arXiv subjects

Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis

Publications and source records attributed to Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis.

35 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2023

The Computational Complexity of Multi-player Concave Games and Kakutani Fixed Points

Kakutani's Fixed Point theorem is a fundamental theorem in topology with numerous applications in game theory and economics. Computational formulations of Kakutani exist only in special cases and are too restrictive to be useful in reductions. In this paper, we provide a general computational formulation of Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem and we prove that it is PPAD-complete. As an application of our theorem we are able to characterize the computational complexity of the following fundamental problems: (1) Concave Games. Introduced by the celebrated works of Debreu and Rosen in the 1950s and 60s, concave $n$-person games have found many important applications in Economics and Game Theory. We characterize the computational complexity of finding an equilibrium in such games. We show that a general formulation of this problem belongs to PPAD, and that finding an equilibrium is PPAD-hard even for a rather restricted games of this kind: strongly-concave utilities that can be expressed as multivariate polynomials of a constant degree with axis aligned box constraints. (2) Walrasian Equilibrium. Using Kakutani's fixed point Arrow and Debreu we resolve an open problem related to Walras's theorem on the existence of price equilibria in general economies. There are many results about the PPAD-hardness of Walrasian equilibria, but the inclusion in PPAD is only known for piecewise linear utilities. We show that the problem with general convex utilities is in PPAD. Along the way we provide a Lipschitz continuous version of Berge's maximum theorem that may be of independent interest.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2023

Smoothed Complexity of SWAP in Local Graph Partitioning

We give the first quasipolynomial upper bound $ϕn^{\text{polylog}(n)}$ for the smoothed complexity of the SWAP algorithm for local Graph Partitioning (also known as Bisection Width), where $n$ is the number of nodes in the graph and $ϕ$ is a parameter that measures the magnitude of perturbations applied on its edge weights. More generally, we show that the same quasipolynomial upper bound holds for the smoothed complexity of the 2-FLIP algorithm for any binary Maximum Constraint Satisfaction Problem, including local Max-Cut, for which similar bounds were only known for $1$-FLIP. Our results are based on an analysis of cycles formed in long sequences of double flips, showing that it is unlikely for every move in a long sequence to incur a positive but small improvement in the cut weight.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2023

Towards convergence to Nash equilibria in two-team zero-sum games

Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games. Formally, two-team zero-sum games are defined as multi-player games where players are split into two competing sets of agents, each experiencing a utility identical to that of their teammates and opposite to that of the opposing team. We focus on the solution concept of Nash equilibria (NE). We first show that computing NE for this class of games is $\textit{hard}$ for the complexity class ${\mathrm{CLS}}$. To further examine the capabilities of online learning algorithms in games with full-information feedback, we propose a benchmark of a simple -- yet nontrivial -- family of such games. These games do not enjoy the properties used to prove convergence for relevant algorithms. In particular, we use a dynamical systems perspective to demonstrate that gradient descent-ascent, its optimistic variant, optimistic multiplicative weights update, and extra gradient fail to converge (even locally) to a Nash equilibrium. On a brighter note, we propose a first-order method that leverages control theory techniques and under some conditions enjoys last-iterate local convergence to a Nash equilibrium. We also believe our proposed method is of independent interest for general min-max optimization.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

On the convergence of policy gradient methods to Nash equilibria in general stochastic games

Learning in stochastic games is a notoriously difficult problem because, in addition to each other's strategic decisions, the players must also contend with the fact that the game itself evolves over time, possibly in a very complicated manner. Because of this, the convergence properties of popular learning algorithms - like policy gradient and its variants - are poorly understood, except in specific classes of games (such as potential or two-player, zero-sum games). In view of this, we examine the long-run behavior of policy gradient methods with respect to Nash equilibrium policies that are second-order stationary (SOS) in a sense similar to the type of sufficiency conditions used in optimization. Our first result is that SOS policies are locally attracting with high probability, and we show that policy gradient trajectories with gradient estimates provided by the REINFORCE algorithm achieve an $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{n})$ distance-squared convergence rate if the method's step-size is chosen appropriately. Subsequently, specializing to the class of deterministic Nash policies, we show that this rate can be improved dramatically and, in fact, policy gradient methods converge within a finite number of iterations in that case.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

First-Order Algorithms for Min-Max Optimization in Geodesic Metric Spaces

From optimal transport to robust dimensionality reduction, a plethora of machine learning applications can be cast into the min-max optimization problems over Riemannian manifolds. Though many min-max algorithms have been analyzed in the Euclidean setting, it has proved elusive to translate these results to the Riemannian case. Zhang et al. [2022] have recently shown that geodesic convex concave Riemannian problems always admit saddle-point solutions. Inspired by this result, we study whether a performance gap between Riemannian and optimal Euclidean space convex-concave algorithms is necessary. We answer this question in the negative-we prove that the Riemannian corrected extragradient (RCEG) method achieves last-iterate convergence at a linear rate in the geodesically strongly-convex-concave case, matching the Euclidean result. Our results also extend to the stochastic or non-smooth case where RCEG and Riemanian gradient ascent descent (RGDA) achieve near-optimal convergence rates up to factors depending on curvature of the manifold.

math.OC↗

arXiv2022

Efficiently Computing Nash Equilibria in Adversarial Team Markov Games

Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully competitive or cooperative scenarios or impose strong assumptions that are difficult to meet in most practical applications. In this work, we depart from those prior results by investigating infinite-horizon \emph{adversarial team Markov games}, a natural and well-motivated class of games in which a team of identically-interested players -- in the absence of any explicit coordination or communication -- is competing against an adversarial player. This setting allows for a unifying treatment of zero-sum Markov games and Markov potential games, and serves as a step to model more realistic strategic interactions that feature both competing and cooperative interests. Our main contribution is the first algorithm for computing stationary $ε$-approximate Nash equilibria in adversarial team Markov games with computational complexity that is polynomial in all the natural parameters of the game, as well as $1/ε$. The proposed algorithm is particularly natural and practical, and it is based on performing independent policy gradient steps for each player in the team, in tandem with best responses from the side of the adversary; in turn, the policy for the adversary is then obtained by solving a carefully constructed linear program. Our analysis leverages non-standard techniques to establish the KKT optimality conditions for a nonlinear program with nonconvex constraints, thereby leading to a natural interpretation of the induced Lagrange multipliers. Along the way, we significantly extend an important characterization of optimal policies in adversarial (normal-form) team games due to Von Stengel and Koller (GEB `97).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Near-Optimal Statistical Query Lower Bounds for Agnostically Learning Intersections of Halfspaces with Gaussian Marginals

We consider the well-studied problem of learning intersections of halfspaces under the Gaussian distribution in the challenging \emph{agnostic learning} model. Recent work of Diakonikolas et al. (2021) shows that any Statistical Query (SQ) algorithm for agnostically learning the class of intersections of $k$ halfspaces over $\mathbb{R}^n$ to constant excess error either must make queries of tolerance at most $n^{-\tildeΩ(\sqrt{\log k})}$ or must make $2^{n^{Ω(1)}}$ queries. We strengthen this result by improving the tolerance requirement to $n^{-\tildeΩ(\log k)}$. This lower bound is essentially best possible since an SQ algorithm of Klivans et al. (2008) agnostically learns this class to any constant excess error using $n^{O(\log k)}$ queries of tolerance $n^{-O(\log k)}$. We prove two variants of our lower bound, each of which combines ingredients from Diakonikolas et al. (2021) with (an extension of) a different earlier approach for agnostic SQ lower bounds for the Boolean setting due to Dachman-Soled et al. (2014). Our approach also yields lower bounds for agnostically SQ learning the class of "convex subspace juntas" (studied by Vempala, 2010) and the class of sets with bounded Gaussian surface area; all of these lower bounds are nearly optimal since they essentially match known upper bounds from Klivans et al. (2008).

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

On the Approximation Power of Two-Layer Networks of Random ReLUs

This paper considers the following question: how well can depth-two ReLU networks with randomly initialized bottom-level weights represent smooth functions? We give near-matching upper- and lower-bounds for $L_2$-approximation in terms of the Lipschitz constant, the desired accuracy, and the dimension of the problem, as well as similar results in terms of Sobolev norms. Our positive results employ tools from harmonic analysis and ridgelet representation theory, while our lower-bounds are based on (robust versions of) dimensionality arguments.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Survival of the strictest: Stable and unstable equilibria under regularized learning with partial information

In this paper, we examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. For concreteness, we focus on the archetypal follow the regularized leader (FTRL) family of algorithms, and we consider the full spectrum of uncertainty that the players may encounter - from noisy, oracle-based feedback, to bandit, payoff-based information. In this general context, we establish a comprehensive equivalence between the stability of a Nash equilibrium and its support: a Nash equilibrium is stable and attracting with arbitrarily high probability if and only if it is strict (i.e., each equilibrium strategy has a unique best response). This equivalence extends existing continuous-time versions of the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory to a bona fide algorithmic learning setting, and it provides a clear refinement criterion for the prediction of the day-to-day behavior of no-regret learning in games

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Solving Min-Max Optimization with Hidden Structure via Gradient Descent Ascent

Many recent AI architectures are inspired by zero-sum games, however, the behavior of their dynamics is still not well understood. Inspired by this, we study standard gradient descent ascent (GDA) dynamics in a specific class of non-convex non-concave zero-sum games, that we call hidden zero-sum games. In this class, players control the inputs of smooth but possibly non-linear functions whose outputs are being applied as inputs to a convex-concave game. Unlike general zero-sum games, these games have a well-defined notion of solution; outcomes that implement the von-Neumann equilibrium of the "hidden" convex-concave game. We prove that if the hidden game is strictly convex-concave then vanilla GDA converges not merely to local Nash, but typically to the von-Neumann solution. If the game lacks strict convexity properties, GDA may fail to converge to any equilibrium, however, by applying standard regularization techniques we can prove convergence to a von-Neumann solution of a slightly perturbed zero-sum game. Our convergence guarantees are non-local, which as far as we know is a first-of-its-kind type of result in non-convex non-concave games. Finally, we discuss connections of our framework with generative adversarial networks.

math.OC↗

arXiv2020

Optimal Private Median Estimation under Minimal Distributional Assumptions

We study the fundamental task of estimating the median of an underlying distribution from a finite number of samples, under pure differential privacy constraints. We focus on distributions satisfying the minimal assumption that they have a positive density at a small neighborhood around the median. In particular, the distribution is allowed to output unbounded values and is not required to have finite moments. We compute the exact, up-to-constant terms, statistical rate of estimation for the median by providing nearly-tight upper and lower bounds. Furthermore, we design a polynomial-time differentially private algorithm which provably achieves the optimal performance. At a technical level, our results leverage a Lipschitz Extension Lemma which allows us to design and analyze differentially private algorithms solely on appropriately defined "typical" instances of the samples.

math.ST↗

arXiv2020

No-regret learning and mixed Nash equilibria: They do not mix

Understanding the behavior of no-regret dynamics in general $N$-player games is a fundamental question in online learning and game theory. A folk result in the field states that, in finite games, the empirical frequency of play under no-regret learning converges to the game's set of coarse correlated equilibria. By contrast, our understanding of how the day-to-day behavior of the dynamics correlates to the game's Nash equilibria is much more limited, and only partial results are known for certain classes of games (such as zero-sum or congestion games). In this paper, we study the dynamics of "follow-the-regularized-leader" (FTRL), arguably the most well-studied class of no-regret dynamics, and we establish a sweeping negative result showing that the notion of mixed Nash equilibrium is antithetical to no-regret learning. Specifically, we show that any Nash equilibrium which is not strict (in that every player has a unique best response) cannot be stable and attracting under the dynamics of FTRL. This result has significant implications for predicting the outcome of a learning process as it shows unequivocally that only strict (and hence, pure) Nash equilibria can emerge as stable limit points thereof.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Reconstructing weighted voting schemes from partial information about their power indices

A number of recent works [Goldberg 2006; O'Donnell and Servedio 2011; De, Diakonikolas, and Servedio 2017; De, Diakonikolas, Feldman, and Servedio 2014] have considered the problem of approximately reconstructing an unknown weighted voting scheme given information about various sorts of ``power indices'' that characterize the level of control that individual voters have over the final outcome. In the language of theoretical computer science, this is the problem of approximating an unknown linear threshold function (LTF) over $\{-1, 1\}^n$ given some numerical measure (such as the function's $n$ ``Chow parameters,'' a.k.a. its degree-1 Fourier coefficients, or the vector of its $n$ Shapley indices) of how much each of the $n$ individual input variables affects the outcome of the function. In this paper we consider the problem of reconstructing an LTF given only partial information about its Chow parameters or Shapley indices; i.e. we are given only the Chow parameters or the Shapley indices corresponding to a subset $S \subseteq [n]$ of the $n$ input variables. A natural goal in this partial information setting is to find an LTF whose Chow parameters or Shapley indices corresponding to indices in $S$ accurately match the given Chow parameters or Shapley indices of the unknown LTF. We refer to this as the Partial Inverse Power Index Problem. Our main results are a polynomial time algorithm for the ($\varepsilon$-approximate) Chow Parameters Partial Inverse Power Index Problem and a quasi-polynomial time algorithm for the ($\varepsilon$-approximate) Shapley Indices Partial Inverse Power Index Problem.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Smoothed complexity of local Max-Cut and binary Max-CSP

We show that the smoothed complexity of the FLIP algorithm for local Max-Cut is at most $\smash{ϕn^{O(\sqrt{\log n})}}$, where $n$ is the number of nodes in the graph and $ϕ$ is a parameter that measures the magnitude of perturbations applied on its edge weights. This improves the previously best upper bound of $ϕn^{O(\log n)}$ by Etscheid and Röglin. Our result is based on an analysis of long sequences of flips, which shows~that~it is very unlikely for every flip in a long sequence to incur a positive but small improvement in the cut weight. We also extend the same upper bound on the smoothed complexity of FLIP to all binary Maximum Constraint Satisfaction Problems.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2019

Pattern Search Multidimensional Scaling

We present a novel view of nonlinear manifold learning using derivative-free optimization techniques. Specifically, we propose an extension of the classical multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) method, where instead of performing gradient descent, we sample and evaluate possible "moves" in a sphere of fixed radius for each point in the embedded space. A fixed-point convergence guarantee can be shown by formulating the proposed algorithm as an instance of General Pattern Search (GPS) framework. Evaluation on both clean and noisy synthetic datasets shows that pattern search MDS can accurately infer the intrinsic geometry of manifolds embedded in high-dimensional spaces. Additionally, experiments on real data, even under noisy conditions, demonstrate that the proposed pattern search MDS yields state-of-the-art results.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

Efficiently avoiding saddle points with zero order methods: No gradients required

We consider the case of derivative-free algorithms for non-convex optimization, also known as zero order algorithms, that use only function evaluations rather than gradients. For a wide variety of gradient approximators based on finite differences, we establish asymptotic convergence to second order stationary points using a carefully tailored application of the Stable Manifold Theorem. Regarding efficiency, we introduce a noisy zero-order method that converges to second order stationary points, i.e avoids saddle points. Our algorithm uses only $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1 / ε^2)$ approximate gradient calculations and, thus, it matches the converge rate guarantees of their exact gradient counterparts up to constants. In contrast to previous work, our convergence rate analysis avoids imposing additional dimension dependent slowdowns in the number of iterations required for non-convex zero order optimization.

math.OC↗

arXiv2019

Poincaré Recurrence, Cycles and Spurious Equilibria in Gradient-Descent-Ascent for Non-Convex Non-Concave Zero-Sum Games

We study a wide class of non-convex non-concave min-max games that generalizes over standard bilinear zero-sum games. In this class, players control the inputs of a smooth function whose output is being applied to a bilinear zero-sum game. This class of games is motivated by the indirect nature of the competition in Generative Adversarial Networks, where players control the parameters of a neural network while the actual competition happens between the distributions that the generator and discriminator capture. We establish theoretically, that depending on the specific instance of the problem gradient-descent-ascent dynamics can exhibit a variety of behaviors antithetical to convergence to the game theoretically meaningful min-max solution. Specifically, different forms of recurrent behavior (including periodicity and Poincaré recurrence) are possible as well as convergence to spurious (non-min-max) equilibria for a positive measure of initial conditions. At the technical level, our analysis combines tools from optimization theory, game theory and dynamical systems.

math.OC↗