arXiv subjects

Elias Fernandez Domingos

Publications and source records attributed to Elias Fernandez Domingos.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Trust or Check? Understanding the (Evolutionary) Dynamics of User Trust in AI Systems

As the capabilities and adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems grow, trust in these AI systems is an increasingly urgent concern. Much research has focused on models of AI governance and has primarily examined incentives for safe development and effective regulation. Hence they typically represented users trust as a one-shot adoption choice rather than as a dynamic, evolving process shaped by repeated interactions. We instead model trust as the dynamic choice of reduced monitoring in a repeated, asymmetric interaction between users and AI developers, where checking developers' behaviour is costly. Using evolutionary game theory, we study how users' strategies of trust and developers' strategies of providing safe (compliant) or unsafe (non-compliant) AI co-evolve under different levels of monitoring cost and institutional regimes. We conduct the analysis on both imitation-based and learning-based perspectives, with the stochastic finite-population dynamics, the infinite-population replicator analysis and the reinforcement learning analysis. We find three robust long-run regimes: no adoption by users while developers provide unsafe AI, unsafe but widely adopted systems, and safe systems that are widely adopted. Only the last is desirable, and it arises when penalties for unsafe behaviour exceed the extra cost of safety and users can still afford to monitor at least occasionally. Our results formally support governance proposals that emphasise transparency, low-cost monitoring, and meaningful sanctions, and they show that neither regulation alone nor blind user trust is sufficient to prevent the drift towards unsafe or low-adoption outcomes.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Humans Are More Diverse: Frontier LLMs Show Extreme Policies in Idealised AI Development Races

An AI development race creates a multi-agent safety dilemma. Each company can develop slowly and safely, or move faster while taking a risk that may remove its final reward. We use this repeated game to study strategic safety behaviour among large language model (LLM) agents in races with two to five players. However, a valid action does not show that an agent understands the game. We therefore place an audit gate before behavioural interpretation. We first verify the game engine, then test rule recall, state tracking, payoff calculation, and stability under different but equivalent task descriptions. We then compare LLM action sequences with an evolutionary game-theory benchmark and published human data, and explore differences across models, risk conditions, personas, and two- to five-player races. The audit shows that strong rule recall can coexist with weak state tracking and expected-payoff calculation. Providing verified arithmetic and changing the response representation can also change later actions, even when the game rules stay fixed. Across seven tested model endpoints, aggregate rates hide large differences in action sequences, responses to opponents, and responses to race position. Patterns across the tested three- to five-player races are also model-specific rather than a single effect of adding competitors. These results show why multi-agent AI-race simulations need validity checks and trajectory-level analysis before their outputs are described as strategic, human-like, or safety-aware. Our findings are exploratory and apply only to the tested models, prompts, and decoding settings.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Improving Cross-Cultural Survey Simulation with Calibrated Value Personas

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human opinions and survey responses, but their ability to reproduce population responses across cultures remains limited. Existing persona-based prompting methods typically rely on sociodemographic or personality traits, which are only indirect proxies for the values that shape human responses. We propose a value-based persona construction method that derives textual descriptors from survey responses capturing core cultural dimensions. By sampling value profiles from target populations and aggregating LLM responses across personas, we obtain population-level predictions grounded in observed value distributions. We further introduce a calibration procedure that improves response diversity while preserving estimated opinions. We show that our approach reduces prediction error across countries, with the largest improvements observed in underrepresented populations. This substantially narrows the performance gap between countries aligned with dominant LLM priors and those that are less represented in training data, while also yielding response distributions that closely match human diversity.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Can Media Act as a Soft Regulator of Safe AI Development? A Game Theoretical Analysis

When developers of artificial intelligence (AI) products need to decide between profit and safety for the users, they likely choose profit. Untrustworthy AI technology must come packaged with tangible negative consequences. Here, we envisage those consequences as the loss of reputation caused by media coverage of their misdeeds, disseminated to the public. We explore whether media coverage has the potential to push AI creators into the production of safe products, enabling widespread adoption of AI technology. We created artificial populations of self-interested creators and users and studied them through the lens of evolutionary game theory. Our results reveal that media is indeed able to foster cooperation between creators and users, but not always. Cooperation does not evolve if the quality of the information provided by the media is not reliable enough, or if the costs of either accessing media or ensuring safety are too high. By shaping public perception and holding developers accountable, media emerges as a powerful soft regulator -- guiding AI safety even in the absence of formal government oversight.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Evolution favours positively biased reasoning in sequential interactions with high future gains

Empirical evidence shows that human behaviour often deviates from game-theoretical rationality. For instance, humans may hold unrealistic expectations about future outcomes. As the evolutionary roots of such biases remain unclear, we investigate here how reasoning abilities and cognitive biases co-evolve using Evolutionary Game Theory. In our model, individuals in a population deploy a variety of unbiased and biased level-k reasoning strategies to anticipate others' behaviour in sequential interactions, represented by the Incremental Centipede Game. Positively biased reasoning strategies have a systematic inference bias towards higher but uncertain rewards, while negatively biased strategies reflect the opposite tendency. We find that selection consistently favours positively biased reasoning, with rational behaviour even going extinct. This bias co-evolves with bounded rationality, as the reasoning depth remains limited in the population. Interestingly, positively biased agents may co-exist with non-reasoning agents, thus pointing to a novel equilibrium. Longer games further promote positively biased reasoning, as they can lead to higher future rewards. The biased reasoning strategies proposed in this model may reflect cognitive phenomena like wishful thinking and defensive pessimism. This work therefore supports the claim that certain cognitive biases, despite deviating from rational judgment, constitute an adaptive feature to better cope with social dilemmas.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2025

Do LLMs trust AI regulation? Emerging behaviour of game-theoretic LLM agents

There is general agreement that fostering trust and cooperation within the AI development ecosystem is essential to promote the adoption of trustworthy AI systems. By embedding Large Language Model (LLM) agents within an evolutionary game-theoretic framework, this paper investigates the complex interplay between AI developers, regulators and users, modelling their strategic choices under different regulatory scenarios. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is used to quantitatively model the dilemmas faced by each actor, and LLMs provide additional degrees of complexity and nuances and enable repeated games and incorporation of personality traits. Our research identifies emerging behaviours of strategic AI agents, which tend to adopt more "pessimistic" (not trusting and defective) stances than pure game-theoretic agents. We observe that, in case of full trust by users, incentives are effective to promote effective regulation; however, conditional trust may deteriorate the "social pact". Establishing a virtuous feedback between users' trust and regulators' reputation thus appears to be key to nudge developers towards creating safe AI. However, the level at which this trust emerges may depend on the specific LLM used for testing. Our results thus provide guidance for AI regulation systems, and help predict the outcome of strategic LLM agents, should they be used to aid regulation itself.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Media and responsible AI governance: a game-theoretic and LLM analysis

This paper investigates the complex interplay between AI developers, regulators, users, and the media in fostering trustworthy AI systems. Using evolutionary game theory and large language models (LLMs), we model the strategic interactions among these actors under different regulatory regimes. The research explores two key mechanisms for achieving responsible governance, safe AI development and adoption of safe AI: incentivising effective regulation through media reporting, and conditioning user trust on commentariats' recommendation. The findings highlight the crucial role of the media in providing information to users, potentially acting as a form of "soft" regulation by investigating developers or regulators, as a substitute to institutional AI regulation (which is still absent in many regions). Both game-theoretic analysis and LLM-based simulations reveal conditions under which effective regulation and trustworthy AI development emerge, emphasising the importance of considering the influence of different regulatory regimes from an evolutionary game-theoretic perspective. The study concludes that effective governance requires managing incentives and costs for high quality commentaries.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Trust AI Regulation? Discerning users are vital to build trust and effective AI regulation

There is general agreement that some form of regulation is necessary both for AI creators to be incentivised to develop trustworthy systems, and for users to actually trust those systems. But there is much debate about what form these regulations should take and how they should be implemented. Most work in this area has been qualitative, and has not been able to make formal predictions. Here, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be used to quantitatively model the dilemmas faced by users, AI creators, and regulators, and provide insights into the possible effects of different regulatory regimes. We show that creating trustworthy AI and user trust requires regulators to be incentivised to regulate effectively. We demonstrate the effectiveness of two mechanisms that can achieve this. The first is where governments can recognise and reward regulators that do a good job. In that case, if the AI system is not too risky for users then some level of trustworthy development and user trust evolves. We then consider an alternative solution, where users can condition their trust decision on the effectiveness of the regulators. This leads to effective regulation, and consequently the development of trustworthy AI and user trust, provided that the cost of implementing regulations is not too high. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the effect of different regulatory regimes from an evolutionary game theoretic perspective.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Mitigating Biases in Collective Decision-Making: Enhancing Performance in the Face of Fake News

Individual and social biases undermine the effectiveness of human advisers by inducing judgment errors which can disadvantage protected groups. In this paper, we study the influence these biases can have in the pervasive problem of fake news by evaluating human participants' capacity to identify false headlines. By focusing on headlines involving sensitive characteristics, we gather a comprehensive dataset to explore how human responses are shaped by their biases. Our analysis reveals recurring individual biases and their permeation into collective decisions. We show that demographic factors, headline categories, and the manner in which information is presented significantly influence errors in human judgment. We then use our collected data as a benchmark problem on which we evaluate the efficacy of adaptive aggregation algorithms. In addition to their improved accuracy, our results highlight the interactions between the emergence of collective intelligence and the mitigation of participant biases.

cs.HC↗