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Erald Sinanaj

Publications and source records attributed to Erald Sinanaj.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Improved Multi-Dimensional Forecasting for Swap Regret

We study the problem of forecasting for an arbitrary number of downstream agents with unknown objectives, each of whom best responds to the forecaster's predictions. We seek a single forecaster that guarantees sublinear swap regret for all downstream agents simultaneously. For two-dimensional outcome spaces, we give a polynomial time algorithm that guarantees $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{kT})$ swap regret for any downstream agent with $k$ actions. This improves over the previously known bound of $\tilde{O}(kT^{5/8})$ and avoids the exponential in $T$ runtime of prior algorithms in this setting. Our algorithm extends nicely to other low dimensional environments, retaining $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ downstream swap regret while the exponent of $k$ in the regret bound and the exponent of $T$ in the running time both grow with dimension. For arbitrary dimension $d$, we give a forecasting algorithm that guarantees $\tilde{O}(d\sqrt{kT})$ swap regret, assuming the forecaster knows an upper bound $k$ on the number of actions available to any downstream agent, albeit with a much longer runtime. This improves upon previous high dimensional guarantees that had $\tilde{O}(T^{2/3})$ dependence and required additional behavioral assumptions.

cs.GT

Price of Anarchy of Algorithmic Monoculture

Several recent works investigate the effects of monoculture, the ever increasing phenomenon of (possibly) self-interested actors in a society relying on one common source of advice for decision making, with an archetypal driving example being the growing adoption and predictive power of machine learning models in matching markets, e.g. in hiring. Kleinberg and Raghavan (PNAS, 2021) introduced a model that captures the effects of monoculture in a one-sided matching market with advice, demonstrating that a higher accuracy common signal (such as an algorithmic vendor) might incentivize society as a whole to rationally adopt it, but as a collective it would be better off if each instead adopted less accurate, but private advice. We generalize their model and address the open question of their work in quantifying the social welfare loss. We find that monoculture and more generally decentralized optimization is close to optimal: we show a tight constant bound of 2 on the price of anarchy (and more general notions) for the induced game.

cs.GT