Chi-MERA: Defending Orbit-Based Authentication of LEO Satellites with the Space Oddity of MLAT (Long Version)
An active research area, physical layer security can be a last resort in insecure legacy systems, a resource-efficient alternative, or a complementary backup for cryptographic techniques. In this paper, we demonstrate that previously established authentication schemes for LEO satellites are vulnerable to attackers that control multiple devices. In extensive experiments, such attackers produce false positive rates (FPR) of up to 40%. Based on a root cause analysis, we develop a novel scheme, called Chi-MERA, that improves authentication performance and is robust against multi-device attackers. Our scheme uses two enhancements: (1) multilateration (MLAT) to clearly distinguish between attackers and legitimate satellites, and (2), a new resilient signature scheme without dependency on a single dedicated reference receiver. Our evaluation shows that exploiting MLAT characteristics such as residual analysis to classify vastly different signal source categories (orbit vs. non-orbit) is highly effective. In extensive simulations, we show that the new authentication achieves low FPR of $<$2% and false negative rates of $<$3% for accidentally rejecting valid signals. Furthermore, our scheme's defense scales linearly: $n$ receivers reliably withstand spoofing (FPR $< 1%$) from attackers with $\frac{n}{2}$ devices.