Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Efren Lopez-Morales

Publications and source records attributed to Efren Lopez-Morales.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Stargate: Security Analysis and Mission-Aware Firewall for the CubeSat Space Protocol

The CubeSat Space Protocol (CSP) is widely used for communication in CubeSat missions, yet its security model and attack surface remain largely unexplored. In this work, we present a systematic security analysis of CSP and identify fundamental limitations in its trust assumptions, coarse-grained network abstractions, privileged management services, application command semantics, and lack of mission-context awareness. Based on these findings, we develop a taxonomy of CSP attacks spanning four classes: network identity abuse, management service abuse, application semantic abuse, and mission context abuse. We then introduce Stargate, a modular, mission-aware firewall that enforces CSP-specific policies derived from this taxonomy, including node and service authorization, command-level filtering, and mission-context constraints. We implement Stargate and evaluate it on a virtual testbed based on a real-world CubeSat mission and flight software. Stargate successfully blocks all 11 representative attacks across the four attack classes while introducing only 1.42 ms of additional median round-trip latency. Our results demonstrate that protocol- and mission-aware policy enforcement provides a practical approach for securing CSP-based spacecraft networks.

cs.CR↗

We Have All the Cards: Securing Agent Cards at the Operational Trust Boundary of the Agent2Agent Protocol

AI agent interoperability protocols enable orchestrators to discover and invoke external agents using machine-readable metadata. In the Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol, Agent Cards contain attacker-controllable natural-language fields that may influence agent selection before a provider is invoked, creating a pre-invocation trust problem. We characterize this discovery-time attack surface through a taxonomy of ten Agent Card manipulation attacks and present SECCARD, a layered validation framework combining protocol checks, deterministic analysis, and LLM-based semantic reasoning. We measure the emerging public A2A ecosystem by probing 36.1 million Internet domains and collecting 310 deployed Agent Cards. Two annotators independently label the corpus with 96.8% agreement. We then construct a 660-card real-card perturbation benchmark with matched benign controls and a 260-card synthetic adversarial benchmark spanning all ten attack categories. On controlled attacks injected into real Agent Cards, the strongest semantic judge achieves 97.0% security recall at a 1.7% false-positive rate. Across nine LLM judges on the synthetic benchmark, security recall ranges from 25.8% to 92.3%, demonstrating substantial model-dependent variation. These results show that SECCARD effectively identifies Agent Card manipulations spanning all ten discovery-time attack classes while preserving benign Agent Cards, but also reveal that its effectiveness depends critically on the choice of the underlying LLM judge.

cs.CR↗