arXiv subjects

Ernesto Savaglio

Publications and source records attributed to Ernesto Savaglio.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Sufficientarian Grading Rules and Rankings: Characterizations and Implementation

Sufficientarian grading rules are defined using a finite family of sufficientarian judgements on individual capability assignments as embodied in a sufficientarian binary grading function (BGF). Both sufficientarian grading rules and the sufficientarian total preorders on capability-type assignments they induce are characterized. Moreover, several further total preorders based upon sufficiency-gap information provided by a sufficientarian grading rule are explicitly defined and some of them are also characterized. It is also shown that there exists a class of inclusive, unanimity-respecting and suitably strategy-proof protocols (including simple majority when the number of agents is odd) which can be deployed in order to select one specific sufficientarian grading rule.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2022

Strategy-proof aggregation rules in median semilattices with applications to preference aggregation

Two characterizations of the whole class of strategy-proof aggregation rules on rich domains of locally unimodal preorders in finite median join-semilattices are provided. In particular, it is shown that such a class consists precisely of generalized weak sponsorship rules induced by certain families of order filters of the coalition poset. It follows that the co-majority rule and many other inclusive aggregation rules belong to that class. The co-majority rule for an odd number of agents is characterized and shown to be equivalent to a Condorcet-Kemeny median rule. Applications to preference aggregation rules including Arrowian social welfare functions are also considered. The existence of strategy-proof anonymous, weakly neutral and unanimity-respecting social welfare functions which are defined on arbitrary profiles of total preorders and satisfy a suitably relaxed independence condition is shown to follow from our characterizations.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2014

Strategy-proofness and single-peackedness in bounded distributive lattices

Two distinct specifications of single peakedness as currently met in the relevant literature are singled out and discussed. Then, it is shown that, under both of those specifications, a voting rule as defined on a bounded distributive lattice is strategy-proof on the set of all profiles of single peaked total preorders if and only if it can be represented as an iterated median of projections and constants, or equivalently as the behaviour of a certain median tree-automaton. The equivalence of individual and coalitional strategy-proofness that is known to hold for single peaked domains in bounded linear orders fails in such a general setting. A related impossibility result on anonymous coalitionally strategy-proof voting rules is also obtained.

econ.GN↗