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Elvis Yeboah-Duako

Publications and source records attributed to Elvis Yeboah-Duako.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

When Apps Outlive Vendors: Security Implications of IoT Abandonware

As the Internet of Things (IoT) market continues to expand, many companion apps are being published in app stores, raising security concerns for those whose vendors have abandoned support. Even after vendors discontinue support, such applications frequently remain operational on users' mobile devices, continue to interface with users' IoT devices and collect user data without receiving security updates. This leaves known and newly discovered vulnerabilities unmitigated, increasing risks of remote exploitation, unauthorized device access, and prolonged data misuse. We define these abandoned applications as "IoT abandonware" and present the first large-scale measurement study of the security risks associated with discontinued applications. We analyze 61,500 IoT companion Android applications that had not been updated for at least two years or were no longer in service as of March 2025. From decompiled binaries, we extracted latent and embedded resources (e.g., bundled libraries, domain names, and permissions), and assessed their security implications. First, we identify outdated dependencies with post-abandonment CVE reports and discover domains vulnerable to takeover or data exfiltration. Second, we perform static data-flow analysis to trace how sensitive data, inferred from the extracted permissions, propagates to broken or hijackable external endpoints. We found that persistent analytics and third-party trackers continue aggregating user data and device telemetry long after vendor control lapses, creating data flows that adversaries can redirect or abuse. Overall, we identified security risks in 73.6% of our dataset, with 30 of the top 1,000 most-installed apps sending data to broken external endpoints.

cs.CR↗

Permissions on the Loose: Measuring Overprivilege in Real-World Serverless Applications

Serverless computing has seen rapid adoption in cloud deployments, yet the security implications of its service-oriented programming model remain poorly understood. Distributed, modular, and heterogeneous applications complicate the specification of precise security policies. Role-based access control solutions such as Identity and Access Management (IAM) already exhibit pervasive misconfiguration problems, and the multiplicity of functions, services, and resources in serverless applications, together with frequent permission model changes by cloud providers, greatly increases the likelihood of policy misconfigurations. Consequently, policies are often overprivileged, thereby enlarging the attack surface and exposing sensitive cloud resources to compromise. We present a large-scale measurement study of overprivilege in real-world serverless applications, analyzing a curated dataset of 789 AWS Lambda applications comprised of 1,293 functions. To enable this study, we develop PrivLess, a static policy analysis framework that extracts function-to-resource interactions from application source code, derives an interaction-permission mapping, and reconciles inferred interactions with declared policies to quantify overprivilege. Our measurement reveals that overprivilege is systemic and severe across the serverless ecosystem: 47.7% of applications carry excess permissions with a significant privilege reduction potential of 99.65%. Applications with wildcard-defined permissions exhibited an average overprivilege ratio 274x higher than those without. More critically, the excess permissions enable concrete attack vectors: 18.8% of applications hold unnecessary Privilege Escalation capabilities, and 12 applications had Defense Evasion permissions they did not need.

cs.CR↗