arXiv subjects

Emily Adlam

Publications and source records attributed to Emily Adlam.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Against Many Worlds

Any viable interpretation of quantum theory needs to account for the Born rule, from which the theory gets its probabilistic empirical predictions. In this paper, we give an overview of possible approaches to this problem in the context of the Many Worlds interpretation. We argue that, for structural reasons, none of them can possibly succeed. More precisely, we argue that the Many Worlds interpretation must obtain the Born rule by proceeding either axiomatically, deductively, or inductively, and that all three of these approaches run into general, fundamental obstructions.

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arXiv2026

What Do Black Holes Teach Us About Wigner's Friend?

Recently, Hausmann and Renner have pointed out that several famous paradoxes relating to black holes have a similar character to various Extended Wigner's Friend paradoxes. In this paper I consider what the connection between these things could teach us about the Wigner's Friend scenarios. I argue that if we take the analogy between these cases seriously, the black hole paradoxes appear to favour a certain class of response to the Wigner's Friend scenario - specifically, those which posit intrinsic relationality, rather than effective and emergent relationality, and also those which posit some kind of retrocausality.

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arXiv2026

Why does the wavefunction 'collapse' in relational approaches to quantum mechanics?

I argue that there is a straightforward way to understand the occurrence of wavefunction collapses or 'quantum events' in relational approaches to quantum mechanics: we necessarily encounter a discontinuity in our description when a system interacts with the reference relative to which we are describing it, since the reference system cannot be described relative to itself. This makes it clear how recent concerns around quantum events in relational quantum mechanics should be resolved. However, the solution requires accepting that quantum mechanics is not a complete description of all physical facts, and moreover I argue that this is most likely inevitable if we want to be able to give a precise description of quantum events.

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arXiv2025

Wigner's Frame

This article suggests that thinking about the role of reference frames can provide new insight into Extended Wigner's Friend scenarios. This involves appealing to symmetries to make a principled distinction between properties of a system which are meaningful only relative to an external reference system and properties which are meaningful without further relativization. Thus we may propose that there are always well-defined facts about what observers have observed, but there are not necessarily well-defined facts about the relations between their reference frames, so there will not always exist a joint distribution over their outcomes which can meaningfully be compared to the predictions of quantum mechanics. In addition, this approach also offers a general argument against the idea that there should be a regress of relativization.

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arXiv2025

Relational Observables, Quiddities, and Structural Realism

In this article, I argue that modern spacetime physics causes problems for a number of traditional accounts of modality, but also offers important new ideas about the connection between modal and non-modal features of reality. I suggest that recent work on relational observables in general relativity and quantum gravity can help us understand how non-modal features of reality could arise from modal features of reality within some form of modal ontic structural realism. In particular, I argue that the notion of an `internal view,' as employed in the partial/complete observables formalism and the quantum reference frame formalism, is an important conceptual insight which can help address outstanding problems in the philosophy of lawhood and modality.

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arXiv2025

What Kind of Relationality does Quantum Mechanics Exhibit?

In this article I elaborate on the approach to relational quantum mechanics suggested by Adlam and Rovelli (2023). I suggest that this approach fills an important gap in the spectrum of relational approaches, because it posits that the relational aspects of quantum mechanics are both inherent and dynamical. I compare this approach to Orthodox RQM, arguing that it has a number of advantages, and I show how some possible objections can be resolved.

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arXiv2024

Moderate Physical Perspectivalism

Recent developments in foundations of physics have given rise to a class of views suggesting that physically meaningful descriptions must always be relativized to a physical perspective. In this article I distinguish between strong physical perspectivalism, which maintains that all facts must be relativized to a perspective, and moderate physical perspectivalism, which maintains that all empirically meaningful descriptions must be relativized to a perspective. I argue that both scientific evidence and philosophical considerations support moderate physical perspectivalism over strong physical perspectivalism. In particular, motivations connected to epistemic humility and the social nature of science are more compatible with the moderate approach.

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arXiv2024

How do we Observe Relational Observables?

In theories with a diffeomorphism symmetry, such as general relativity and canonical quantum gravity, it is often proposed that the empirical content is encoded in relational observables. But how do relational observables actually make contact with experience? I argue that this question can only be answered by providing a schematization of the observer which is appropriate for the context of a diffeomorphism-invariant theory. I suggest that this may require us to move away from a `passive awareness' conception of consciousness towards a more agential conception, because there is a clear sense in which an embodied agent must experience herself as localised at a time. Finally, I consider what this means for the prospects of using quantum reference frames to address the problem of time, arguing that the way in which quantum reference frames are standardly described does not give us adequate resources to model agency, so some other kind of internal reference frame may be required to fully explain how we observe relational observables in the quantum context.

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arXiv2024

Against Self-Location

I distinguish between pure self-locating credences and superficially self-locating credences, and argue that there is never any rationally compelling way to assign pure self-locating credences. I first argue that from a practical point of view, pure self-locating credences simply encode our pragmatic goals, and thus pragmatic rationality does not dictate how they must be set. I then use considerations motivated by Bertrand's paradox to argue that the indifference principle and other popular constraints on self-locating credences fail to be a priori principles of epistemic rationality, and I critique some approaches to deriving self-locating credences based on analogies to non-self-locating cases. Finally, I consider the implications of this conclusion for various applications of self-locating probabilities in scientific contexts, arguing that it may undermine certain kinds of reasoning about multiverses, the simulation hypothesis, and Boltzmann brains.

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arXiv2024

Quantum Field Theory and the Limits of Reductionism

I suggest that the current situation in quantum field theory (QFT) provides some reason to question the universal validity of ontological reductionism. I argue that the renormalization group flow is reversible except at fixed points, which makes the relation between large and small distance scales quite symmetric in QFT, opening up at least the technical possibility of a non-reductionist approach to QFT. I suggest that some conceptual problems encountered within QFT may potentially be mitigated by moving to an alternative picture in which it is no longer the case that the large supervenes on the small. Finally, I explore some specific models in which a form of non-reductionism might be implemented, and consider the prospects for future development of these models.

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arXiv2024

How are Entanglement Entropies Related to Entropy Bounds?

In this paper we seek to understand what current knowledge of entanglement entropies suggests about the appropriate way to interpret the covariant entropy bound. We first begin by arguing that just as in the classical case, a universal bound on the von Neumann entropy could have either an epistemic or ontological origin. We then consider several possible ways of explaining the bound as a consequence of features of the entanglement entropy. We discuss consider area laws in condensed matter and quantum field theory, arguing that they suggest an epistemic reading of the bound. We also discuss the 'spacetime from entanglement' programme, arguing that entanglement alone may not be able to full ground spacetime topology, but it could potentially play a role in determining the spacetime metric, in which case it would potentially support a more ontological reading of the bound.

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arXiv2024

The Combination Problem for Relational Quantum Mechanics

This article uses the existing literature on the panpsychist combination problem as a starting point to think about how to address a structurally similar combination problem in relational quantum mechanics. I note some similarities and differences between the two problems, and I consider various proposed solutions to the panpsychist problem, assessing the prospects for a similar solution in the context of RQM. I argue that overall the prospects for solving RQM's combination problem look better for RQM with cross-perspective links than for orthodox versions of RQM.

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arXiv2023

Time and event symmetry in quantum mechanics

We investigate two types of temporal symmetry in quantum mechanics. The first type, time symmetry, refers to the inclusion of opposite time orientations on an equivalent physical footing. The second, event symmetry, refers to the inclusion of all time instants in a history sequence on an equivalent physical footing. We find that recent time symmetric interpretations of quantum mechanics fail to respect event symmetry. Building on the recent fixed-point formulation (FPF) of quantum theory, we formulate the notion of an event precisely as a fixed point constraint on the Keldysh time contour. Then, considering a sequence of measurement events in time, we show that both time and event symmetry can be retained in this multiple-time formulation of quantum theory. We then use this model to resolve conceptual paradoxes with time symmetric quantum mechanics within an `all-at-once', atemporal picture.

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arXiv2023

Taxonomy for Physics Beyond Quantum Mechanics

We propose terminology to classify interpretations of quantum mechanics and models that modify or complete quantum mechanics. Our focus is on models which have previously been referred to as superdeterministic (strong or weak), retrocausal (with or without signalling, dynamical or non-dynamical), future-input-dependent, atemporal and all-at-once, not always with the same meaning or context. Sometimes these models are assumed to be deterministic, sometimes not, the word deterministic has been given different meanings, and different notions of causality have been used when classifying them. This has created much confusion in the literature, and we hope that the terms proposed here will help to clarify the nomenclature. The general model framework that we will propose may also be useful to classify other interpretations and modifications of quantum mechanics. This document grew out of the discussions at the 2022 Bonn Workshop on Superdeterminism and Retrocausality.

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arXiv2023

What Does '(Non)-Absoluteness of Observed Events' Mean?

Recently there have emerged an assortment of theorems relating to the 'absoluteness of emerged events,' and these results have sometimes been used to argue that quantum mechanics may involve some kind of metaphysically radical non-absoluteness, such as relationalism or perspectivalism. However, in our view a close examination of these theorems fails to convincingly support such possibilities. In this paper we argue that the Wigner's friend paradox, the theorem of Bong et al and the theorem of Lawrence et al are all best understood as demonstrating that if quantum mechanics is universal, and if certain auxiliary assumptions hold, then the world inevitably includes various forms of 'disaccord,' but this need not be interpreted in a metaphysically radical way; meanwhile, the theorem of Ormrod and Barrett is best understood either as an argument for an interpretation allowing multiple outcomes per observer, such as the Everett approach, or as a proof that quantum mechanics cannot be universal in the sense relevant for this theorem. We also argue that these theorems taken together suggest interesting possibilities for a different kind of relational approach in which dynamical states are relativized whilst observed events are absolute, and we show that although something like 'retrocausality' might be needed to make such an approach work, this would be a very special kind of retrocausality which would evade a number of common objections against retrocausality. We conclude that the non-absoluteness theorems may have a significant role to play in helping converge towards an acceptable solution to the measurement problem.

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arXiv2023

Disappearing Without a Trace: The Arrows of Time in Kent's Solution to the Lorentzian Quantum Reality Problem

Most existing proposals to explain the temporal asymmetries we see around us are sited within an approach to physics based on time evolution, and thus they typically put the asymmetry in at the beginning of time in the form of a special initial state. But there may be other possibilities for explaining temporal asymmetries if we don't presuppose the time evolution paradigm. In this article, we explore one such possibility, based on Kent's `final-measurement' interpretation of quantum mechanics. We argue that this approach potentially has the resources to explain the electromagnetic asymmetry, the thermodynamic asymmetry, the coarse-graining asymmetry, the fork asymmetry, the record asymmetry, and the cosmological asymmetry, and that the explanations it offers may potentially be better than explanations appealing to a special initial state. Our hope is that this example will encourage further exploration of novel approaches to temporal asymmetry outside of the time evolution paradigm.

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arXiv2023

Are Entropy Bounds Epistemic?

Entropy bounds have played an important role in the development of holography as an approach to quantum gravity, so in this article we seek to gain a better understanding of the covariant entropy bound. We observe that there is a possible way of thinking about the covariant entropy bound which would suggest that it encodes an epistemic limitation rather than an objective count of the true number of degrees of freedom on a light-sheet; thus we distinguish between ontological and epistemic interpretations of the covariant bound. We consider the consequences that these interpretations might have for physics and we discuss what each approach has to say about gravitational phenomena. Our aim is not to advocate for either the ontological or epistemic approach in particular, but rather to articulate both possibilities clearly and explore some arguments for and against them.

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arXiv2023

Do We Have Any Viable Solution to the Measurement Problem?

Wallace (2022) has recently argued that a number of popular approaches to the measurement problem can't be fully extended to relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory; Wallace thus contends that as things currently stand, only the unitary-only approaches to the measurement problem are viable. However, the unitary-only approaches face serious epistemic problems which may threaten their viability as solutions, and thus we consider that it remains an urgent outstanding problem to find a viable solution to the measurement problem which can be extended to relativistic quantum mechanics. In this article we seek to understand in general terms what such a thing might look like. We argue that in order to avoid serious epistemic problems, the solution must be a single-world realist approach, and we further argue that any single-world realist approach which is able to reproduce the predictions of relativistic quantum mechanics will most likely have the property that our observable reality does not supervene on dynamical, precisely-defined microscopic beables. Thus we suggest three possible routes for further exploration: observable reality could be approximate and emergent, as in relational quantum mechanics with the addition of cross-perspective links, or observable reality could supervene on beables which are not microscopically defined, as in the consistent histories approach, or observable reality could supervene on beables which are not dynamical, as in Kent's solution to the Lorentzian classical reality problem. We conclude that once all of these issues are taken into account, the options for a viable solution to the measurement problem are significantly narrowed down.

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