arXiv subjects

Eric Schulz

Publications and source records attributed to Eric Schulz.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Sparks of In Silico Cognitive Science: Theories from Simulated Data Can Generalize to Humans

Behavioral foundation models have been proposed as stand-ins for human participants across settings, but it is unclear whether theories discovered on them generalize to humans or merely characterize the simulator. We ran the Automated Cognitive Scientist (\textsc{AutoCog}), a closed-loop discovery system in which LLM agents design theory-discriminating experiments, collect responses, arbitrate between competing theories, and synthesize successors, entirely on behavior simulated by Centaur, a foundation model of human behavior. In a multi-attribute decision-making setting, the theories \textsc{AutoCog} found on Centaur generalized to human data: they outperformed canonical theories on ten held-out experiments and were rivaled only by theories found by running the same loop on people. We argue that this succeeds despite the simulator's inevitable imperfections because a discovery loop that arbitrates between competing theories demands less of its simulator than estimation does. The simulator only needs to capture the regularities that distinguish the theories, and not necessarily reproduce behavior precisely. Imperfect simulators can therefore widen the search over theories, with human data then testing whether the surfaced theories generalize.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Closing the Loop to Discover Psychological Theories with an Automated Cognitive Scientist

Across the sciences, autonomous systems are increasingly being used in closed-loop discovery, proposing new theories and designing and running experiments to test them. This approach is yet to be applied in the field of cognitive science, where the central bottleneck is theory-building: the creative step of turning the accumulated failures of existing models into better ones. Theory generation has remained manual even as data collection, modeling, and experiment design have been automated. We present the Automated Cognitive Scientist (AutoCog), a fully autonomous agentic-AI system that closes this loop. Large-language-model agents advocate competing theories, each expressed as an executable cognitive model, design experiments that best discriminate them, collect behavioral data from participants recruited online, score theories against collected data based on their generative performance, diagnose why they fail, and synthesize a better successor. Repeating this cycle allows them to search the space of theories, models, and experiments. In the domain of decision-making, AutoCog recovered known decision-making strategies from simulated behavior, including unconventional ones, showing that its discoveries are ultimately driven by the data rather than strictly bound by the priors of the underlying language models. When run with human participants, it produced theories that outperformed the established theories it was seeded with and generalized to held-out studies in two different experimental settings. It also surfaced a novel theory of multi-cue decision-making in which choices show diminishing sensitivity to feature values. The distinctive predictions of this theory were confirmed in a preregistered study with new participants. AutoCog demonstrates how an automated discovery system can be used to turn cognitive theory-building into an explicit, executable, and cumulative science.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

Meta-learning as a principle for human-like visual representations

The structure of human visual representations underpins our capacity for adaptive behaviour. While pretrained neural networks model human visual representations with unprecedented success, a large discrepancy remains. We propose one reason: these networks optimise a single fixed objective, whereas human representations must support open-ended tasks. We hypothesise this flexibility arises from meta-learning (learning to learn), a pressure shaping representations to acquire new tasks from few observations. To test this, we train a sequence model, without any supervision from human data, across thousands of semantically rich tasks mapping images to high-level concepts. Compared to their pretrained base encoders, meta-learned representations better predict human similarity judgements, semantic rule learning, and high-level visual cortex. Behavioural gains depend on disentangled, high-level task distributions, while brain alignment is driven primarily by the learning-to-learn pressure. Our results suggest the flexibility of human visual representations reflects the functional demand to learn new semantic relationships on the fly.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2026

Post-training makes large language models less human-like

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as surrogates for human participants, but it remains unclear which models best capture human behavior and why. To address this, we introduce Psych-201, a novel dataset that enables us to measure behavioral alignment at scale. We find that post-training -- the stage that turns base models into useful assistants -- consistently reduces alignment with human behavior across model families, sizes, and objectives. Moreover, this misalignment widens in newer model generations even as base models continue to improve. Finally, we find that persona-induction -- a popular technique for eliciting human-like behavior by conditioning models on participant-specific information -- does not improve predictions at the level of individuals. Taken together, our results suggest that the very processes that are currently employed to turn LLMs into useful assistants also make them less accurate models of human behavior.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Unifying Goal-Conditioned RL and Unsupervised Skill Learning via Control-Maximization

Unsupervised pretraining has driven empirical advances in goal-conditioned reinforcement learning (GCRL), but its theoretical foundations remain poorly understood. In particular, an influential class of methods, mutual information skill learning (MISL), discovers behaviorally diverse skills that can later be used for downstream goal-reaching. However, it remains a theoretical mystery why skills learned through MISL should support goal-reaching. A subtle challenge is that both GCRL and MISL are umbrella terms: different GCRL tasks use distinct criteria for measuring goal-reaching performance, while different MISL methods optimize distinct notions of behavioral diversity. We address this challenge and unify GCRL and MISL as instances of control maximization. We identify three canonical GCRL formulations and prove that they are fundamentally inequivalent: they can induce incompatible optimal policies even in the same environment. Nevertheless, they all share a common interpretation: a well-performing goal-conditioned policy is one whose future trajectory is highly sensitive to the commanded goal, with the precise notion of sensitivity determined by the GCRL formulation. Noting that MISL objectives can be understood as measures of skill-sensitivity akin to goal-sensitivity, we show that MISL objectives are bounded by formulation-specific downstream goal-sensitivities. These bounds establish a precise correspondence between MISL methods and downstream GCRL tasks: for every GCRL formulation, there exists a matching MISL objective for which more diverse skills afford greater downstream goal sensitivity. Our results thus lay a theoretical foundation for RL pretraining and have important practical implications, such as suggesting which pretraining objectives to use when a user cares about a specific class of downstream tasks.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Can we automatize scientific discovery in the cognitive sciences?

The cognitive sciences aim to understand intelligence by formalizing underlying operations as computational models. Traditionally, this follows a cycle of discovery where researchers develop paradigms, collect data, and test predefined model classes. However, this manual pipeline is fundamentally constrained by the slow pace of human intervention and a search space limited by researchers' background and intuition. Here, we propose a paradigm shift toward a fully automated, in silico science of the mind that implements every stage of the discovery cycle using Large Language Models (LLMs). In this framework, experimental paradigms exploring conceptually meaningful task structures are directly sampled from an LLM. High-fidelity behavioral data are then simulated using foundation models of cognition. The tedious step of handcrafting cognitive models is replaced by LLM-based program synthesis, which performs a high-throughput search over a vast landscape of algorithmic hypotheses. Finally, the discovery loop is closed by optimizing for ''interestingness'', a metric of conceptual yield evaluated by an LLM-critic. By enabling a fast and scalable approach to theory development, this automated loop functions as a high-throughput in-silico discovery engine, surfacing informative experiments and mechanisms for subsequent validation in real human populations.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

In-Context Function Learning in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) can learn from a few demonstrations provided at inference time. We study this in-context learning phenomenon through the lens of Gaussian Processes (GPs). We build controlled experiments where models observe sequences of multivariate scalar-valued function samples drawn from known GP priors. We evaluate prediction error in relation to the number of demonstrations and compare against two principled references: (i) an empirical GP-regression learner that gives a lower bound on achievable error, and (ii) the expected error of a 1-nearest-neighbor (1-NN) rule, which gives a data-driven upper bound. Across model sizes, we find that LLM learning curves are strongly influenced by the function-generating kernels and approach the GP lower bound as the number of demonstrations increases. We then study the inductive biases of these models using a likelihood-based analysis. We find that LLM predictions are most likely under less smooth GP kernels. Finally, we explore whether post-training can shift these inductive biases and improve sample-efficiency on functions sampled from GPs with smoother kernels. We find that both reinforcement learning and supervised fine-tuning can effectively shift inductive biases in the direction of the training data. Together, our framework quantifies the extent to which LLMs behave like GP learners and provides tools for steering their inductive biases for continuous function learning tasks.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Measuring What AI Systems Might Do: Towards A Measurement Science in AI

Scientists, policy-makers, business leaders, and members of the public care about what modern artificial intelligence systems are disposed to do. Yet terms such as capabilities, propensities, skills, values, and abilities are routinely used interchangeably and conflated with observable performance, with AI evaluation practices rarely specifying what quantity they purport to measure. We argue that capabilities and propensities are dispositional properties - stable features of systems characterised by counterfactual relationships between contextual conditions and behavioural outputs. Measuring a disposition requires (i) hypothesising which contextual properties are causally relevant, (ii) independently operationalising and measuring those properties, and (iii) empirically mapping how variation in those properties affects the probability of the behaviour. Dominant approaches to AI evaluation, from benchmark averages to data-driven latent-variable models such as Item Response Theory, bypass these steps entirely. Building on ideas from philosophy of science, measurement theory, and cognitive science, we develop a principled account of AI capabilities and propensities as dispositions, show why prevailing evaluation practices fail to measure them, and outline what disposition-respecting, scientifically defensible AI evaluation would require.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Can Vision Language Models Learn Intuitive Physics from Interaction?

Pre-trained vision language models do not have good intuitions about the physical world. Recent work has shown that supervised fine-tuning can improve model performance on simple physical tasks. However, fine-tuned models do not appear to learn robust physical rules that can generalize to new contexts. Based on research in cognitive science, we hypothesize that models need to interact with an environment to properly learn its physical dynamics. We train models that learn through interaction with a simulated environment using reinforcement learning. While learning from interaction allows models to improve their within-task performance, it fails to produce models with generalizable physical intuitions. We find that models trained on one task do not reliably generalize to related tasks, even if the tasks share visual statistics and physical principles, and regardless of whether the models are trained through interaction.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

metabeta -- A fast neural model for Bayesian mixed-effects regression

Hierarchical data with multiple observations per group is ubiquitous in empirical sciences and is often analyzed using mixed-effects regression. In such models, Bayesian inference gives an estimate of uncertainty but is analytically intractable and requires costly approximation using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. Neural posterior estimation shifts the bulk of computation from inference time to pre-training time, amortizing over simulated datasets with known ground truth targets. We propose metabeta, a neural network model for Bayesian mixed-effects regression. Using simulated and real data, we show that it reaches stable and comparable performance to MCMC-based parameter estimation at a fraction of the usually required time, enabling new use cases for Bayesian mixed-effects modeling.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Exploring System 1 and 2 communication for latent reasoning in LLMs

Should LLM reasoning live in a separate module, or within a single model's forward pass and representational space? We study dual-architecture latent reasoning, where a fluent Base exchanges latent messages with a Coprocessor, and test two hypotheses aimed at improving latent communication over Liu et al. (2024): (H1) increase channel capacity; (H2) learn communication via joint finetuning. Under matched latent-token budgets on GPT-2 and Qwen-3, H2 is consistently strongest while H1 yields modest gains. A unified soft-embedding baseline, a single model with the same forward pass and shared representations, using the same latent-token budget, nearly matches H2 and surpasses H1, suggesting current dual designs mostly add compute rather than qualitatively improving reasoning. Across GSM8K, ProsQA, and a Countdown stress test with increasing branching factor, scaling the latent-token budget beyond small values fails to improve robustness. Latent analyses show overlapping subspaces with limited specialization, consistent with weak reasoning gains. We conclude dual-model latent reasoning remains promising in principle, but likely requires objectives and training schedules that explicitly shape latent spaces for algorithmic planning.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Reference-Free Rating of LLM Responses via Latent Information

How reliable are single-response LLM-as-a-judge ratings without references, and can we obtain fine-grained, deterministic scores in this setting? We study the common practice of asking a judge model to assign Likert-scale scores to free-text responses and show two systematic issues: scores are unstable under sampling and poorly calibrated, leading to compression near the top of the scale and frequent ties. We then propose and evaluate Latent Judges, which derive scalar ratings from internal model signals: (i) probability-weighted scores over integer ratings, (ii) verifier-style probabilities of "yes", and (iii) linear probes trained on model activations at the rating position. Across a broad suite of pairwise and single-rating benchmarks, latent methods match or surpass standard prompting, with consistent gains on pairwise accuracy and listwise ranking relevant to Best-of-N selection. Probability-weighted scores achieve the strongest single-rating correlations, while probes recover useful signals when output logits are miscalibrated. These results indicate that latent information provides deterministic and more discriminative signals for reference-free evaluation, and can improve selection and training approaches like Best-of-$N$, multi-teacher distillation, and routing.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

A circuit for predicting hierarchical structure in-context in Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at in-context learning, the ability to use information provided as context to improve prediction of future tokens. Induction heads have been argued to play a crucial role for in-context learning in Transformer Language Models. These attention heads make a token attend to successors of past occurrences of the same token in the input. This basic mechanism supports LLMs' ability to copy and predict repeating patterns. However, it is unclear if this same mechanism can support in-context learning of more complex repetitive patterns with hierarchical structure. Natural language is teeming with such cases: The article "the" in English usually prefaces multiple nouns in a text. When predicting which token succeeds a particular instance of "the", we need to integrate further contextual cues from the text to predict the correct noun. If induction heads naively attend to all past instances of successor tokens of "the" in a context-independent manner, they cannot support this level of contextual information integration. In this study, we design a synthetic in-context learning task, where tokens are repeated with hierarchical dependencies. Here, attending uniformly to all successor tokens is not sufficient to accurately predict future tokens. Evaluating a range of LLMs on these token sequences and natural language analogues, we find adaptive induction heads that support prediction by learning what to attend to in-context. Next, we investigate how induction heads themselves learn in-context. We find evidence that learning is supported by attention heads that uncover a set of latent contexts, determining the different token transition relationships. Overall, we not only show that LLMs have induction heads that learn, but offer a complete mechanistic account of how LLMs learn to predict higher-order repetitive patterns in-context.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Meta-learning ecological priors from large language models explains human learning and decision making

Human cognition is profoundly shaped by the environments in which it unfolds. Yet, it remains an open question whether learning and decision making can be explained as a principled adaptation to the statistical structure of real-world tasks. We introduce ecologically rational analysis, a computational framework that unifies the normative foundations of rational analysis with ecological grounding. Leveraging large language models to generate ecologically valid cognitive tasks at scale, and using meta-learning to derive rational models optimized for these environments, we develop a new class of learning algorithms: Ecologically Rational Meta-learned Inference (ERMI). ERMI internalizes the statistical regularities of naturalistic problem spaces and adapts flexibly to novel situations, without requiring hand-crafted heuristics or explicit parameter updates. We show that ERMI captures human behavior across 15 experiments spanning function learning, category learning, and decision making, outperforming several established cognitive models in trial-by-trial prediction. Our results suggest that much of human cognition may reflect adaptive alignment to the ecological structure of the problems we encounter in everyday life.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2025

Automated scientific minimization of regret

We introduce automated scientific minimization of regret (ASMR) -- a framework for automated computational cognitive science. Building on the principles of scientific regret minimization, ASMR leverages Centaur -- a recently proposed foundation model of human cognition -- to identify gaps in an interpretable cognitive model. These gaps are then addressed through automated revisions generated by a language-based reasoning model. We demonstrate the utility of this approach in a multi-attribute decision-making task, showing that ASMR discovers cognitive models that predict human behavior at noise ceiling while retaining interpretability. Taken together, our results highlight the potential of ASMR to automate core components of the cognitive modeling pipeline.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Concept-Guided Interpretability via Neural Chunking

Neural networks are often described as black boxes, reflecting the significant challenge of understanding their internal workings and interactions. We propose a different perspective that challenges the prevailing view: rather than being inscrutable, neural networks exhibit patterns in their raw population activity that mirror regularities in the training data. We refer to this as the Reflection Hypothesis and provide evidence for this phenomenon in both simple recurrent neural networks (RNNs) and complex large language models (LLMs). Building on this insight, we propose to leverage our cognitive tendency of chunking to segment high-dimensional neural population dynamics into interpretable units that reflect underlying concepts. We propose three methods to extract recurring chunks on a neural population level, complementing each other based on label availability and neural data dimensionality. Discrete sequence chunking (DSC) learns a dictionary of entities in a lower-dimensional neural space; population averaging (PA) extracts recurring entities that correspond to known labels; and unsupervised chunk discovery (UCD) can be used when labels are absent. We demonstrate the effectiveness of these methods in extracting concept-encoding entities agnostic to model architectures. These concepts can be both concrete (words), abstract (POS tags), or structural (narrative schema). Additionally, we show that extracted chunks play a causal role in network behavior, as grafting them leads to controlled and predictable changes in the model's behavior. Our work points to a new direction for interpretability, one that harnesses both cognitive principles and the structure of naturalistic data to reveal the hidden computations of complex learning systems, gradually transforming them from black boxes into systems we can begin to understand.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Bringing Comparative Cognition To Computers

Researchers are increasingly subjecting artificial intelligence systems to psychological testing. But to rigorously compare their cognitive capacities with humans and other animals, we must avoid both over- and under-stating our similarities and differences. By embracing a comparative approach, we can integrate AI cognition research into the broader cognitive sciences.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Testing the Limits of Fine-Tuning for Improving Visual Cognition in Vision Language Models

Pre-trained vision language models still fall short of human visual cognition. In an effort to improve visual cognition and align models with human behavior, we introduce visual stimuli and human judgments on visual cognition tasks, allowing us to systematically evaluate performance across cognitive domains under a consistent environment. We fine-tune models on ground truth data for intuitive physics and causal reasoning and find that this improves model performance in the respective fine-tuning domain. Furthermore, it can improve model alignment with human behavior. However, we find that task-specific fine-tuning does not contribute to robust human-like generalization to data with other visual characteristics or to tasks in other cognitive domains.

cs.LG↗