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Eric Brigham

Publications and source records attributed to Eric Brigham.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Splitting for Stability: a Modified Reward Scheme for Transaction-Fee-Only Regimes

As Bitcoin's block subsidy declines over time, miner revenue will come to depend increasingly on transaction fees. In fee-dominated regimes, winner-take-all reward structures can create incentives for undercutting and fork-based mining strategies, leading to instability and reduced transaction throughput. To prevent this instability, we propose a reward-splitting mechanism in which the winning block producer receives an $α$-portion of the block reward, while the rest is distributed among other miners; this incentivizes mining on previous blocks with higher rewards, while preserving the incentive to produce blocks with high rewards. We evaluate the proposed reward structure through analysis and simulation. Our analysis derives a local profitability condition for one-step Function-Fork deviations, showing how the winner-side reward, loser-side subsidy, and honest hash power jointly determine whether undercutting is profitable. Simulations show parameter regions in which honest behavior dominates fork-based deviations. In the cases where forking becomes dominant, the learned strategy is the least aggressive variant studied. The analysis and simulations suggest that suitable reward-splitting parameters can reduce the honest participation needed to suppress aggressive forking strategies relative to the winner-take-all structure studied in prior work. Finally, we show that the modified reward scheme does not appear to worsen selfish mining incentives. Together, these results suggest that reward redistribution can mitigate fee-driven fork incentives without introducing stronger selfish mining incentives, providing a possible direction for incentive design in fee-era proof-of-work systems.

cs.CR↗

Poster: No safety in numbers: traffic analysis of sealed-sender groups in Signal

Secure messaging applications often offer privacy to users by protecting their messages from would be observers through end-to-end encryption techniques. However, the metadata of who communicates with whom cannot be concealed by encryption alone. Signal's Sealed Sender mechanism attempts to enhance its protection of this data by obfuscating the sender of any message sent with the protocol. However, it was shown by Martiny et al. that due to the message delivery protocols in Signal, the record of who receives messages can be enough to recover this metadata. In this work we extend the attack presented from deanonymizing communicating pairs to deanonymizing entire group conversations.

cs.CR↗

Competing (Semi)-Selfish Miners in Bitcoin

The Bitcoin protocol prescribes certain behavior by the miners who are responsible for maintaining and extending the underlying blockchain; in particular, miners who successfully solve a puzzle, and hence can extend the chain by a block, are supposed to release that block immediately. Eyal and Sirer showed, however, that a selfish miner is incentivized to deviate from the protocol and withhold its blocks under certain conditions. The analysis by Eyal and Sirer, as well as in followup work, considers a \emph{single} deviating miner (who may control a large fraction of the hashing power in the network) interacting with a remaining pool of honest miners. Here, we extend this analysis to the case where there are \emph{multiple} (non-colluding) selfish miners. We find that with multiple strategic miners, specific deviations from honest mining by multiple strategic agents can outperform honest mining, even if individually miners would not be incentivised to be dishonest. This previous point effectively renders the Bitcoin protocol to be less secure than previously thought.

cs.GT↗