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Everette Jacob Remington Nelson

Publications and source records attributed to Everette Jacob Remington Nelson.

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PEN-STACK: A non-fabricating tool layer for language-model agents in genome writing

Background. Language-model agents are widely used in biology, but they report quantities without a verifiable source and pose unmanaged biosecurity risks. Genome writing sharpens both: a write plan must specify a location, writer enzyme, cargo, and delivery vehicle, all quantitative and interdependent, so without an integrated tool layer, the agent must supply them. We introduce PEN-STACK, an open tool layer that supplies them with guaranteed provenance. Results. PEN-STACK provides ten genome-writing design stages as twenty-two scope-aware tools, accessible via a software development kit, a Model Context Protocol server, and a Representational State Transfer interface, under a type-enforced invariant: every quantity must originate from a validated tool. Without tools, three model families fabricated 90.8% to 98.8% of the 240 required quantities under a naive prompt; coaching left a residual of 0 to 4, with no model certified at zero. Driving the tools, the same models fabricated nothing on a four-goal audit. A pre-emission biosecurity screen matched expert labels on all eight designs. The expression-robustness axis validated at exact-site resolution (ρ= 0.571, n = 1,506) but not at the coarser resolution served by default (ρ\approx 0.16), which returns a machine-readable downgrade flag. Eight of ten pre-registered claims did not pass, each flagged as machine-readable. Conclusions. On this evidence, grounding, not prompting or model scale, removes fabrication, and grounding requires a substrate; the grounded arm, a four-goal audit, warrants replication at the 240-field scale. PEN-STACK provides that substrate as open, importable code for agentic genome-engineering systems.

q-bio.GN↗

BioFirewall: A genome-writing-native governance layer for design-stage biosecurity screening of agentic AI

Background. Artificial-intelligence design tools now plan genome-scale edits, and agentic systems execute those plans with progressively less human oversight. Biosecurity controls are limited to two points: refusal guardrails at the foundation model and sequence-identity screening at the synthesiser. The design stage between them, where the plan is specified, remains governed by recommendations rather than any deployed system. Results. We present BioFirewall, a rule-governed middleware that intercepts a genome-writing plan and returns allow, flag-for-review, or refuse across five hazard axes native to genome writing: cargo, locus, edit type, germline and scale, with cited evidence, a signed design passport, a tamper-evident audit log, and tiered access. On a de-circularised benchmark of safe proxies scored against independent oracles, a function-aware cargo classifier reached a true-positive rate of 0.72 (95% CI 0.43 to 0.89) at a 1% false-positive rate, whereas frontier and open language-model judges did not screen the same sequences reliably. Under prompt injection, the open-weight judges flipped their blocking verdict to allow in 3 and 5 of 6 trials per channel, while the deterministic screen remained invariant. None of 288 legitimate plans from three templates was refused, yielding a certified 95% upper bound of 0.0103 on the false-refuse rate, and a session monitor intercepted cross-call decomposition attacks. On a held-out gene set, the locus axis was enriched for drivers of in vivo insertional oncogenesis (AUROC 0.605; odds ratio 3.34). Conclusions. Design-stage governance is achievable in practice. BioFirewall is released as open source with a pre-registered, open-data-reproducible benchmark.

q-bio.GN↗