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Elina van Kempen

Publications and source records attributed to Elina van Kempen.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Let My Data Go: Data Brokers' Compliance with Opt-Out and Deletion Requests

Data brokers are a largely American phenomenon. They collect vast amounts of personal information about most adult U.S. consumers, mainly without the latter's knowledge or consent. Accumulated data can be sold to anyone, including employers, landlords, insurance agencies, banks, governments (local, state, federal, and even foreign), as well as various malicious actors. This, in turn, enables discrimination, surveillance, identity theft, and stalking. Recent regulations -- such as the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) modeled after EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) -- were introduced to bolster consumer privacy, e.g., the rights to: (1) opt-out of the sharing or selling one's personal information, (2) delete one's personal information, and (3) obtain a copy of that information. However, exercising these rights is not easy, as shown by our comprehensive study of the data broker ecosystem. We submitted both opt-out and deletion requests (using synthetic consumer identities) under the CCPA to all California-registered data brokers and investigated their responses and lack thereof. While the majority seem to be compliant, a significant fraction is not and many failed to reply to (and/or acknowledge) consumer requests. Furthermore, some data brokers require intrusive consumer identity verification in order to exercise one's opt-out rights, which is explicitly disallowed by the CCPA. There is also great disparity in the request submission process among data brokers as well as an extremely heavy (time and effort) overall consumer burden. This motivates an urgent need for streamlining and standardization of the consumer interface, stronger enforcement, and meaningful consequences for (especially sustained) non-compliance.

cs.CR

Consumer Beware! Exploring Data Brokers' CCPA Compliance

Data brokers collect and sell the personal information of millions of individuals, often without their knowledge or consent. The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) grants consumers the legal right to request access to, or deletion of, their data. To facilitate these requests, California maintains an official registry of data brokers. However, the extent to which these entities comply with the law is unclear. This paper presents the first large-scale, systematic study of CCPA compliance of all 543 officially registered data brokers. Data access requests were manually submitted to each broker, followed by in-depth analyses of their responses (or lack thereof). Above 40% failed to respond at all, in an apparent violation of the CCPA. Data brokers that responded requested personal information as part of their identity verification process, including details they had not previously collected. Paradoxically, this means that exercising one's privacy rights under CCPA introduces new privacy risks. Our findings reveal rampant non-compliance and lack of standardization of the data access request process. These issues highlight an urgent need for stronger enforcement, clearer guidelines, and standardized, periodic compliance checks to enhance consumers' privacy protections and improve data broker accountability.

cs.CR

FedPoP: Federated Learning Meets Proof of Participation

Federated learning (FL) offers privacy preserving, distributed machine learning, allowing clients to contribute to a global model without revealing their local data. As models increasingly serve as monetizable digital assets, the ability to prove participation in their training becomes essential for establishing ownership. In this paper, we address this emerging need by introducing FedPoP, a novel FL framework that allows nonlinkable proof of participation while preserving client anonymity and privacy without requiring either extensive computations or a public ledger. FedPoP is designed to seamlessly integrate with existing secure aggregation protocols to ensure compatibility with real-world FL deployments. We provide a proof of concept implementation and an empirical evaluation under realistic client dropouts. In our prototype, FedPoP introduces 0.97 seconds of per-round overhead atop securely aggregated FL and enables a client to prove its participation/contribution to a model held by a third party in 0.0612 seconds. These results indicate FedPoP is practical for real-world deployments that require auditable participation without sacrificing privacy.

cs.CR

LISA: LIghtweight single-server Secure Aggregation with a public source of randomness

Secure Aggregation (SA) is a key component of privacy-friendly federated learning applications, where the server learns the sum of many user-supplied gradients, while individual gradients are kept private. State-of-the-art SA protocols protect individual inputs with zero-sum random shares that are distributed across users, have a per-user overhead that is logarithmic in the number of users, and take more than 5 rounds of interaction. In this paper, we introduce LISA, an SA protocol that leverages a source of public randomness to minimize per-user overhead and the number of rounds. In particular, LISA requires only two rounds and has a communication overhead that is asymptotically equal to that of a non-private protocol -- one where inputs are provided to the server in the clear -- for most of the users. In a nutshell, LISA uses public randomness to select a subset of the users -- a committee -- that aid the server to recover the aggregated input. Users blind their individual contributions with randomness shared with each of the committee members; each committee member provides the server with an aggregate of the randomness shared with each user. Hence, as long as one committee member is honest, the server cannot learn individual inputs but only the sum of threshold-many inputs. We compare LISA with state-of-the-art SA protocols both theoretically and by means of simulations and present results of our experiments. We also integrate LISA in a Federated Learning pipeline and compare its performance with a non-private protocol.

cs.CR