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Eleonora Kreacic

Publications and source records attributed to Eleonora Kreacic.

6 recordsLinked to original sources

Privacy-Aware Time Series Synthesis via Public Knowledge Distillation

Sharing sensitive time series data in domains such as finance, healthcare, and energy consumption, such as patient records or investment accounts, is often restricted due to privacy concerns. Privacy-aware synthetic time series generation addresses this challenge by enforcing noise during training, inherently introducing a trade-off between privacy and utility. In many cases, sensitive sequences is correlated with publicly available, non-sensitive contextual metadata (e.g., household electricity consumption may be influenced by weather conditions and electricity prices). However, existing privacy-aware data generation methods often overlook this opportunity, resulting in suboptimal privacy-utility trade-offs. In this paper, we present Pub2Priv, a novel framework for generating private time series data by leveraging heterogeneous public knowledge. Our model employs a self-attention mechanism to encode public data into temporal and feature embeddings, which serve as conditional inputs for a diffusion model to generate synthetic private sequences. Additionally, we introduce a practical metric to assess privacy by evaluating the identifiability of the synthetic data. Experimental results show that Pub2Priv consistently outperforms state-of-the-art benchmarks in improving the privacy-utility trade-off across finance, energy, and commodity trading domains.

cs.LG

Distributionally and Adversarially Robust Logistic Regression via Intersecting Wasserstein Balls

Adversarially robust optimization (ARO) has emerged as the *de facto* standard for training models that hedge against adversarial attacks in the test stage. While these models are robust against adversarial attacks, they tend to suffer severely from overfitting. To address this issue, some successful methods replace the empirical distribution in the training stage with alternatives including *(i)* a worst-case distribution residing in an ambiguity set, resulting in a distributionally robust (DR) counterpart of ARO; *(ii)* a mixture of the empirical distribution with a distribution induced by an auxiliary (*e.g.*, synthetic, external, out-of-domain) dataset. Inspired by the former, we study the Wasserstein DR counterpart of ARO for logistic regression and show it admits a tractable convex optimization reformulation. Adopting the latter setting, we revise the DR approach by intersecting its ambiguity set with another ambiguity set built using the auxiliary dataset, which offers a significant improvement whenever the Wasserstein distance between the data generating and auxiliary distributions can be estimated. We study the underlying optimization problem, develop efficient solution algorithms, and demonstrate that the proposed method outperforms benchmark approaches on standard datasets.

math.OC

Decentralized Convergence to Equilibrium Prices in Trading Networks

We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. in 2013. Prior work has established that fully-substitutable preferences guarantee the existence of competitive equilibria which can be centrally computed. Our motivation comes from the fact that prices in markets such as over-the-counter markets and used car markets arise from decentralized negotiation among agents, which has left open an important question as to whether equilibrium prices can emerge from agent-to-agent bilateral negotiations. We design a best response dynamic intended to capture such negotiations between market participants. We assume fully substitutable preferences for market participants. In this setting, we provide proofs of convergence for sparse markets (covering many real world markets of interest), and experimental results for more general cases, demonstrating that prices indeed reach equilibrium, quickly, via bilateral negotiations. Our best response dynamic, and its convergence behavior, forms an important first step in understanding how decentralized markets reach, and retain, equilibrium.

cs.GT

Learning Payment-Free Resource Allocation Mechanisms

We consider the design of mechanisms that allocate limited resources among self-interested agents using neural networks. Unlike the recent works that leverage machine learning for revenue maximization in auctions, we consider welfare maximization as the key objective in the payment-free setting. Without payment exchange, it is unclear how we can align agents' incentives to achieve the desired objectives of truthfulness and social welfare simultaneously, without resorting to approximations. Our work makes novel contributions by designing an approximate mechanism that desirably trade-off social welfare with truthfulness. Specifically, (i) we contribute a new end-to-end neural network architecture, ExS-Net, that accommodates the idea of "money-burning" for mechanism design without payments; (ii)~we provide a generalization bound that guarantees the mechanism performance when trained under finite samples; and (iii) we provide an experimental demonstration of the merits of the proposed mechanism.

cs.GT

Guarding Multiple Secrets: Enhanced Summary Statistic Privacy for Data Sharing

Data sharing enables critical advances in many research areas and business applications, but it may lead to inadvertent disclosure of sensitive summary statistics (e.g., means or quantiles). Existing literature only focuses on protecting a single confidential quantity, while in practice, data sharing involves multiple sensitive statistics. We propose a novel framework to define, analyze, and protect multi-secret summary statistics privacy in data sharing. Specifically, we measure the privacy risk of any data release mechanism by the worst-case probability of an attacker successfully inferring summary statistic secrets. Given an attacker's objective spanning from inferring a subset to the entirety of summary statistic secrets, we systematically design and analyze tailored privacy metrics. Defining the distortion as the worst-case distance between the original and released data distribution, we analyze the tradeoff between privacy and distortion. Our contribution also includes designing and analyzing data release mechanisms tailored for different data distributions and secret types. Evaluations on real-world data demonstrate the effectiveness of our mechanisms in practical applications.

cs.CR

Sequential Fair Resource Allocation under a Markov Decision Process Framework

We study the sequential decision-making problem of allocating a limited resource to agents that reveal their stochastic demands on arrival over a finite horizon. Our goal is to design fair allocation algorithms that exhaust the available resource budget. This is challenging in sequential settings where information on future demands is not available at the time of decision-making. We formulate the problem as a discrete time Markov decision process (MDP). We propose a new algorithm, SAFFE, that makes fair allocations with respect to the entire demands revealed over the horizon by accounting for expected future demands at each arrival time. The algorithm introduces regularization which enables the prioritization of current revealed demands over future potential demands depending on the uncertainty in agents' future demands. Using the MDP formulation, we show that SAFFE optimizes allocations based on an upper bound on the Nash Social Welfare fairness objective, and we bound its gap to optimality with the use of concentration bounds on total future demands. Using synthetic and real data, we compare the performance of SAFFE against existing approaches and a reinforcement learning policy trained on the MDP. We show that SAFFE leads to more fair and efficient allocations and achieves close-to-optimal performance in settings with dense arrivals.

cs.LG