arXiv subjects

Elena Inarra

Publications and source records attributed to Elena Inarra.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2023

Solidarity to achieve stability

Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2022

Effects of heterogeneity on cancer: a game theory perspective

In this study, we explore interactions between cancer cells by using the hawk-dove game. We analyze the heterogeneity of tumors by considering games with populations composed of 2 or 3 types of cells. We determine what strategies are evolutionarily stable in the 2-type and 3-type population games and the corresponding expected payoffs. Our results show that the payoff of the best-off cell in the 2-type population game is higher than that of the best-off cell in the 3-type population game. Translating these mathematical findings to the field of oncology suggests that a branching-type tumor pursues a less aggressive course than a punctuated-type one. Some histological and genomic data of clear cell renal cell carcinomas are consistent with these results.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2020

A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games

Given a standard myopic dynamic process among coalition structures, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of such structures that is never left once entered through that process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a "reduced form" of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments.

econ.TH↗