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Emmanouil Papadogiannakis

Publications and source records attributed to Emmanouil Papadogiannakis.

8 recordsLinked to original sources

COBRA: A Content-Agnostic Framework for Zero-Day Detection of Suspicious Domains

The use of malicious domains is central to cyberattacks such as phishing, malware distribution, impersonation, and fraudulent transactions. Because domains are inexpensive to register and easy to deploy at scale, they remain one of the most common and damaging tools used in cybercrime across industries. Proactive detection is essential to reducing this window of vulnerability and preventing harm to users. In this work, we propose COBRA: a content-agnostic, registration-time detection framework for identifying and analyzing suspicious domains from day zero. Our approach does not rely on any content-based features, allowing us to classify a domain even before it is populated with content. We analyze the names of newly registered domains and employ a clustering technique to group them based on lexical and structural similarity. We evaluate our methodology using real-world data consisting of 1.5M newly created domains, demonstrating that COBRA detects suspicious domains with a precision of 98.5%, identifying more than 47K distinct newly registered suspicious domains. Furthermore, our results show that domain-name clustering enables accurate early detection, allowing us to identify 80% of suspicious or malicious domains earlier than one of the most widely used threat-intelligence services, which in some cases may require up to 7 days.

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Paid to Look Like Truth: The Prevalence and Dark Patterns of Advertorials in News Outlets

Advertorials represent a marketing strategy where advertisements are designed to resemble the style and tone of editorial content. Despite their appearance, they are, in fact, paid content intended to promote a product, brand or service. Studies indicate that advertorials are more effective (81%) and less intrusive than traditional banner ads or pop-ups. Despite regulatory efforts for clear disclosure of paid content, concerns persist about the deceptive nature of advertorials. Advertorials can mislead readers into believing that they are consuming unbiased editorial content. In doing so, they gain undeserved legitimacy, by draping themselves in the credibility of the publication's design. In this study, we conduct the first systematic large-scale study of advertorials. We propose a novel automated methodology for detecting problematic advertorials in the wild, and collect 186K ad URLs over a period of 5 months. We investigate their prevalence and explore their structural and linguistic characteristics, finding that advertorials appear in 1 out of 3 news websites, including popular and credible outlets (e.g., The Guardian, EuroNews, CNN). Additionally, they often exhibit behavior associated with malicious practices and deliberately obscure or make legal disclaimers difficult to recognize, preventing users from identifying the promotional nature of the content.

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Before & After: The Effect of EU's 2022 Code of Practice on Disinformation

Over the past few years, the European Commission has made significant steps to reduce disinformation in cyberspace. One of those steps has been the introduction of the 2022 "Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation". Signed by leading online platforms, this Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation is an attempt to combat disinformation on the Web. The Code of Practice includes a variety of measures including the demonetization of disinformation, urging, for example, advertisers "to avoid the placement of advertising next to Disinformation content". In this work, we set out to explore what was the impact of the Code of Practice and especially to explore to what extent ad networks continue to advertise on dis-/mis-information sites. We perform a historical analysis and find that, although at a hasty glance things may seem to be improving, there is really no significant reduction in the amount of advertising relationships among popular misinformation websites and major ad networks. In fact, we show that ad networks have withdrawn mostly from unpopular misinformation websites with very few visitors, but still form relationships with highly unreliable websites that account for the majority of misinformation traffic. To make matters worse, we show that ad networks continue to place advertisements of legitimate companies next to misinformation content. We show that major ad networks place ads in almost 400 misinformation websites in our dataset.

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Welcome to the Dark Side: Analyzing the Revenue Flows of Fraud in the Online Ad Ecosystem

The online advertising market has recently reached the 500 billion dollar mark. To accommodate the need to match a user with the highest bidder at a fraction of a second, it has moved towards a complex, automated and often opaque model that involves numerous agents and intermediaries. Stimulated by the lack of transparency, but also the enormous potential profits, bad actors have found ways to circumvent restrictions, and generate substantial revenue that can support websites with objectionable or even illegal content. In this work, we evaluate transparency Web standards and show how shady actors take advantage of gaps to absorb ad revenues while putting the brand safety of advertisers in danger. We collect and study a large corpus of thousands of websites and show how ad transparency standards can be abused by bad actors to obscure ad revenue flows. We show how identifier pooling can redirect ad revenues from reputable domains to notorious domains serving objectionable content, and that the phenomenon is underestimated by previous studies by a factor of 15. Finally, we publish a Web monitoring service that enhances the transparency of supply chains and business relationships between publishers and ad networks.

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I Know What You Bought Last Summer: Investigating User Data Leakage in E-Commerce Platforms

In the digital age, e-commerce has transformed the way consumers shop, offering convenience and accessibility. Nevertheless, concerns about the privacy and security of personal information shared on these platforms have risen. In this work, we investigate user privacy violations, noting the risks of data leakage to third-party entities. Utilizing a semi-automated data collection approach, we examine a selection of popular online e-shops, revealing that nearly 30% of them violate user privacy by disclosing personal information to third parties. We unveil how minimal user interaction across multiple e-commerce websites can result in a comprehensive privacy breach. We observe significant data-sharing patterns with platforms like Facebook, which use personal information to build user profiles and link them to social media accounts.

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Who Funds Misinformation? A Systematic Analysis of the Ad-related Profit Routines of Fake News sites

Fake news is an age-old phenomenon, widely assumed to be associated with political propaganda published to sway public opinion. Yet, with the growth of social media, it has become a lucrative business for Web publishers. Despite many studies performed and countermeasures proposed, unreliable news sites have increased in the last years their share of engagement among the top performing news sources. Stifling fake news impact depends on our efforts in limiting the (economic) incentives of fake news producers. In this paper, we aim at enhancing the transparency around these exact incentives, and explore: Who supports the existence of fake news websites via paid ads, either as an advertiser or an ad seller? Who owns these websites and what other Web business are they into? We are the first to systematize the auditing process of fake news revenue flows. We identify the companies that advertise in fake news websites and the intermediary companies responsible for facilitating those ad revenues. We study more than 2,400 popular news websites and show that well-known ad networks, such as Google and IndexExchange, have a direct advertising relation with more than 40% of fake news websites. Using a graph clustering approach on 114.5K sites, we show that entities who own fake news sites, also operate other types of websites pointing to the fact that owning a fake news website is part of a broader business operation.

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User Tracking in the Post-cookie Era: How Websites Bypass GDPR Consent to Track Users

During the past few years, mostly as a result of the GDPR and the CCPA, websites have started to present users with cookie consent banners. These banners are web forms where the users can state their preference and declare which cookies they would like to accept, if such option exists. Although requesting consent before storing any identifiable information is a good start towards respecting the user privacy, yet previous research has shown that websites do not always respect user choices. Furthermore, considering the ever decreasing reliance of trackers on cookies and actions browser vendors take by blocking or restricting third-party cookies, we anticipate a world where stateless tracking emerges, either because trackers or websites do not use cookies, or because users simply refuse to accept any. In this paper, we explore whether websites use more persistent and sophisticated forms of tracking in order to track users who said they do not want cookies. Such forms of tracking include first-party ID leaking, ID synchronization, and browser fingerprinting. Our results suggest that websites do use such modern forms of tracking even before users had the opportunity to register their choice with respect to cookies. To add insult to injury, when users choose to raise their voice and reject all cookies, user tracking only intensifies. As a result, users' choices play very little role with respect to tracking: we measured that more than 75% of tracking activities happened before users had the opportunity to make a selection in the cookie consent banner, or when users chose to reject all cookies.

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Leveraging Google's Publisher-specific IDs to Detect Website Administration

Digital advertising is the most popular way for content monetization on the Internet. Publishers spawn new websites, and older ones change hands with the sole purpose of monetizing user traffic. In this ever-evolving ecosystem, it is challenging to effectively answer questions such as: Which entities monetize what websites? What categories of websites does an average entity typically monetize on and how diverse are these websites? How has this website administration ecosystem changed across time? In this paper, we propose a novel, graph-based methodology to detect administration of websites on the Web, by exploiting the ad-related publisher-specific IDs. We apply our methodology across the top 1 million websites and study the characteristics of the created graphs of website administration. Our findings show that approximately 90% of the websites are associated each with a single publisher, and that small publishers tend to manage less popular websites. We perform a historical analysis of up to 8 million websites, and find a new, constantly rising number of (intermediary) publishers that control and monetize traffic from hundreds of websites, seeking a share of the ad-market pie. We also observe that over time, websites tend to move from big to smaller administrators.

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