arXiv subjects

Eric Graves

Publications and source records attributed to Eric Graves.

21 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2014

Equating the achievable exponent region to the achievable entropy region by partitioning the source

In this paper we investigate the image size characterization problem. We show that any arbitrary source set may be decomposed into sets whose image size characterization is the same as its entropy characterization. We also show that the number of these sets required is small enough that one may consider that from a coding perspective the achievable entropy region and achievable exponent region are equal. This has an impact on many source networks and network problems whose solution heretofore could not have the image size characterization applied to them.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2013

A coding approach to guarantee information integrity against a Byzantine relay

This paper presents a random coding scheme with which two nodes can exchange information with guaranteed integrity over a two-way Byzantine relay. This coding scheme is employed to obtain an inner bound on the capacity region with guaranteed information integrity. No pre-shared secret or secret transmission is needed for the proposed scheme. Hence the inner bound obtained is generally larger than those achieved based on secret transmission schemes. This approach advocates the separation of supporting information integrity and secrecy.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2012

Detectability of Symbol Manipulation by an Amplify-and-Forward Relay

This paper studies the problem of detecting a potential malicious relay node by a source node that relies on the relay to forward information to other nodes. The channel model of two source nodes simultaneously sending symbols to a relay is considered. The relay is contracted to forward the symbols that it receives back to the sources in the amplify-and-forward manner. However there is a chance that the relay may send altered symbols back to the sources. Each source attempts to individually detect such malicious acts of the relay by comparing the empirical distribution of the symbols that it receives from the relay conditioned on its own transmitted symbols with known stochastic characteristics of the channel. It is shown that maliciousness of the relay can be asymptotically detected with sufficient channel observations if and only if the channel satisfies a non-manipulable condition, which can be easily checked. As a result, the non-manipulable condition provides us a clear-cut criterion to determine the detectability of the aforementioned class of symbol manipulation attacks potentially conducted by the relay.

cs.IT↗