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Erfan Shayegani

Publications and source records attributed to Erfan Shayegani.

14 recordsLinked to original sources

VLMs Need Words: Vision Language Models Ignore Visual Detail In Favor of Semantic Anchors

Vision-language models (VLMs) have achieved impressive performance across a wide range of multimodal tasks. However, they often fail on tasks that require fine-grained visual perception, even when the required information is still present in their internal representations. Prior work has attributed this ``hidden-in-plain-sight'' gap to the language model, but the cause remains unexplained. In this work, we demonstrate that this gap arises from the language model's lack of semantic labels for fine-grained visual details: when visual entities can be mapped to known concepts, VLMs bypass visual comparison and reason through language; when they cannot, VLMs resort to brittle and hallucinated descriptions. We verify this across semantic correspondence, synthetic shape matching, and face matching, and find that VLMs perform much better when the relevant entities are nameable than when they are unnamable. Mechanistically, Logit Lens analysis confirms that VLMs explicitly recover semantic labels for nameable entities and surface more unique tokens compared to unnameable entities. Furthermore, we show that this limitation can be addressed: teaching completely arbitrary names for unknown entities improves performance. More importantly, task-specific finetuning yields even stronger generalization without relying on language priors, i.e., through real visual perception. Our findings suggest that current VLM failures on visual tasks reflect a learned shortcut rather than a fundamental limitation of multimodal reasoning. Code and datasets are available at https://github.com/Patchwork53/VLMs-Need-Words-COLM2026.

cs.CV↗

Modeling Hierarchical Thinking in Large Reasoning Models

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) solve complex tasks by generating long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) sequences; however, the emergent dynamics governing reasoning trajectories are not well understood and can lead to inconsistencies and reasoning pathologies. In this work, we propose to approximate LRM's emerging hierarchical reasoning dynamics as a trajectory within a Finite State Machine (FSM) transitioning among six abstract cognitive states. We demonstrate that these states and transitions can be captured in the latent state of the model. We believe that this representation can have different applications in the interpretability and optimization of LRM models. For example, by analyzing the topology of these transitions, we identify statistical shifts in reasoning strategies that help identify effective reasoning chains from those that fail. To illustrate these potential advantages, we propose Q-Value guided steering, a training-free inference-time control method that treats reasoning as a planning problem. We estimate the long-horizon utility of state transitions and apply sparse, orthogonal activation steering at sentence boundaries to align the CoT generation with optimal reasoning policies. Experiments across four benchmarks (AIME25, MATH-500, GSM8k, and GPQA Diamond) using three state-of-the-art open reasoning models demonstrate that Q-Value steering policy achieves significant performance gains with "surgical" efficiency, often requiring 25 times fewer interventions than greedy and weighted baselines, which suggests that reasoning can be effectively controlled by guiding high-level cognitive dynamics rather than micro-managing token generation. Code is available at: https://github.com/shahariar-shibli/CoT-FSM.

cs.AI↗

From Measurement to Expertise: Empathetic Expert Adapters for Context-Based Empathy in Conversational AI Agents

Empathy is a critical factor in fostering positive user experiences in conversational AI. While models can display empathy, it is often generic rather than tailored to specific tasks and contexts. In this work, we introduce a novel framework for developing and evaluating context-specific empathetic large language models (LLMs). We first analyze a real-world conversational dataset consisting of 672 multi-turn conversations across 8 tasks, revealing significant differences in terms of expected and experienced empathy before and after the conversations, respectively. To help minimize this gap, we develop a synthetic multi-turn conversational generation pipeline and steer responses toward our defined empathy patterns based on the context that more closely matches users' expectations. We then train empathetic expert adapters for context-specific empathy that specialize in varying empathy levels based on the recognized task. Our empirical results demonstrate a significant gap reduction of 72.66% between perceived and desired empathy with scores increasing by an average factor of 2.43 as measured by our metrics and reward models. Additionally, our trained empathetic expert adapters demonstrate superior effectiveness in preserving empathy patterns throughout conversation turns, outperforming system prompts, which tend to dramatically diminish in impact as conversations lengthen.

cs.HC↗

Cross-Modal Safety Alignment: Is textual unlearning all you need?

Recent studies reveal that integrating new modalities into Large Language Models (LLMs), such as Vision-Language Models (VLMs), creates a new attack surface that bypasses existing safety training techniques like Supervised Fine-tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). While further SFT and RLHF-based safety training can be conducted in multi-modal settings, collecting multi-modal training datasets poses a significant challenge. Inspired by the structural design of recent multi-modal models, where, regardless of the combination of input modalities, all inputs are ultimately fused into the language space, we aim to explore whether unlearning solely in the textual domain can be effective for cross-modality safety alignment. Our evaluation across six datasets empirically demonstrates the transferability -- textual unlearning in VLMs significantly reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) to less than 8\% and in some cases, even as low as nearly 2\% for both text-based and vision-text-based attacks, alongside preserving the utility. Moreover, our experiments show that unlearning with a multi-modal dataset offers no potential benefits but incurs significantly increased computational demands, possibly up to 6 times higher.

cs.CL↗

Just Do It!? Computer-Use Agents Exhibit Blind Goal-Directedness

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) are an increasingly deployed class of agents that take actions on GUIs to accomplish user goals. In this paper, we show that CUAs consistently exhibit Blind Goal-Directedness (BGD): a bias to pursue goals regardless of feasibility, safety, reliability, or context. We characterize three prevalent patterns of BGD: (i) lack of contextual reasoning, (ii) assumptions and decisions under ambiguity, and (iii) contradictory or infeasible goals. We develop BLIND-ACT, a benchmark of 90 tasks capturing these three patterns. Built on OSWorld, BLIND-ACT provides realistic environments and employs LLM-based judges to evaluate agent behavior, achieving 93.75% agreement with human annotations. We use BLIND-ACT to evaluate nine frontier models, including Claude Sonnet and Opus 4, Computer-Use-Preview, and GPT-5, observing high average BGD rates (80.8%) across them. We show that BGD exposes subtle risks that arise even when inputs are not directly harmful. While prompting-based interventions lower BGD levels, substantial risk persists, highlighting the need for stronger training- or inference-time interventions. Qualitative analysis reveals observed failure modes: execution-first bias (focusing on how to act over whether to act), thought-action disconnect (execution diverging from reasoning), and request-primacy (justifying actions due to user request). Identifying BGD and introducing BLIND-ACT establishes a foundation for future research on studying and mitigating this fundamental risk and ensuring safe CUA deployment.

cs.AI↗

Evil Vizier: Vulnerabilities of LLM-Integrated XR Systems

Extended reality (XR) applications increasingly integrate Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance user experience, scene understanding, and even generate executable XR content, and are often called "AI glasses". Despite these potential benefits, the integrated XR-LLM pipeline makes XR applications vulnerable to new forms of attacks. In this paper, we analyze LLM-Integated XR systems in the literature and in practice and categorize them along different dimensions from a systems perspective. Building on this categorization, we identify a common threat model and demonstrate a series of proof-of-concept attacks on multiple XR platforms that employ various LLM models (Meta Quest 3, Meta Ray-Ban, Android, and Microsoft HoloLens 2 running Llama and GPT models). Although these platforms each implement LLM integration differently, they share vulnerabilities where an attacker can modify the public context surrounding a legitimate LLM query, resulting in erroneous visual or auditory feedback to users, thus compromising their safety or privacy, sowing confusion, or other harmful effects. To defend against these threats, we discuss mitigation strategies and best practices for developers, including an initial defense prototype, and call on the community to develop new protection mechanisms to mitigate these risks.

cs.CR↗

SENSE-7: Taxonomy and Dataset for Measuring User Perceptions of Empathy in Sustained Human-AI Conversations

Empathy is increasingly recognized as a key factor in human-AI communication, yet conventional approaches to "digital empathy" often focus on simulating internal, human-like emotional states while overlooking the inherently subjective, contextual, and relational facets of empathy as perceived by users. In this work, we propose a human-centered taxonomy that emphasizes observable empathic behaviors and introduce a new dataset, Sense-7, of real-world conversations between information workers and Large Language Models (LLMs), which includes per-turn empathy annotations directly from the users, along with user characteristics, and contextual details, offering a more user-grounded representation of empathy. Analysis of 695 conversations from 109 participants reveals that empathy judgments are highly individualized, context-sensitive, and vulnerable to disruption when conversational continuity fails or user expectations go unmet. To promote further research, we provide a subset of 672 anonymized conversation and provide exploratory classification analysis, showing that an LLM-based classifier can recognize 5 levels of empathy with an encouraging average Spearman $ρ$=0.369 and Accuracy=0.487 over this set. Overall, our findings underscore the need for AI designs that dynamically tailor empathic behaviors to user contexts and goals, offering a roadmap for future research and practical development of socially attuned, human-centered artificial agents.

cs.HC↗

Layer-wise Alignment: Examining Safety Alignment Across Image Encoder Layers in Vision Language Models

Vision-language models (VLMs) have improved significantly in their capabilities, but their complex architecture makes their safety alignment challenging. In this paper, we reveal an uneven distribution of harmful information across the intermediate layers of the image encoder and show that skipping a certain set of layers and exiting early can increase the chance of the VLM generating harmful responses. We call it as "Image enCoder Early-exiT" based vulnerability (ICET). Our experiments across three VLMs: LLaVA-1.5, LLaVA-NeXT, and Llama 3.2, show that performing early exits from the image encoder significantly increases the likelihood of generating harmful outputs. To tackle this, we propose a simple yet effective modification of the Clipped-Proximal Policy Optimization (Clip-PPO) algorithm for performing layer-wise multi-modal RLHF for VLMs. We term this as Layer-Wise PPO (L-PPO). We evaluate our L-PPO algorithm across three multimodal datasets and show that it consistently reduces the harmfulness caused by early exits.

cs.CL↗

Securing Large Language Models: Threats, Vulnerabilities and Responsible Practices

Large language models (LLMs) have significantly transformed the landscape of Natural Language Processing (NLP). Their impact extends across a diverse spectrum of tasks, revolutionizing how we approach language understanding and generations. Nevertheless, alongside their remarkable utility, LLMs introduce critical security and risk considerations. These challenges warrant careful examination to ensure responsible deployment and safeguard against potential vulnerabilities. This research paper thoroughly investigates security and privacy concerns related to LLMs from five thematic perspectives: security and privacy concerns, vulnerabilities against adversarial attacks, potential harms caused by misuses of LLMs, mitigation strategies to address these challenges while identifying limitations of current strategies. Lastly, the paper recommends promising avenues for future research to enhance the security and risk management of LLMs.

cs.CR↗

Misaligned Roles, Misplaced Images: Structural Input Perturbations Expose Multimodal Alignment Blind Spots

Multimodal Language Models (MMLMs) typically undergo post-training alignment to prevent harmful content generation. However, these alignment stages focus primarily on the assistant role, leaving the user role unaligned, and stick to a fixed input prompt structure of special tokens, leaving the model vulnerable when inputs deviate from these expectations. We introduce Role-Modality Attacks (RMA), a novel class of adversarial attacks that exploit role confusion between the user and assistant and alter the position of the image token to elicit harmful outputs. Unlike existing attacks that modify query content, RMAs manipulate the input structure without altering the query itself. We systematically evaluate these attacks across multiple Vision Language Models (VLMs) on eight distinct settings, showing that they can be composed to create stronger adversarial prompts, as also evidenced by their increased projection in the negative refusal direction in the residual stream, a property observed in prior successful attacks. Finally, for mitigation, we propose an adversarial training approach that makes the model robust against input prompt perturbations. By training the model on a range of harmful and benign prompts all perturbed with different RMA settings, it loses its sensitivity to Role Confusion and Modality Manipulation attacks and is trained to only pay attention to the content of the query in the input prompt structure, effectively reducing Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the model's general utility.

cs.CR↗

Co(ve)rtex: ML Models as storage channels and their (mis-)applications

Machine learning (ML) models are overparameterized to support generality and avoid overfitting. The state of these parameters is essentially a "don't-care" with respect to the primary model provided that this state does not interfere with the primary model. In both hardware and software systems, don't-care states and undefined behavior have been shown to be sources of significant vulnerabilities. In this paper, we propose a new information theoretic perspective of the problem; we consider the ML model as a storage channel with a capacity that increases with overparameterization. Specifically, we consider a sender that embeds arbitrary information in the model at training time, which can be extracted by a receiver with a black-box access to the deployed model. We derive an upper bound on the capacity of the channel based on the number of available unused parameters. We then explore black-box write and read primitives that allow the attacker to:(i) store data in an optimized way within the model by augmenting the training data at the transmitter side, and (ii) to read it by querying the model after it is deployed. We also consider a new version of the problem which takes information storage covertness into account. Specifically, to obtain storage covertness, we introduce a new constraint such that the data augmentation used for the write primitives minimizes the distribution shift with the initial (baseline task) distribution. This constraint introduces a level of "interference" with the initial task, thereby limiting the channel's effective capacity. Therefore, we develop optimizations to improve the capacity in this case, including a novel ML-specific substitution based error correction protocol. We believe that the proposed modeling of the problem offers new tools to better understand and mitigate potential vulnerabilities of ML, especially in the context of increasingly large models.

cs.LG↗

That Doesn't Go There: Attacks on Shared State in Multi-User Augmented Reality Applications

Augmented Reality (AR) is expected to become a pervasive component in enabling shared virtual experiences. In order to facilitate collaboration among multiple users, it is crucial for multi-user AR applications to establish a consensus on the "shared state" of the virtual world and its augmentations, through which they interact within augmented reality spaces. Current methods to create and access shared state collect sensor data from devices (e.g., camera images), process them, and integrate them into the shared state. However, this process introduces new vulnerabilities and opportunities for attacks. Maliciously writing false data to "poison" the shared state is a major concern for the security of the downstream victims that depend on it. Another type of vulnerability arises when reading the shared state; by providing false inputs, an attacker can view hologram augmentations at locations they are not allowed to access. In this work, we demonstrate a series of novel attacks on multiple AR frameworks with shared states, focusing on three publicly-accessible frameworks. We show that these frameworks, while using different underlying implementations, scopes, and mechanisms to read from and write to the shared state, have shared vulnerability to a unified threat model. Our evaluation of these state-of-art AR applications demonstrates reliable attacks both on updating and accessing shared state across the different systems. To defend against such threats, we discuss a number of potential mitigation strategies that can help enhance the security of multi-user AR applications.

cs.CR↗

Survey of Vulnerabilities in Large Language Models Revealed by Adversarial Attacks

Large Language Models (LLMs) are swiftly advancing in architecture and capability, and as they integrate more deeply into complex systems, the urgency to scrutinize their security properties grows. This paper surveys research in the emerging interdisciplinary field of adversarial attacks on LLMs, a subfield of trustworthy ML, combining the perspectives of Natural Language Processing and Security. Prior work has shown that even safety-aligned LLMs (via instruction tuning and reinforcement learning through human feedback) can be susceptible to adversarial attacks, which exploit weaknesses and mislead AI systems, as evidenced by the prevalence of `jailbreak' attacks on models like ChatGPT and Bard. In this survey, we first provide an overview of large language models, describe their safety alignment, and categorize existing research based on various learning structures: textual-only attacks, multi-modal attacks, and additional attack methods specifically targeting complex systems, such as federated learning or multi-agent systems. We also offer comprehensive remarks on works that focus on the fundamental sources of vulnerabilities and potential defenses. To make this field more accessible to newcomers, we present a systematic review of existing works, a structured typology of adversarial attack concepts, and additional resources, including slides for presentations on related topics at the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL'24).

cs.CL↗

Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional Adversarial Attacks on Multi-Modal Language Models

We introduce new jailbreak attacks on vision language models (VLMs), which use aligned LLMs and are resilient to text-only jailbreak attacks. Specifically, we develop cross-modality attacks on alignment where we pair adversarial images going through the vision encoder with textual prompts to break the alignment of the language model. Our attacks employ a novel compositional strategy that combines an image, adversarially targeted towards toxic embeddings, with generic prompts to accomplish the jailbreak. Thus, the LLM draws the context to answer the generic prompt from the adversarial image. The generation of benign-appearing adversarial images leverages a novel embedding-space-based methodology, operating with no access to the LLM model. Instead, the attacks require access only to the vision encoder and utilize one of our four embedding space targeting strategies. By not requiring access to the LLM, the attacks lower the entry barrier for attackers, particularly when vision encoders such as CLIP are embedded in closed-source LLMs. The attacks achieve a high success rate across different VLMs, highlighting the risk of cross-modality alignment vulnerabilities, and the need for new alignment approaches for multi-modal models.

cs.CR↗