the threats in this practical scenario that backdoor attacks can remain effective even after defenses and introduces the \emph{\toolns} attack, which is resistant to backdoor detection and model fine-tuning defenses. To achieve this, we draw motivations from the perspective of the Bayesian rule and propose a dual-embedding guided framework for backdoor attacks. Specifically, we ensure that visual trigger patterns approximate the textual target semantics in the embedding space, making it challenging to detect the subtle parameter variations induced by backdoor learning on such natural trigger patterns. Additionally, we optimize the visual trigger patterns to align the poisoned samples with target vision features in order to hinder the backdoor unlearning through clean fine-tuning. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our attack significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines (+45.3% ASR) in the presence of SoTA backdoor defenses, rendering these mitigation and detection strategies virtually ineffective. Furthermore, our approach effectively attacks some more rigorous scenarios like downstream tasks. We believe that this paper raises awareness regarding the potential threats associated with the practical application of multimodal contrastive learning and encourages the development of more robust defense mechanisms.

cs.CV↗

Semantic Mirror Jailbreak: Genetic Algorithm Based Jailbreak Prompts Against Open-source LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs), used in creative writing, code generation, and translation, generate text based on input sequences but are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, where crafted prompts induce harmful outputs. Most jailbreak prompt methods use a combination of jailbreak templates followed by questions to ask to create jailbreak prompts. However, existing jailbreak prompt designs generally suffer from excessive semantic differences, resulting in an inability to resist defenses that use simple semantic metrics as thresholds. Jailbreak prompts are semantically more varied than the original questions used for queries. In this paper, we introduce a Semantic Mirror Jailbreak (SMJ) approach that bypasses LLMs by generating jailbreak prompts that are semantically similar to the original question. We model the search for jailbreak prompts that satisfy both semantic similarity and jailbreak validity as a multi-objective optimization problem and employ a standardized set of genetic algorithms for generating eligible prompts. Compared to the baseline AutoDAN-GA, SMJ achieves attack success rates (ASR) that are at most 35.4% higher without ONION defense and 85.2% higher with ONION defense. SMJ's better performance in all three semantic meaningfulness metrics of Jailbreak Prompt, Similarity, and Outlier, also means that SMJ is resistant to defenses that use those metrics as thresholds.

cs.CL↗

VL-Trojan: Multimodal Instruction Backdoor Attacks against Autoregressive Visual Language Models

Autoregressive Visual Language Models (VLMs) showcase impressive few-shot learning capabilities in a multimodal context. Recently, multimodal instruction tuning has been proposed to further enhance instruction-following abilities. However, we uncover the potential threat posed by backdoor attacks on autoregressive VLMs during instruction tuning. Adversaries can implant a backdoor by injecting poisoned samples with triggers embedded in instructions or images, enabling malicious manipulation of the victim model's predictions with predefined triggers. Nevertheless, the frozen visual encoder in autoregressive VLMs imposes constraints on the learning of conventional image triggers. Additionally, adversaries may encounter restrictions in accessing the parameters and architectures of the victim model. To address these challenges, we propose a multimodal instruction backdoor attack, namely VL-Trojan. Our approach facilitates image trigger learning through an isolating and clustering strategy and enhance black-box-attack efficacy via an iterative character-level text trigger generation method. Our attack successfully induces target outputs during inference, significantly surpassing baselines (+62.52\%) in ASR. Moreover, it demonstrates robustness across various model scales and few-shot in-context reasoning scenarios.

cs.CV↗

Domain Bridge: Generative model-based domain forensic for black-box models

In forensic investigations of machine learning models, techniques that determine a model's data domain play an essential role, with prior work relying on large-scale corpora like ImageNet to approximate the target model's domain. Although such methods are effective in finding broad domains, they often struggle in identifying finer-grained classes within those domains. In this paper, we introduce an enhanced approach to determine not just the general data domain (e.g., human face) but also its specific attributes (e.g., wearing glasses). Our approach uses an image embedding model as the encoder and a generative model as the decoder. Beginning with a coarse-grained description, the decoder generates a set of images, which are then presented to the unknown target model. Successful classifications by the model guide the encoder to refine the description, which in turn, are used to produce a more specific set of images in the subsequent iteration. This iterative refinement narrows down the exact class of interest. A key strength of our approach lies in leveraging the expansive dataset, LAION-5B, on which the generative model Stable Diffusion is trained. This enlarges our search space beyond traditional corpora, such as ImageNet. Empirical results showcase our method's performance in identifying specific attributes of a model's input domain, paving the way for more detailed forensic analyses of deep learning models.

cs.LG↗

Improving Adversarial Transferability by Stable Diffusion

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are susceptible to adversarial examples, which introduce imperceptible perturbations to benign samples, deceiving DNN predictions. While some attack methods excel in the white-box setting, they often struggle in the black-box scenario, particularly against models fortified with defense mechanisms. Various techniques have emerged to enhance the transferability of adversarial attacks for the black-box scenario. Among these, input transformation-based attacks have demonstrated their effectiveness. In this paper, we explore the potential of leveraging data generated by Stable Diffusion to boost adversarial transferability. This approach draws inspiration from recent research that harnessed synthetic data generated by Stable Diffusion to enhance model generalization. In particular, previous work has highlighted the correlation between the presence of both real and synthetic data and improved model generalization. Building upon this insight, we introduce a novel attack method called Stable Diffusion Attack Method (SDAM), which incorporates samples generated by Stable Diffusion to augment input images. Furthermore, we propose a fast variant of SDAM to reduce computational overhead while preserving high adversarial transferability. Our extensive experimental results demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art baselines by a substantial margin. Moreover, our approach is compatible with existing transfer-based attacks to further enhance adversarial transferability.

cs.CV↗

Mostree : Malicious Secure Private Decision Tree Evaluation with Sublinear Communication

A private decision tree evaluation (PDTE) protocol allows a feature vector owner (FO) to classify its data using a tree model from a model owner (MO) and only reveals an inference result to the FO. This paper proposes Mostree, a PDTE protocol secure in the presence of malicious parties with sublinear communication. We design Mostree in the three-party honest-majority setting, where an (untrusted) computing party (CP) assists the FO and MO in the secure computation. We propose two low-communication oblivious selection (OS) protocols by exploiting nice properties of three-party replicated secret sharing (RSS) and distributed point function. Mostree combines OS protocols with a tree encoding method and three-party secure computation to achieve sublinear communication. We observe that most of the protocol components already maintain privacy even in the presence of a malicious adversary, and what remains to achieve is correctness. To ensure correctness, we propose a set of lightweight consistency checks and seamlessly integrate them into Mostree. As a result, Mostree achieves sublinear communication and malicious security simultaneously. We implement Mostree and compare it with the state-of-the-art. Experimental results demonstrate that Mostree is efficient and comparable to semi-honest PDTE schemes with sublinear communication. For instance, when evaluated on the MNIST dataset in a LAN setting, Mostree achieves an evaluation using approximately 768 ms with communication of around 168 KB.

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Using Large Language Models for Cybersecurity Capture-The-Flag Challenges and Certification Questions

The assessment of cybersecurity Capture-The-Flag (CTF) exercises involves participants finding text strings or ``flags'' by exploiting system vulnerabilities. Large Language Models (LLMs) are natural-language models trained on vast amounts of words to understand and generate text; they can perform well on many CTF challenges. Such LLMs are freely available to students. In the context of CTF exercises in the classroom, this raises concerns about academic integrity. Educators must understand LLMs' capabilities to modify their teaching to accommodate generative AI assistance. This research investigates the effectiveness of LLMs, particularly in the realm of CTF challenges and questions. Here we evaluate three popular LLMs, OpenAI ChatGPT, Google Bard, and Microsoft Bing. First, we assess the LLMs' question-answering performance on five Cisco certifications with varying difficulty levels. Next, we qualitatively study the LLMs' abilities in solving CTF challenges to understand their limitations. We report on the experience of using the LLMs for seven test cases in all five types of CTF challenges. In addition, we demonstrate how jailbreak prompts can bypass and break LLMs' ethical safeguards. The paper concludes by discussing LLM's impact on CTF exercises and its implications.

cs.AI↗

Adaptive Attractors: A Defense Strategy against ML Adversarial Collusion Attacks

In the seller-buyer setting on machine learning models, the seller generates different copies based on the original model and distributes them to different buyers, such that adversarial samples generated on one buyer's copy would likely not work on other copies. A known approach achieves this using attractor-based rewriter which injects different attractors to different copies. This induces different adversarial regions in different copies, making adversarial samples generated on one copy not replicable on others. In this paper, we focus on a scenario where multiple malicious buyers collude to attack. We first give two formulations and conduct empirical studies to analyze effectiveness of collusion attack under different assumptions on the attacker's capabilities and properties of the attractors. We observe that existing attractor-based methods do not effectively mislead the colluders in the sense that adversarial samples found are influenced more by the original model instead of the attractors as number of colluders increases. Based on this observation, we propose using adaptive attractors whose weight is guided by a U-shape curve to cover the shortfalls. Experimentation results show that when using our approach, the attack success rate of a collusion attack converges to around 15% even when lots of copies are applied for collusion. In contrast, when using the existing attractor-based rewriter with fixed weight, the attack success rate increases linearly with the number of copies used for collusion.

cs.LG↗

Mitigating Adversarial Attacks by Distributing Different Copies to Different Users

Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we consider the scenario where a model is distributed to multiple buyers, among which a malicious buyer attempts to attack another buyer. The malicious buyer probes its copy of the model to search for adversarial samples and then presents the found samples to the victim's copy of the model in order to replicate the attack. We point out that by distributing different copies of the model to different buyers, we can mitigate the attack such that adversarial samples found on one copy would not work on another copy. We observed that training a model with different randomness indeed mitigates such replication to a certain degree. However, there is no guarantee and retraining is computationally expensive. A number of works extended the retraining method to enhance the differences among models. However, a very limited number of models can be produced using such methods and the computational cost becomes even higher. Therefore, we propose a flexible parameter rewriting method that directly modifies the model's parameters. This method does not require additional training and is able to generate a large number of copies in a more controllable manner, where each copy induces different adversarial regions. Experimentation studies show that rewriting can significantly mitigate the attacks while retaining high classification accuracy. For instance, on GTSRB dataset with respect to Hop Skip Jump attack, using attractor-based rewriter can reduce the success rate of replicating the attack to 0.5% while independently training copies with different randomness can reduce the success rate to 6.5%. From this study, we believe that there are many further directions worth exploring.

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