arXiv subjects

Emanuele Ratti

Publications and source records attributed to Emanuele Ratti.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

What Can Artificial Intelligence Learn from Medicine? Generative Analogies and Reliable Machine Learning Systems

In the past few years, machine learning (ML) has been widely (and to an extent, successfully) implemented in medicine. However, uncertainties surrounding ML have made it difficult to establish the bases of its epistemic and methodological warrants. In the literature, a parallel has been drawn between medicine and ML, suggesting that we should model epistemic and methodological standards for ML on the standards of clinical translation. By developing tools from Hesse work, we characterise the nature of this parallel as a generative analogy between the process of clinical translation and the process of building ML systems. We identify more precisely the epistemic and methodological warrants of clinical translation that are typically only mentioned when appealing to the analogy, and we show in which sense such warrants apply analogically to the context of ML. In particular, we interpret warrants of clinical translation in reliabilist terms, and we show how this can inform a new form of ML reliabilism, which is distinct from (though compatible with) existing reliabilist accounts in philosophy of AI.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Epistemic Control and the Normativity of Machine Learning-Based Science

The past few years have witnessed an increasing use of machine learning (ML) systems in science. Paul Humphreys has argued that, because of specific characteristics of ML systems, human scientists are pushed out of the loop of science. In this chapter, I investigate to what extent this is true. First, I express these concerns in terms of what I call epistemic control. I identify two conditions for epistemic control, called tracking and tracing, drawing on works in philosophy of technology. With this new understanding of the problem, I then argue against Humphreys pessimistic view. Finally, I construct a more nuanced view of epistemic control in ML-based science.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Machine Learning and Theory Ladenness -- A Phenomenological Account

We provide an analysis of theory ladenness in machine learning in science, where "theory", that we call "domain theory", refers to the domain knowledge of the scientific discipline where ML is used. By constructing an account of ML models based on a comparison with phenomenological models, we show, against recent trends in philosophy of science, that ML model-building is mostly indifferent to domain theory, even if the model remains theory laden in a weak sense, which we call theory infection. These claims, we argue, have far-reaching consequences for the transferability of ML across scientific disciplines, and shift the priorities of the debate on theory ladenness in ML from descriptive to normative.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Three Kinds of AI Ethics

There is an overwhelming abundance of works in AI Ethics. This growth is chaotic because of how sudden it is, its volume, and its multidisciplinary nature. This makes difficult to keep track of debates, and to systematically characterize goals, research questions, methods, and expertise required by AI ethicists. In this article, I show that the relation between AI and ethics can be characterized in at least three ways, which correspond to three well-represented kinds of AI ethics: ethics and AI; ethics in AI; ethics of AI. I elucidate the features of these three kinds of AI Ethics, characterize their research questions, and identify the kind of expertise that each kind needs. I also show how certain criticisms to AI ethics are misplaced, as being done from the point of view of one kind of AI ethics, to another kind with different goals. All in all, this work sheds light on the nature of AI ethics, and sets the groundwork for more informed discussions about the scope, methods, and training of AI ethicists.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

A Capability Approach to AI Ethics

We propose a conceptualization and implementation of AI ethics via the capability approach. We aim to show that conceptualizing AI ethics through the capability approach has two main advantages for AI ethics as a discipline. First, it helps clarify the ethical dimension of AI tools. Second, it provides guidance to implementing ethical considerations within the design of AI tools. We illustrate these advantages in the context of AI tools in medicine, by showing how ethics-based auditing of AI tools in medicine can greatly benefit from our capability-based approach.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

What do we teach to engineering students: embedded ethics, morality, and politics

In the past few years, calls for integrating ethics modules in engineering curricula have multiplied. Despite this positive trend, a number of issues with these embedded programs remains. First, learning goals are underspecified. A second limitation is the conflation of different dimensions under the same banner, in particular confusion between ethics curricula geared towards addressing the ethics of individual conduct and curricula geared towards addressing ethics at the societal level. In this article, we propose a tripartite framework to overcome these difficulties. Our framework analytically decomposes an ethics module into three dimensions. First, there is the ethical dimension, which pertains to the learning goals. Second, there is the moral dimension, which addresses the moral relevance of engineers conduct. Finally, there is the political dimension, which scales up issues of moral relevance at the civic level. All in all, our framework has two advantages. First, it provides analytic clarity, i.e. it enables course instructors to locate ethical dilemmas in either the moral or political realm and to make use of the tools and resources from moral and political philosophy. Second, it depicts a comprehensive ethical training, which enables students to both reason about moral issues in the abstract, and to socially contextualize potential solutions.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Character comes from practice: longitudinal practice-based ethics training in data science

In this chapter, we propose a non-traditional RCR training in data science that is grounded into a virtue theory framework. First, we delineate the approach in more theoretical detail, by discussing how the goal of RCR training is to foster the cultivation of certain moral abilities. We specify the nature of these abilities: while the ideal is the cultivation of virtues, the limited space allowed by RCR modules can only facilitate the cultivation of superficial abilities or proto-virtues, which help students to familiarize with moral and political issues in the data science environment. Third, we operationalize our approach by stressing that (proto-)virtue acquisition (like skill acquisition) occurs through the technical and social tasks of daily data science activities, where these repetitive tasks provide the opportunities to develop (proto-)virtue capacity and to support the development of ethically robust data systems. Finally, we discuss a concrete example of how this approach has been implemented. In particular, we describe how this method is applied to teach data ethics to students participating in the CODATA-RDA Data Science Summer Schools.

cs.CY↗