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Elham Pourabbas Vafa

Publications and source records attributed to Elham Pourabbas Vafa.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Structured Claim-Level Discourse Representations for Dense Health Narratives

Health discourse in social media videos often contains densely entangled claims spanning multiple thematic aspects, stances, evidential frames, and rhetorical functions within short conversational spans. Existing approaches largely rely on coarse topic-level, sentiment-based, or stance-oriented representations that do not adequately capture this structure. Our analysis identifies an average of 13.22 atomic claims per minute, motivating richer claim-level discourse representations. We introduce a structured framework for claim-level discourse analysis in dense health narratives. Our framework models discourse through tuples linking atomic claims with thematic aspects, stance, and multidimensional pragmatic discourse attributes. To support this setting, we construct a benchmark spanning four health domains with 1,191 manually annotated claims from 60 videos. Using this framework, we evaluate automated structured discourse analysis under different discourse context settings. Results show that current LLMs achieve strong performance on thematic categorization and stance prediction, but struggle with high-dimensional pragmatic profiling. We also find that different discourse tasks benefit from different forms of contextual reasoning, suggesting that future systems may require task decomposition and specialized inference strategies.

cs.CL

Context-Aware Spear Phishing: Generative AI-Enabled Attacks Against Individuals via Public Social Media Data

We demonstrate how publicly available social-media data and generative AI (GenAI) can be misused to automate and scale highly personalized, context-aware spear-phishing campaigns. With minimal attacker effort, a small amount of public activity per target is sufficient for GenAI models to extract interests and contextual cues, producing persuasive messages that mirror a target's style while bypassing generic content-moderation safeguards. We introduce a modular framework that combines multimodal signal extraction, communication-style profiling, and attack-type instantiation across seven strategies (baiting, scareware, honey trap, tailgating, impersonation, quid pro quo, and personalized emotional exploitation). We conduct a large-scale, multi-model evaluation covering thousands of generated emails and eight security-relevant criteria, benchmarking against a corpus of real-world phishing messages. The GenAI-produced emails exhibit markedly higher personalization, contextual grounding, and persuasive leverage. Importantly, a complementary user study corroborates these results, revealing that LLM-generated attacks consistently outperform APWG eCrimeX emails across eight dimensions while eliciting lower suspicion among human recipients. Finally, we measure and analyze the behavior of existing proactive, prompt-level defense mechanisms, which incorporate adaptive mechanisms, as well as two complementary defense approaches-policy-augmented SOTA safeguard models and system-instruction chain-of-thought moderation. We document how these defenses respond to contextualized and adaptive attack prompts, underscoring the need for platform-level safeguards that explicitly account for contextualized abuse at scale.

cs.CR

DarkGram: A Large-Scale Analysis of Cybercriminal Activity Channels on Telegram

We present the first large-scale analysis of 339 cybercriminal activity channels (CACs). Followed by over 23.8 million users, these channels share a wide array of malicious and unethical content with their subscribers, including compromised credentials, pirated software and media, social media manipulation tools, and blackhat hacking resources such as malware, exploit kits, and social engineering scams. To evaluate these channels, we developed DarkGram, a BERT-based framework that automatically identifies malicious posts from the CACs with an accuracy of 96%. Using DarkGram, we conducted a quantitative analysis of 53,605 posts shared on these channels between February and May 2024, revealing key characteristics of the content. While much of this content is distributed for free, channel administrators frequently employ strategies such as promotions and giveaways to engage users and boost the sales of premium cybercriminal content. Interestingly, these channels sometimes pose significant risks to their own subscribers. Notably, 28.1% of the links shared in these channels contained phishing attacks, and 38% of executable files were bundled with malware. Analyzing how subscribers consume and positively react to the shared content paints a dangerous picture of the perpetuation of cybercriminal content at scale. We also found that the CACs can evade scrutiny or platform takedowns by quickly migrating to new channels with minimal subscriber loss, highlighting the resilience of this ecosystem. To counteract this, we utilized DarkGram to detect emerging channels and reported malicious content to Telegram and affected organizations. This resulted in the takedown of 196 channels over three months. Our findings underscore the urgent need for coordinated efforts to combat the growing threats posed by these channels. To aid this effort, we open-source our dataset and the DarkGram framework.

cs.CR