arXiv subjects

Erik Miehling

Publications and source records attributed to Erik Miehling.

33 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2024

Detectors for Safe and Reliable LLMs: Implementations, Uses, and Limitations

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to a variety of risks, from non-faithful output to biased and toxic generations. Due to several limiting factors surrounding LLMs (training cost, API access, data availability, etc.), it may not always be feasible to impose direct safety constraints on a deployed model. Therefore, an efficient and reliable alternative is required. To this end, we present our ongoing efforts to create and deploy a library of detectors: compact and easy-to-build classification models that provide labels for various harms. In addition to the detectors themselves, we discuss a wide range of uses for these detector models - from acting as guardrails to enabling effective AI governance. We also deep dive into inherent challenges in their development and discuss future work aimed at making the detectors more reliable and broadening their scope.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Language Models in Dialogue: Conversational Maxims for Human-AI Interactions

Modern language models, while sophisticated, exhibit some inherent shortcomings, particularly in conversational settings. We claim that many of the observed shortcomings can be attributed to violation of one or more conversational principles. By drawing upon extensive research from both the social science and AI communities, we propose a set of maxims -- quantity, quality, relevance, manner, benevolence, and transparency -- for describing effective human-AI conversation. We first justify the applicability of the first four maxims (from Grice) in the context of human-AI interactions. We then argue that two new maxims, benevolence (concerning the generation of, and engagement with, harmful content) and transparency (concerning recognition of one's knowledge boundaries, operational constraints, and intents), are necessary for addressing behavior unique to modern human-AI interactions. We evaluate the degree to which various language models are able to understand these maxims and find that models possess an internal prioritization of principles that can significantly impact their ability to interpret the maxims accurately.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2022

How does a Rational Agent Act in an Epidemic?

Evolution of disease in a large population is a function of the top-down policy measures from a centralized planner, as well as the self-interested decisions (to be socially active) of individual agents in a large heterogeneous population. This paper is concerned with understanding the latter based on a mean-field type optimal control model. Specifically, the model is used to investigate the role of partial information on an agent's decision-making, and study the impact of such decisions by a large number of agents on the spread of the virus in the population. The motivation comes from the presymptomatic and asymptomatic spread of the COVID-19 virus where an agent unwittingly spreads the virus. We show that even in a setting with fully rational agents, limited information on the viral state can result in an epidemic growth.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Modeling Presymptomatic Spread in Epidemics via Mean-Field Games

This paper is concerned with developing mean-field game models for the evolution of epidemics. Specifically, an agent's decision -- to be socially active in the midst of an epidemic -- is modeled as a mean-field game with health-related costs and activity-related rewards. By considering the fully and partially observed versions of this problem, the role of information in guiding an agent's rational decision is highlighted. The main contributions of the paper are to derive the equations for the mean-field game in both fully and partially observed settings of the problem, to present a complete analysis of the fully observed case, and to present some analytical results for the partially observed case.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Discrete-Time Linear-Quadratic Regulation via Optimal Transport

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic control problem with uncertain initial and target states. We first discuss the connection between optimal transport and stochastic control problems of this form. Next, we formulate a linear-quadratic regulator problem where the initial and terminal states are distributed according to specified probability densities. A closed-form solution for the optimal transport map in the case of linear-time varying systems is derived, along with an algorithm for computing the optimal map. Two numerical examples pertaining to swarm deployment demonstrate the practical applicability of the model, and performance of the numerical method.

math.OC↗

arXiv2020

Reinforcement Learning in Non-Stationary Discrete-Time Linear-Quadratic Mean-Field Games

In this paper, we study large population multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in the context of discrete-time linear-quadratic mean-field games (LQ-MFGs). Our setting differs from most existing work on RL for MFGs, in that we consider a non-stationary MFG over an infinite horizon. We propose an actor-critic algorithm to iteratively compute the mean-field equilibrium (MFE) of the LQ-MFG. There are two primary challenges: i) the non-stationarity of the MFG induces a linear-quadratic tracking problem, which requires solving a backwards-in-time (non-causal) equation that cannot be solved by standard (causal) RL algorithms; ii) Many RL algorithms assume that the states are sampled from the stationary distribution of a Markov chain (MC), that is, the chain is already mixed, an assumption that is not satisfied for real data sources. We first identify that the mean-field trajectory follows linear dynamics, allowing the problem to be reformulated as a linear quadratic Gaussian problem. Under this reformulation, we propose an actor-critic algorithm that allows samples to be drawn from an unmixed MC. Finite-sample convergence guarantees for the algorithm are then provided. To characterize the performance of our algorithm in multi-agent RL, we have developed an error bound with respect to the Nash equilibrium of the finite-population game.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2020

Information State Embedding in Partially Observable Cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) under partial observability has long been considered challenging, primarily due to the requirement for each agent to maintain a belief over all other agents' local histories -- a domain that generally grows exponentially over time. In this work, we investigate a partially observable MARL problem in which agents are cooperative. To enable the development of tractable algorithms, we introduce the concept of an information state embedding that serves to compress agents' histories. We quantify how the compression error influences the resulting value functions for decentralized control. Furthermore, we propose an instance of the embedding based on recurrent neural networks (RNNs). The embedding is then used as an approximate information state, and can be fed into any MARL algorithm. The proposed embed-then-learn pipeline opens the black-box of existing (partially observable) MARL algorithms, allowing us to establish some theoretical guarantees (error bounds of value functions) while still achieving competitive performance with many end-to-end approaches.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2020

Approximate Equilibrium Computation for Discrete-Time Linear-Quadratic Mean-Field Games

While the topic of mean-field games (MFGs) has a relatively long history, heretofore there has been limited work concerning algorithms for the computation of equilibrium control policies. In this paper, we develop a computable policy iteration algorithm for approximating the mean-field equilibrium in linear-quadratic MFGs with discounted cost. Given the mean-field, each agent faces a linear-quadratic tracking problem, the solution of which involves a dynamical system evolving in retrograde time. This makes the development of forward-in-time algorithm updates challenging. By identifying a structural property of the mean-field update operator, namely that it preserves sequences of a particular form, we develop a forward-in-time equilibrium computation algorithm. Bounds that quantify the accuracy of the computed mean-field equilibrium as a function of the algorithm's stopping condition are provided. The optimality of the computed equilibrium is validated numerically. In contrast to the most recent/concurrent results, our algorithm appears to be the first to study infinite-horizon MFGs with non-stationary mean-field equilibria, though with focus on the linear quadratic setting.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2020

Protecting Consumers Against Personalized Pricing: A Stopping Time Approach

The widespread availability of behavioral data has led to the development of data-driven personalized pricing algorithms: sellers attempt to maximize their revenue by estimating the consumer's willingness-to-pay and pricing accordingly. Our objective is to develop algorithms that protect consumer interests against personalized pricing schemes. In this paper, we consider a consumer who learns more and more about a potential purchase across time, while simultaneously revealing more and more information about herself to a potential seller. We formalize a strategic consumer's purchasing decision when interacting with a seller who uses personalized pricing algorithms, and contextualize this problem among the existing literature in optimal stopping time theory and computational finance. We provide an algorithm that consumers can use to protect their own interests against personalized pricing algorithms. This algorithmic stopping method uses sample paths to train estimates of the optimal stopping time. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first works that provides computational methods for the consumer to maximize her utility when decision making under surveillance. We demonstrate the efficacy of the algorithmic stopping method using a numerical simulation, where the seller uses a Kalman filter to approximate the consumer's valuation and sets prices based on myopic expected revenue maximization. Compared to a myopic purchasing strategy, we demonstrate increased payoffs for the consumer in expectation.

cs.CE↗

arXiv2020

Non-Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning

Making decisions in the presence of a strategic opponent requires one to take into account the opponent's ability to actively mask its intended objective. To describe such strategic situations, we introduce the non-cooperative inverse reinforcement learning (N-CIRL) formalism. The N-CIRL formalism consists of two agents with completely misaligned objectives, where only one of the agents knows the true objective function. Formally, we model the N-CIRL formalism as a zero-sum Markov game with one-sided incomplete information. Through interacting with the more informed player, the less informed player attempts to both infer, and act according to, the true objective function. As a result of the one-sided incomplete information, the multi-stage game can be decomposed into a sequence of single-stage games expressed by a recursive formula. Solving this recursive formula yields the value of the N-CIRL game and the more informed player's equilibrium strategy. Another recursive formula, constructed by forming an auxiliary game, termed the dual game, yields the less informed player's strategy. Building upon these two recursive formulas, we develop a computationally tractable algorithm to approximately solve for the equilibrium strategies. Finally, we demonstrate the benefits of our N-CIRL formalism over the existing multi-agent IRL formalism via extensive numerical simulation in a novel cyber security setting.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Strategic Inference with a Single Private Sample

Motivated by applications in cyber security, we develop a simple game model for describing how a learning agent's private information influences an observing agent's inference process. The model describes a situation in which one of the agents (attacker) is deciding which of two targets to attack, one with a known reward and another with uncertain reward. The attacker receives a single private sample from the uncertain target's distribution and updates its belief of the target quality. The other agent (defender) knows the true rewards, but does not see the sample that the attacker has received. This leads to agents possessing asymmetric information: the attacker is uncertain over the parameter of the distribution, whereas the defender is uncertain about the observed sample. After the attacker updates its belief, both the attacker and the defender play a simultaneous move game based on their respective beliefs. We offer a characterization of the pure strategy equilibria of the game and explain how the players' decisions are influenced by their prior knowledge and the payoffs/costs.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Online Planning for Decentralized Stochastic Control with Partial History Sharing

In decentralized stochastic control, standard approaches for sequential decision-making, e.g. dynamic programming, quickly become intractable due to the need to maintain a complex information state. Computational challenges are further compounded if agents do not possess complete model knowledge. In this paper, we take advantage of the fact that in many problems agents share some common information, or history, termed partial history sharing. Under this information structure the policy search space is greatly reduced. We propose a provably convergent, online tree-search based algorithm that does not require a closed-form model or explicit communication among agents. Interestingly, our algorithm can be viewed as a generalization of several existing heuristic solvers for decentralized partially observable Markov decision processes. To demonstrate the applicability of the model, we propose a novel collaborative intrusion response model, where multiple agents (defenders) possessing asymmetric information aim to collaboratively defend a computer network. Numerical results demonstrate the performance of our algorithm.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2016

A Decentralized Mechanism for Computing Competitive Equilibria in Deregulated Electricity Markets

With the increased level of distributed generation and demand response comes the need for associated mechanisms that can perform well in the face of increasingly complex deregulated energy market structures. Using Lagrangian duality theory, we develop a decentralized market mechanism that ensures that, under the guidance of a market operator, self-interested market participants: generation companies (GenCos), distribution companies (DistCos), and transmission companies (TransCos), reach a competitive equilibrium. We show that even in the presence of informational asymmetries and nonlinearities (such as power losses and transmission constraints), the resulting competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.

math.OC↗

arXiv2014

A Supervisory Control Approach to Dynamic Cyber-Security

An analytical approach for a dynamic cyber-security problem that captures progressive attacks to a computer network is presented. We formulate the dynamic security problem from the defender's point of view as a supervisory control problem with imperfect information, modeling the computer network's operation by a discrete event system. We consider a min-max performance criterion and use dynamic programming to determine, within a restricted set of policies, an optimal policy for the defender. We study and interpret the behavior of this optimal policy as we vary certain parameters of the supervisory control problem.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2011

Sequential Detection with Mutual Information Stopping Cost

This paper formulates and solves a sequential detection problem that involves the mutual information (stochastic observability) of a Gaussian process observed in noise with missing measurements. The main result is that the optimal decision is characterized by a monotone policy on the partially ordered set of positive definite covariance matrices. This monotone structure implies that numerically efficient algorithms can be designed to estimate and implement monotone parametrized decision policies.The sequential detection problem is motivated by applications in radar scheduling where the aim is to maintain the mutual information of all targets within a specified bound. We illustrate the problem formulation and performance of monotone parametrized policies via numerical examples in fly-by and persistent-surveillance applications involving a GMTI (Ground Moving Target Indicator) radar.

math.OC↗