SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Eleanor J. Murray

Publications and source records attributed to Eleanor J. Murray.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Lord's 'paradox' explained: the 50-year warning on the use of 'change scores' in observational data

In 1967, Frederick Lord posed a conundrum that has confused scientists for over half a century. Subsequently named Lord's 'paradox', the puzzle centres on the observation that two different approaches to estimating the effect of an exposure on the 'change' in an outcome can produce radically different results. Approach 1 involves comparing the mean 'change score' between exposure groups and Approach 2 involves comparing the follow-up outcome between exposure groups conditional on the baseline outcome. Resolving this puzzle starts with recognising the three reasons that a variable may change value: (A) 'endogenous change', which represents autocorrelation from baseline, (B) 'random change', which represents change from transient random processes, and (C) 'exogenous change', which represents all non-endogenous, non-random change and contains all change that is potentially modifiable by other baseline variables. In observational data, neither Approach 1 nor Approach 2 can reliably estimate the causal effect of an exposure on 'exogenous change' in an outcome. Approach 1 is susceptible to diluted or opposite-sign estimates whenever the exposure causes, or is caused by, the baseline outcome. Approach 2 is susceptible to inflated estimates due to measurement error in the baseline outcome and time-varying confounding bias when the baseline outcome is a mediator. The measurement error can be reduced with multiple measures of the baseline outcome, and the time-varying confounding can be reduced using g- methods. Lord's 'paradox' offers several enduring lessons for observational data science including the importance of a well-defined research question and the problems with analysing change scores in observational data.

stat.ME

Do LLMs Act as Repositories of Causal Knowledge?

Large language models (LLMs) offer the potential to automate a large number of tasks that previously have not been possible to automate, including some in science. There is considerable interest in whether LLMs can automate the process of causal inference by providing the information about causal links necessary to build a structural model. We use the case of confounding in the Coronary Drug Project (CDP), for which there are several studies listing expert-selected confounders that can serve as a ground truth. LLMs exhibit mediocre performance in identifying confounders in this setting, even though text about the ground truth is in their training data. Variables that experts identify as confounders are only slightly more likely to be labeled as confounders by LLMs compared to variables that experts consider non-confounders. Further, LLM judgment on confounder status is highly inconsistent across models, prompts, and irrelevant concerns like multiple-choice option ordering. LLMs do not yet have the ability to automate the reporting of causal links.

econ.EM

Shall we count the living or the dead?

In the 1958 paper "Shall we count the living or the dead?", Mindel C. Sheps proposed a principled solution to the familiar problem of asymmetry of the relative risk. We provide causal models to clarify the scope and limitations of Sheps' line of reasoning, and show that her preferred variant of the relative risk will be stable between patient groups under certain biologically interpretable conditions. Such stability is useful when findings from an intervention study must be generalized to support clinical decisions in patients whose risk profile differs from the participants in the study. We show that Sheps' approach is consistent with a substantial body of psychological and philosophical research on how human reasoners carry causal information from one context to another, and that it can be implemented in practice using van der Laan et al's Switch Relative Risk, or equivalently, using Baker and Jackson's Generalized Relative Risk Reduction (GRRR).

stat.ME

EIC (Expert Information Criterion) not AIC: the cautious biologist's guide to model selection

1.A goal of many research programs in biology is to extract meaningful insights from large, complex data sets. Researchers in Ecology, Evolution and Behavior (EEB) often grapple with long-term, observational data sets from which they construct models to address fundamental questions about biology. Similarly, epidemiologists analyze large, complex observational data sets to understand the distribution and determinants of human health and disease. A key difference in the analytical workflows for these two distinct areas of biology is delineation of data analysis tasks and explicit use of causal inference methods, widely adopted by epidemiologists. 2.Here, we review the most recent causal inference literature and describe an analytical workflow that has direct applications for EEB researchers. 3.The first half of this commentary defines four distinct analytical tasks (description, prediction, association, and causal inference), and the corresponding approaches to data analysis and model selection. The latter half is dedicated to walking the reader through the steps of casual inference, focusing on examples from EEB. 4.Given increasing interest in causal inference and common misperceptions regarding the task of causal inference, we aim to facilitate an exchange of ideas between disciplinary silos and provide a framework for analyses of all data, though particularly relevant for observational data.

q-bio.QM

Guidelines for estimating causal effects in pragmatic randomized trials

Pragmatic randomized trials are designed to provide evidence for clinical decision-making rather than regulatory approval. Common features of these trials include the inclusion of heterogeneous or diverse patient populations in a wide range of care settings, the use of active treatment strategies as comparators, unblinded treatment assignment, and the study of long-term, clinically relevant outcomes. These features can greatly increase the usefulness of the trial results for patients, clinicians, and other stakeholders. However, these features also introduce an increased risk of non-adherence, which reduces the value of the intention-to-treat effect as a patient-centered measure of causal effect. In these settings, the per-protocol effect provides useful complementary information for decision making. Unfortunately, there is little guidance for valid estimation of the per-protocol effect. Here, we present our full guidelines for analyses of pragmatic trials that will result in more informative causal inferences for both the intention-to-treat effect and the per-protocol effect.

stat.ME