arXiv subjects

F. Nisa Bostancı

Publications and source records attributed to F. Nisa Bostancı.

13 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

MORDOR: Mitigating Overheads of Read Disturbance Preventive Operations via Elastic Refresh Scheduling

Modern DRAM chips are susceptible to read disturbance phenomena such as RowHammer, where repeatedly accessing (hammering) a row of DRAM cells (i.e., a DRAM row) induces bitflips in other physically nearby (victim) DRAM rows. A common practice to avoid such bitflips is to preventively refresh victim rows that might otherwise experience bitflips. Unfortunately, preventive refreshes cause long latencies and need to be performed urgently before the aggressor row is activated again to ensure data integrity. This is done by prioritizing them over demand memory requests, thereby potentially imposing significant delays on those requests and causing performance and energy overheads. Our goal in this work is to alleviate these overheads by scheduling preventive refreshes off the critical path of demand memory requests. We propose MORDOR, a new preventive refresh scheduling policy that significantly reduces system performance degradation and energy consumption caused by preventive refresh operations. MORDOR is integrated into the memory controller and operates alongside memory-controller-based read disturbance mitigation techniques to intelligently delay preventive refresh operations, while maintaining their data integrity guarantees. MORDOR leverages the key observation that a preventive refresh operation targeting an aggressor row can be delayed to serve any other demand memory request, as long as that memory request does not access the aggressor row. By doing so, MORDOR executes latency-critical memory requests before long-latency preventive refresh operations, while mitigating read disturbance bitflips. We evaluate MORDOR by integrating it into six state-of-the-art read disturbance mitigation techniques. Our comprehensive evaluation shows that MORDOR significantly improves system performance and energy efficiency at low area cost.

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arXiv2026

Understanding the Power Consumption of Modern High Bandwidth Memory: Experimental Analysis and Modeling Using Real HBM2 DRAM Chips

We perform the first comprehensive experimental characterization of power consumed by real HBM2 DRAM chips. Our extensive characterization yields 1) the empirical basis for developing new, accurate HBM power models or validating existing power models and 2) key insights into structural and data-pattern-dependent variation of power in HBM2 chips. Out of our 13 new findings and 6 key takeaway messages, we highlight: 1) a read operation consumes significantly higher current than any other operation and 2) the toggled data bus signals in a data transfer burst significantly affect current draw where toggling all HBM2-internal bank group bus signals causes 29.4% higher power consumption than keeping them constant. Leveraging our empirical insights into HBM2 power consumption, we engineer an access pattern that yields 23.6% higher power consumption on average across 36 tested HBM2 chips than the highest-power-consuming JEDEC-specified current measurement loop. Our results have important implications for HBM-based system design and validation. Relying solely on JEDEC- or vendor-specified test loops to bound HBM power could cause system failures and/or thermal throttling in real-world high-power AI/ML workloads. To improve 3D-stacked DRAM power modeling in open source architectural simulation infrastructures, we develop a new HBM power model. Our model predicts the power of 36 real HBM2 chips across diverse workloads (including a real LLM decode workload) with 7.6 -- 8.1% mean absolute percentage error, substantially more accurately than state-of-the-art HBM power models. The power consumption predicted by our model for a power-intensive microbenchmark closely matches (with 2.4% to 5.3% error across HBM3E's specified supply voltage range) the average HBM3E memory power consumed by three tested NVIDIA H200 GPUs. We publicly release our power model at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/HBM-Power.

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arXiv2026

Terracotta: Enabling the Adoption of New DRAM Techniques via a Flexible DRAM Interface and Memory Controller

DRAM continues to limit the performance, energy efficiency, and robustness of modern systems. Many prior works propose DRAM techniques that support in-DRAM computation, improve memory access latency and parallelism, and enhance DRAM maintenance and reliability. However, adopting each new technique requires repeated modifications to the rigid DRAM interface and memory controller, hindering its deployment. Our goal is to reduce these repeated modifications. We observe that the DRAM commands and memory controller structures of many DRAM techniques are similar. Our key idea is to use these similarities to compose a set of primitives for implementing diverse DRAM techniques. We propose Terracotta, a new framework with two flexible components: (i) custom command extensions that let DRAM vendors define new commands within a single, standardized interface, and (ii) a programmable memory controller that system designers can program to support new DRAM techniques post-silicon. Together, these enable deployment by configuring the memory controller instead of modifying the interface and controller. We design Terracotta for a DDR5-based system and evaluate its performance, energy, and hardware complexity. For four DRAM techniques from four distinct domains (processing-using-DRAM, low-cost DRAM maintenance, subarray-level parallelism, and latency reduction), Terracotta retains almost all of the performance benefits (>96%) of custom implementations. A Terracotta-based composition of two techniques outperforms the Terracotta-based implementation of each technique alone, demonstrating the benefits of adding techniques without repeated interface and controller modifications. Terracotta incurs low DRAM energy (0.6-3.2%), area (0.03%), and power (0.56%) overheads in a high-end server-grade processor. Terracotta's source code is freely available at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/Terracotta.

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arXiv2026

PipeDRAM: A Data-Transposition-Free Processing-Using-DRAM Architecture with Hardware/Software Pipelining

Processing-using-DRAM (PUD) architectures exploit the analog operational properties of DRAM to perform bulk bitwise Boolean and arithmetic operations inside memory arrays by organizing data in a vertical layout, where operand bits are stacked along DRAM columns. However, modern computing systems natively employ a horizontal data layout that preserves the cache line abstraction, leverages spatial locality in row buffers, and enables high memory throughput. This fundamental mismatch forces existing PUD architectures to frequently perform data layout transformations between horizontal and vertical formats, incurring significant performance, energy, and system integration overheads. Our goal is to eliminate data transposition overheads in PUD systems at low cost. To this end, we propose PipeDRAM, a PUD architecture that eliminates the need for runtime data layout transformation, enabling PUD operations directly over horizontally laid-out data. PipeDRAM's key ideas are to (i) deterministically reorganize bits inside each memory request to enable a PUD-friendly data placement within a DRAM array in a horizontal data layout, and (ii) employ a pipeline-based execution model that overlaps bit-dependent and bit-independent in-DRAM operations to exploit bit-level parallelism across the memory array. We compare PipeDRAM to different computing platforms. PipeDRAM provides (i) 11.8x, 11.8x, and 80.4x higher performance and (ii) 25.4x, 3.0x, and 38.0x lower energy consumption than three state-of-the-art PUD systems. PipeDRAM incurs low area cost on top of a DRAM chip (1.86%) and CPU die (0.05%). To enable further research on PUD systems, we open-source PipeDRAM at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/PipeDRAM.

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arXiv2026

Ramulator 2.1: A Composable Memory System Simulator for Modern DRAM Systems

Ramulator 2.1 is a major overhaul of Ramulator 2.0 that substantially improves the simulator in three directions: 1) support of modern and emerging DRAM and memory-controller features, 2) better usability and extensibility of the simulator, and 3) more comprehensive tests and validation workflows. Ramulator 2.1 adds support for advanced features in recent and emerging DRAM standards and memory controllers, including HBM3/4, LPDDR5/6, and GDDR7. To improve usability and extensibility, Ramulator 2.1 introduces a Python-based modeling and configuration interface backed by a two-way code-generation framework that 1) hides low-level C++ code behind high-level DRAM specifications written in Python, and 2) automatically creates Python proxies for all components of the simulator. Doing so enables users to rapidly create variants of DRAM standards and automate design-space-exploration workflows. To improve trustworthiness in simulation results, Ramulator 2.1 provides a comprehensive testing and validation infrastructure that covers both 1) fine-grained validation of specific DRAM timing constraints and memory-controller scheduling behavior, and 2) system-level performance evaluation using latency-throughput curves. To aid performance analysis and debugging, Ramulator 2.1 also includes an easy-to-use and high-performance DRAM command trace visualizer. Ramulator 2.1 is open-source on GitHub and under active development.

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arXiv2026

ScaleDisturb: Exploiting Temporal Asymmetry to Amplify Read Disturbance in Modern DRAM Chips

DRAM suffers from read disturbance phenomena (e.g., RowHammer and RowPress), where repeatedly accessing or continuously keeping open a DRAM row (aggressor row) induces bitflips in other physically nearby unaccessed rows (victim rows). The disturbance mechanism is practically exploitable from the software stack and worsens across generations with continued density scaling. DRAM read disturbance is highly sensitive to memory access patterns, yet prior work explores read disturbance under only a limited set of access patterns. We present ScaleDisturb, a new DRAM access pattern that can amplify DRAM read disturbance by asymmetrically extending the open time of two aggressor rows. Our rigorous experimental characterization of 196 DDR4 and 3 HBM2 DRAM chips shows that ScaleDisturb (1) leads to bitflips at significantly fewer row activations, compared to state-of-the-art memory access patterns, (2) makes read disturbance attacks easier across all tested DRAM chips, (3) increases DRAM vulnerability to read disturbance as DRAM manufacturing technology scales down to smaller node sizes. We showcase a proof-of-concept attack on a real system where a user-level program leveraging ScaleDisturb induces more bitflips than state-of-the-art RowHammer and RowPress memory access patterns. We describe and evaluate four solutions for mitigating read disturbance bitflips in the presence of ScaleDisturb and call for more research on the topic.

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arXiv2025

ColumnDisturb: Understanding Column-based Read Disturbance in Real DRAM Chips and Implications for Future Systems

We experimentally demonstrate a new widespread read disturbance phenomenon, ColumnDisturb, in real commodity DRAM chips. By repeatedly opening or keeping a DRAM row (aggressor row) open, we show that it is possible to disturb DRAM cells through a DRAM column (i.e., bitline) and induce bitflips in DRAM cells sharing the same columns as the aggressor row (across multiple DRAM subarrays). With ColumnDisturb, the activation of a single row concurrently disturbs cells across as many as three subarrays (e.g., 3072 rows) as opposed to RowHammer/RowPress, which affect only a few neighboring rows of the aggressor row in a single subarray. We rigorously characterize ColumnDisturb and its characteristics under various operational conditions using 216 DDR4 and 4 HBM2 chips from three major manufacturers. Among our 27 key experimental observations, we highlight two major results and their implications. First, ColumnDisturb affects chips from all three major manufacturers and worsens as DRAM technology scales down to smaller node sizes (e.g., the minimum time to induce the first ColumnDisturb bitflip reduces by up to 5.06x). We observe that, in existing DRAM chips, ColumnDisturb induces bitflips within a standard DDR4 refresh window (e.g., in 63.6 ms) in multiple cells. We predict that, as DRAM technology node size reduces, ColumnDisturb would worsen in future DRAM chips, likely causing many more bitflips in the standard refresh window. Second, ColumnDisturb induces bitflips in many (up to 198x) more rows than retention failures. Therefore, ColumnDisturb has strong implications for retention-aware refresh mechanisms that leverage the heterogeneity in cell retention times: our detailed analyses show that ColumnDisturb greatly reduces the benefits of such mechanisms.

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arXiv2025

Understanding and Mitigating Covert Channel and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer Defenses

DRAM chips are vulnerable to read disturbance phenomena (e.g., RowHammer and RowPress), where repeatedly accessing or keeping open a DRAM row causes bitflips in nearby rows. Attackers leverage RowHammer bitflips in real systems to take over systems and leak data. Consequently, many prior works propose defenses, including recent DDR specifications introducing new defenses (e.g., PRAC and RFM). For robust operation, it is critical to analyze other security implications of RowHammer defenses. Unfortunately, no prior work analyzes the timing covert and side channel vulnerabilities introduced by RowHammer defenses. This paper presents the first analysis and evaluation of timing covert and side channel vulnerabilities introduced by state-of-the-art RowHammer defenses. We demonstrate that RowHammer defenses' preventive actions have two fundamental features that enable timing channels. First, preventive actions reduce DRAM bandwidth availability, resulting in longer memory latencies. Second, preventive actions can be triggered on demand depending on memory access patterns. We introduce LeakyHammer, a new class of attacks that leverage the RowHammer defense-induced memory latency differences to establish communication channels and leak secrets. First, we build two covert channel attacks exploiting two state-of-the-art RowHammer defenses, achieving 39.0 Kbps and 48.7 Kbps channel capacity. Second, we demonstrate a website fingerprinting attack that identifies visited websites based on the RowHammer-preventive actions they cause. We propose and evaluate three countermeasures against LeakyHammer. Our results show that fundamentally mitigating LeakyHammer induces large performance overheads in highly RowHammer-vulnerable systems. We believe and hope our work can enable and aid future work on designing better solutions and more robust systems in the presence of such new vulnerabilities.

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arXiv2025

PuDHammer: Experimental Analysis of Read Disturbance Effects of Processing-using-DRAM in Real DRAM Chips

Processing-using-DRAM (PuD) is a promising paradigm for alleviating the data movement bottleneck using DRAM's massive internal parallelism and bandwidth to execute very wide operations. Performing a PuD operation involves activating multiple DRAM rows in quick succession or simultaneously, i.e., multiple-row activation. Multiple-row activation is fundamentally different from conventional memory access patterns that activate one DRAM row at a time. However, repeatedly activating even one DRAM row (e.g., RowHammer) can induce bitflips in unaccessed DRAM rows because modern DRAM is subject to read disturbance. Unfortunately, no prior work investigates the effects of multiple-row activation on DRAM read disturbance. In this paper, we present the first characterization study of read disturbance effects of multiple-row activation-based PuD (which we call PuDHammer) using 316 real DDR4 DRAM chips from four major DRAM manufacturers. Our detailed characterization show that 1) PuDHammer significantly exacerbates the read disturbance vulnerability, causing up to 158.58x reduction in the minimum hammer count required to induce the first bitflip ($HC_{first}$), compared to RowHammer, 2) PuDHammer is affected by various operational conditions and parameters, 3) combining RowHammer with PuDHammer is more effective than using RowHammer alone to induce read disturbance error, e.g., doing so reduces $HC_{first}$ by 1.66x on average, and 4) PuDHammer bypasses an in-DRAM RowHammer mitigation mechanism (Target Row Refresh) and induces more bitflips than RowHammer. To develop future robust PuD-enabled systems in the presence of PuDHammer, we 1) develop three countermeasures and 2) adapt and evaluate the state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation standardized by industry, called Per Row Activation Counting (PRAC). We show that the adapted PRAC incurs large performance overheads (48.26%, on average).

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arXiv2024

MIMDRAM: An End-to-End Processing-Using-DRAM System for High-Throughput, Energy-Efficient and Programmer-Transparent Multiple-Instruction Multiple-Data Processing

Processing-using-DRAM (PUD) is a processing-in-memory (PIM) approach that uses a DRAM array's massive internal parallelism to execute very-wide data-parallel operations, in a single-instruction multiple-data (SIMD) fashion. However, DRAM rows' large and rigid granularity limit the effectiveness and applicability of PUD in three ways. First, since applications have varying degrees of SIMD parallelism, PUD execution often leads to underutilization, throughput loss, and energy waste. Second, most PUD architectures are limited to the execution of parallel map operations. Third, the need to feed the wide DRAM row with tens of thousands of data elements combined with the lack of adequate compiler support for PUD systems create a programmability barrier. Our goal is to design a flexible PUD system that overcomes the limitations caused by the large and rigid granularity of PUD. To this end, we propose MIMDRAM, a hardware/software co-designed PUD system that introduces new mechanisms to allocate and control only the necessary resources for a given PUD operation. The key idea of MIMDRAM is to leverage fine-grained DRAM (i.e., the ability to independently access smaller segments of a large DRAM row) for PUD computation. MIMDRAM exploits this key idea to enable a multiple-instruction multiple-data (MIMD) execution model in each DRAM subarray. We evaluate MIMDRAM using twelve real-world applications and 495 multi-programmed application mixes. Our evaluation shows that MIMDRAM provides 34x the performance, 14.3x the energy efficiency, 1.7x the throughput, and 1.3x the fairness of a state-of-the-art PUD framework, along with 30.6x and 6.8x the energy efficiency of a high-end CPU and GPU, respectively. MIMDRAM adds small area cost to a DRAM chip (1.11%) and CPU die (0.6%).

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arXiv2023

Ramulator 2.0: A Modern, Modular, and Extensible DRAM Simulator

We present Ramulator 2.0, a highly modular and extensible DRAM simulator that enables rapid and agile implementation and evaluation of design changes in the memory controller and DRAM to meet the increasing research effort in improving the performance, security, and reliability of memory systems. Ramulator 2.0 abstracts and models key components in a DRAM-based memory system and their interactions into shared interfaces and independent implementations. Doing so enables easy modification and extension of the modeled functions of the memory controller and DRAM in Ramulator 2.0. The DRAM specification syntax of Ramulator 2.0 is concise and human-readable, facilitating easy modifications and extensions. Ramulator 2.0 implements a library of reusable templated lambda functions to model the functionalities of DRAM commands to simplify the implementation of new DRAM standards, including DDR5, LPDDR5, HBM3, and GDDR6. We showcase Ramulator 2.0's modularity and extensibility by implementing and evaluating a wide variety of RowHammer mitigation techniques that require different memory controller design changes. These techniques are added modularly as separate implementations without changing any code in the baseline memory controller implementation. Ramulator 2.0 is rigorously validated and maintains a fast simulation speed compared to existing cycle-accurate DRAM simulators. Ramulator 2.0 is open-sourced under the permissive MIT license at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/ramulator2

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arXiv2022

TuRaN: True Random Number Generation Using Supply Voltage Underscaling in SRAMs

Prior works propose SRAM-based TRNGs that extract entropy from SRAM arrays. SRAM arrays are widely used in a majority of specialized or general-purpose chips that perform the computation to store data inside the chip. Thus, SRAM-based TRNGs present a low-cost alternative to dedicated hardware TRNGs. However, existing SRAM-based TRNGs suffer from 1) low TRNG throughput, 2) high energy consumption, 3) high TRNG latency, and 4) the inability to generate true random numbers continuously, which limits the application space of SRAM-based TRNGs. Our goal in this paper is to design an SRAM-based TRNG that overcomes these four key limitations and thus, extends the application space of SRAM-based TRNGs. To this end, we propose TuRaN, a new high-throughput, energy-efficient, and low-latency SRAM-based TRNG that can sustain continuous operation. TuRaN leverages the key observation that accessing SRAM cells results in random access failures when the supply voltage is reduced below the manufacturer-recommended supply voltage. TuRaN generates random numbers at high throughput by repeatedly accessing SRAM cells with reduced supply voltage and post-processing the resulting random faults using the SHA-256 hash function. To demonstrate the feasibility of TuRaN, we conduct SPICE simulations on different process nodes and analyze the potential of access failure for use as an entropy source. We verify and support our simulation results by conducting real-world experiments on two commercial off-the-shelf FPGA boards. We evaluate the quality of the random numbers generated by TuRaN using the widely-adopted NIST standard randomness tests and observe that TuRaN passes all tests. TuRaN generates true random numbers with (i) an average (maximum) throughput of 1.6Gbps (1.812Gbps), (ii) 0.11nJ/bit energy consumption, and (iii) 278.46us latency.

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arXiv2022

DR-STRaNGe: End-to-End System Design for DRAM-based True Random Number Generators

Random number generation is an important task in a wide variety of critical applications including cryptographic algorithms, scientific simulations, and industrial testing tools. True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) produce truly random data by sampling a physical entropy source that typically requires custom hardware and suffers from long latency. To enable high-bandwidth and low-latency TRNGs on commodity devices, recent works propose TRNGs that use DRAM as an entropy source. Although prior works demonstrate promising DRAM-based TRNGs, integration of such mechanisms into real systems poses challenges. We identify three challenges for using DRAM-based TRNGs in current systems: (1) generating random numbers can degrade system performance by slowing down concurrently-running applications due to the interference between RNG and regular memory operations in the memory controller (i.e., RNG interference), (2) this RNG interference can degrade system fairness by unfairly prioritizing applications that intensively use random numbers (i.e., RNG applications), and (3) RNG applications can experience significant slowdowns due to the high RNG latency. We propose DR-STRaNGe, an end-to-end system design for DRAM-based TRNGs that (1) reduces the RNG interference by separating RNG requests from regular requests in the memory controller, (2) improves the system fairness with an RNG-aware memory request scheduler, and (3) hides the large TRNG latencies using a random number buffering mechanism with a new DRAM idleness predictor that accurately identifies idle DRAM periods. We evaluate DR-STRaNGe using a set of 186 multiprogrammed workloads. Compared to an RNG-oblivious baseline system, DR-STRaNGe improves the average performance of non-RNG and RNG applications by 17.9% and 25.1%, respectively. DR-STRaNGe improves average system fairness by 32.1% and reduces average energy consumption by 21%.

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