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Evan Munro

Publications and source records attributed to Evan Munro.

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Robust Signal Maximization in Spillover Experiments

We study the optimal design and analysis of experiments for estimating spillover effects. Assuming a known (e.g., linear) exposure mapping, we characterize the treatment-assignment distribution and regression-based estimator that minimize worst-case asymptotic variance against a broad class of distributions of unobservables. The design problem yields an intuitive solution in which the planner trades off spillover signal strength against diffusion of spillover variation. The analysis problem yields a simple recentered instrumental variable estimator to best leverage this variation. This framework produces natural solutions in several benchmark cases - such as clustered exposure - and suggests computationally tractable approximations for general networks, including bipartite settings. We illustrate these new tools in semi-synthetic experiments based on two applications from development economics. Our approach yields large standard error reductions in both experiments, increasing effective sample sizes by 50-100% or more.

econ.EM

Causal Inference under Interference through Designed Markets

In auction and matching markets, estimating the welfare effects of demand-side treatments is challenging because of spillovers through the mechanism. We develop a quasi-experimental approach that avoids parametric assumptions typically imposed by structural methods. For a class of strategy-proof "cutoff" mechanisms, we propose an estimator that runs a weighted and perturbed version of the mechanism on data from a single market. The estimator is semi-parametrically efficient, asymptotically normal, and robust to a wide class of demand-side specifications. We propose spillover-aware targeting rules with vanishing asymptotic regret. Empirically, spillovers diminish the effect of information on inequality in Chilean schools.

econ.EM

Causal Estimation of User Learning in Personalized Systems

In online platforms, the impact of a treatment on an observed outcome may change over time as 1) users learn about the intervention, and 2) the system personalization, such as individualized recommendations, change over time. We introduce a non-parametric causal model of user actions in a personalized system. We show that the Cookie-Cookie-Day (CCD) experiment, designed for the measurement of the user learning effect, is biased when there is personalization. We derive new experimental designs that intervene in the personalization system to generate the variation necessary to separately identify the causal effect mediated through user learning and personalization. Making parametric assumptions allows for the estimation of long-term causal effects based on medium-term experiments. In simulations, we show that our new designs successfully recover the dynamic causal effects of interest.

stat.ME

Treatment Effects in Market Equilibrium

Policy-relevant treatment effect estimation in a marketplace setting requires taking into account both the direct benefit of the treatment and any spillovers induced by changes to the market equilibrium. The standard way to address these challenges is to evaluate interventions via cluster-randomized experiments, where each cluster corresponds to an isolated market. This approach, however, cannot be used when we only have access to a single market (or a small number of markets). Here, we show how to identify and estimate policy-relevant treatment effects using a unit-level randomized trial run within a single large market. A standard Bernoulli-randomized trial allows consistent estimation of direct effects, and of treatment heterogeneity measures that can be used for welfare-improving targeting. Estimating spillovers - as well as providing confidence intervals for the direct effect - requires estimates of price elasticities, which we provide using an augmented experimental design. Our results rely on all spillovers being mediated via the (observed) prices of a finite number of traded goods, and the market power of any single unit decaying as the market gets large. We illustrate our results using a simulation calibrated to a conditional cash transfer experiment in the Philippines.

econ.EM

Treatment Allocation under Uncertain Costs

We consider the problem of learning how to optimally allocate treatments whose cost is uncertain and can vary with pre-treatment covariates. This setting may arise in medicine if we need to prioritize access to a scarce resource that different patients would use for different amounts of time, or in marketing if we want to target discounts whose cost to the company depends on how much the discounts are used. Here, we show that the optimal treatment allocation rule under budget constraints is a thresholding rule based on priority scores (those with a higher score are treated first), and we propose a number of practical methods for learning these priority scores using data from a randomized trial. Our formal results leverage a statistical connection between our problem and that of learning heterogeneous treatment effects under endogeneity using an instrumental variable. We find our method to perform well in a number of empirical evaluations.

stat.ME

Treatment Allocation with Strategic Agents

There is increasing interest in allocating treatments based on observed individual characteristics: examples include targeted marketing, individualized credit offers, and heterogeneous pricing. Treatment personalization introduces incentives for individuals to modify their behavior to obtain a better treatment. Strategic behavior shifts the joint distribution of covariates and potential outcomes. The optimal rule without strategic behavior allocates treatments only to those with a positive Conditional Average Treatment Effect. With strategic behavior, we show that the optimal rule can involve randomization, allocating treatments with less than 100% probability even to those who respond positively on average to the treatment. We propose a sequential experiment based on Bayesian Optimization that converges to the optimal treatment rule without parametric assumptions on individual strategic behavior.

econ.EM

Using Wasserstein Generative Adversarial Networks for the Design of Monte Carlo Simulations

When researchers develop new econometric methods it is common practice to compare the performance of the new methods to those of existing methods in Monte Carlo studies. The credibility of such Monte Carlo studies is often limited because of the freedom the researcher has in choosing the design. In recent years a new class of generative models emerged in the machine learning literature, termed Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) that can be used to systematically generate artificial data that closely mimics real economic datasets, while limiting the degrees of freedom for the researcher and optionally satisfying privacy guarantees with respect to their training data. In addition if an applied researcher is concerned with the performance of a particular statistical method on a specific data set (beyond its theoretical properties in large samples), she may wish to assess the performance, e.g., the coverage rate of confidence intervals or the bias of the estimator, using simulated data which resembles her setting. Tol illustrate these methods we apply Wasserstein GANs (WGANs) to compare a number of different estimators for average treatment effects under unconfoundedness in three distinct settings (corresponding to three real data sets) and present a methodology for assessing the robustness of the results. In this example, we find that (i) there is not one estimator that outperforms the others in all three settings, so researchers should tailor their analytic approach to a given setting, and (ii) systematic simulation studies can be helpful for selecting among competing methods in this situation.

econ.EM

Latent Dirichlet Analysis of Categorical Survey Responses

Beliefs are important determinants of an individual's choices and economic outcomes, so understanding how they comove and differ across individuals is of considerable interest. Researchers often rely on surveys that report individual beliefs as qualitative data. We propose using a Bayesian hierarchical latent class model to analyze the comovements and observed heterogeneity in categorical survey responses. We show that the statistical model corresponds to an economic structural model of information acquisition, which guides interpretation and estimation of the model parameters. An algorithm based on stochastic optimization is proposed to estimate a model for repeated surveys when responses follow a dynamic structure and conjugate priors are not appropriate. Guidance on selecting the number of belief types is also provided. Two examples are considered. The first shows that there is information in the Michigan survey responses beyond the consumer sentiment index that is officially published. The second shows that belief types constructed from survey responses can be used in a subsequent analysis to estimate heterogeneous returns to education.

econ.EM