Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Fabien Gensbittel

Publications and source records attributed to Fabien Gensbittel.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

A class of singular control problems with tipping points

Tipping points characterize situations where a regulated system may experience a sudden and irreversible change and are generally associated with a random state of the system below which the change materializes. In this paper, we study a singular stochastic control problem in which the performance criterion depends on the hitting time of a random state that is not a stopping time for the reference filtration. We establish a connection between the value of this problem and that of a singular control problem involving a diffusion and its running minimum. We provide a verification lemma that we apply to explicitly solve a resource-extraction problem with an ex-ante unknown tipping point.

math.OC↗

Mixed Markov-Perfect Equilibria in the Continuous-Time War of Attrition

We prove the existence of a Markov-perfect equilibrium in randomized stopping times for a model of the war of attrition in which the underlying state variable follows a homogenous linear diffusion. The proof uses the fact that the space of Markovian randomized stopping times can be topologized as a compact absolute retract, which in turn enables us to use a powerful fixed-point theorem by Eilenberg and Montgomery. We illustrate our results with an example of a war of attrition that admits a mixed-strategy Markov-perfect equilibrium but no pure-strategy Markov-perfect equilibrium.

math.OC↗

Nash equilibria for dividend distribution with competition

We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic game in which two financially-constrained firms operate in the same market. The firms distribute dividends and are faced with default risk. The strategic interaction arises from the fact that if one firm defaults, the other one becomes a monopolist and increases its profitability. The firms choose their dividend distribution policies from a class of randomised strategies and we identify two types of equilibria, depending on the firms' initial endowments. In both situations the optimal strategies and the equilibrium payoffs are found explicitly.

math.OC↗

Games played by Exponential Weights Algorithms

This paper studies the last-iterate convergence properties of the exponential weights algorithm with constant learning rates. We consider a repeated interaction in discrete time, where each player uses an exponential weights algorithm characterized by an initial mixed action and a fixed learning rate, so that the mixed action profile $p^t$ played at stage $t$ follows an homogeneous Markov chain. At first, we show that whenever a strict Nash equilibrium exists, the probability to play a strict Nash equilibrium at the next stage converges almost surely to 0 or 1. Secondly, we show that the limit of $p^t$, whenever it exists, belongs to the set of ``Nash Equilibria with Equalizing Payoffs''. Thirdly, we show that in strong coordination games, where the payoff of a player is positive on the diagonal and 0 elsewhere, $p^t$ converges almost surely to one of the strict Nash equilibria. We conclude with open questions.

cs.AI↗

Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in the War of Attrition under Uncertainty

We study a generic family of two-player continuous-time nonzero-sum stopping games modeling a war of attrition with symmetric information and stochastic payoffs that depend on an homogeneous linear diffusion. We first show that any Markovian mixed strategy for player $i$ can be represented by a pair $(μ^i,S^i)$, where $μ^i$ is a measure over the state space representing player $i$'s stopping intensity, and $S^i$ is a subset of the state space over which player $i$ stops with probability $1$. We then prove that, if players are asymmetric, then, in all mixed-strategy Markov-perfect equilibria, the measures $μ^i$ have to be essentially discrete, and we characterize any such equilibrium through a variational system satisfied by the players' equilibrium value functions. This result contrasts with the literature, which focuses on pure-strategy equilibria, or, in the case of symmetric players, on mixed-strategy equilibria with absolutely continuous stopping intensities. We illustrate this result by revisiting the model of exit in a duopoly under uncertainty, and exhibit a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which attrition takes place on the equilibrium path though firms have different liquidation values.

math.OC↗

Competition and Recall in Selection Problems

We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of the item, which is represented by a random variable following a known distribution with support contained in [0, 1]. We consider two different settings for this problem. In the first one, namely competitive selection problem with no recall, agents observe the value of each item upon its arrival and decide whether to accept or reject it, in which case they will not select it in future. In the second setting, called competitive selection problem with recall, agents are allowed to select any of the available items arrived so far. For each of these problems, we describe the game induced by the selection problem as a sequential game with imperfect information and study the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs. We also study the efficiency of the game equilibria. More specifically, we address the question of how much better is to have the power of getting any available item against the take-it-or-leave-it fashion. To this end, we define and study the price of anarchy and price of stability of a game instance as the ratio between the maximal sum of payoffs obtained by players under any feasible strategy and the sum of payoffs for the worst and best subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, respectively. For the no recall case, we prove that if there are two agents and two items arriving sequentially over time, both the price of anarchy and price of stability are upper bounded by the constant 4/3 for any value distribution. Even more, we show that this bound is tight.

cs.GT↗

Value-Based Distance Between Information Structures

We define the distance between two information structures as the largest possible difference in value across all zero-sum games. We provide a tractable characterization of distance and use it to discuss the relation between the value of information in games versus single-agent problems, the value of additional information, informational substitutes, complements, or joint information. The convergence to a countable information structure under value-based distance is equivalent to the weak convergence of belief hierarchies, implying, among other things, that for zero-sum games, approximate knowledge is equivalent to common knowledge. At the same time, the space of information structures under the value-based distance is large: there exists a sequence of information structures where players acquire increasingly more information, and $ε$ > 0 such that any two elements of the sequence have distance of at least $ε$. This result answers by the negative the second (and last unsolved) of the three problems posed by J.F. Mertens in his paper Repeated Games , ICM 1986.

math.OC↗

Investment Timing and Technological Breakthroughs

We study the optimal investment policy of a firm facing both technological and cash-flow uncertainty. At any point in time, the firm can decide to invest in a standalone technology or to wait for a technological breakthrough. Breakthroughs occur when market conditions become favorable enough, exceeding a certain threshold value that is ex-ante unknown to the firm. A microfoundation for this assumption is that a breakthrough occurs when the share of the surplus from the new technology accruing to its developer is high enough to cover her privately observed cost. We show that the relevant Markov state variables for the firm's optimal investment policy are the current market conditions and their current historic maximum, and that the firm optimally invests in the stand-alone technology only when market conditions deteriorate enough after reaching a maximum. Empirically, investments in new technologies requiring the active cooperation of developers should thus take place in booms, whereas investments in state-of-the-art technologies should take place in busts. Moreover, the required return for investing in the stand-alone technology is always higher than if this were the only available technology and can take arbitrarily large values following certain histories. Finally, a decrease in development costs, or an increase in the value of the new technology, makes the firm more prone to bear downside risk and to delay investment in the stand-alone technology.

math.OC↗

Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information: the dependent case

Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (1996a, 1996b), De Meyer and Marino (2005) provided optimal strategies for both players in finitely repeated games with incomplete information on two sides, in the independent case. In this note, we extend both the duality techniques and the construction of optimal strategies to the case of general type dependence.

math.OC↗

Value-based distance between the information structures

We dene the distance between two information structures as the largest possible dierence in the value across all zero-sum games. We provide a tractable characterization of the distance, as the minimal distance between 2 polytopes. We use it to show various results about the relation between games and single-agent problems, the value of additional information, informational substitutes, complements, etc. We show that approximate knowledge is similar to approximate common knowledge with respect to the value-based distance. Nevertheless, contrary to the weak topology, the value-based distance does not have a compact completion: there exists a sequence of information structures, where players acquire more and more information, and $ε$ > 0 such that any two elements of the sequence have distance at least $ε$. This result answers by the negative the second (and last unsolved) of the three problems posed by J.F. Mertens in his paper Repeated Games", ICM 1986.

math.OC↗

A Dynkin game on assets with incomplete information on the return

This paper studies a 2-players zero-sum Dynkin game arising from pricing an option on an asset whose rate of return is unknown to both players. Using filtering techniques we first reduce the problem to a zero-sum Dynkin game on a bi-dimensional diffusion $(X,Y)$. Then we characterize the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which each player stops at the hitting time of $(X,Y)$ to a set with moving boundary. A detailed description of the stopping sets for the two players is provided along with global $C^1$ regularity of the value function.

math.PR↗

The Large Space of Information Structures

We revisit the question of modeling incomplete information among 2 Bayesian players, following an ex-ante approach based on values of zero-sum games. $K$ being the finite set of possible parameters, an information structure is defined as a probability distribution $u$ with finite support over $K\times \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ with the interpretation that: $u$ is publicly known by the players, $(k,c,d)$ is selected according to $u$, then $c$ (resp. $d$) is announced to player 1 (resp. player 2). Given a payoff structure $g$, composed of matrix games indexed by the state, the value of the incomplete information game defined by $u$ and $g$ is denoted $\mathrm{val}(u,g)$. We evaluate the pseudo-distance $d(u,v)$ between 2 information structures $u$ and $v$ by the supremum of $|\mathrm{val}(u,g)-\mathrm{val}(v,g)|$ for all $g$ with payoffs in $[-1,1]$, and study the metric space $Z^*$ of equivalent information structures. We first provide a tractable characterization of $d(u,v)$, as the minimal distance between 2 polytopes, and recover the characterization of Peski (2008) for $u \succeq v$, generalizing to 2 players Blackwell's comparison of experiments via garblings. We then show that $Z^*$, endowed with a weak distance $d_W$, is homeomorphic to the set of consistent probabilities with finite support over the universal belief space of Mertens and Zamir. Finally we show the existence of a sequence of information structures, where players acquire more and more information, and of $\varepsilon>0$ such that any two elements of the sequence have distance at least $\varepsilon$: having more and more information may lead now here. As a consequence, the completion of $(Z^*,d)$ is not compact, hence not homeomorphic to the set of consistent probabilities over the states of the world {\it à la} Mertens and Zamir. This example answers by the negative the second (and last unsolved) of the three problems posed by J.F. Mertens in his paper ``Repeated Games", ICM 1986.

math.OC↗

Continuous-time Markov games with asymmetric information

We study a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information where the payoff depends on a controlled continuous-time Markov chain X with finite state space which is only observed by player 1. This model was already studied in Cardaliaguet et al. (2015) through an approximating sequence of discrete-time games. Our first contribution is the proof of the existence of the value in the continuous-time model based on duality techniques. This value is shown to be the unique solution of the same Hamilton-Jacobi equation with convexity constraints which characterized the limit value obtained in Cardaliaguet et al. (2015). Our second main contribution is to provide a simpler equivalent formulation for this Hamilton-Jacobi equation using directional derivatives and exposed points, which we think is interesting for its own sake as the associated comparison principle has a very simple proof which avoids all the technical machinery of viscosity solutions.

math.OC↗

Zero-sum stopping games with asymmetric information

We study a model of two-player, zero-sum, stopping games with asymmetric information. We assume that the payoff depends on two continuous-time Markov chains (X, Y), where X is only observed by player 1 and Y only by player 2, implying that the players have access to stopping times with respect to different filtrations. We show the existence of a value in mixed stopping times and provide a variational characterization for the value as a function of the initial distribution of the Markov chains. We also prove a verification theorem for optimal stopping rules which allows to construct optimal stopping times. Finally we use our results to solve explicitly two generic examples.

math.OC↗

A two player zerosum game where only one player observes a Brownian motion

We study a two-player zero-sum game in continuous time, where the payoff-a running cost-depends on a Brownian motion. This Brownian motion is observed in real time by one of the players. The other one observes only the actions of his opponent. We prove that the game has a value and characterize it as the largest convex subsolution of a Hamilton-Jacobi equation on the space of probability measures.

math.OC↗

A probabilistic representation for the value of zero-sum differential games with incomplete information on both sides

We prove that for a class of zero-sum differential games with incomplete information on both sides, the value admits a probabilistic representation as the value of a zero-sum stochastic differential game with complete information, where both players control a continuous martingale. A similar representation as a control problem over discontinuous martingales was known for games with incomplete information on one side (see Cardaliaguet-Rainer [8]), and our result is a continuous-time analog of the so called splitting-game introduced in Laraki [20] and Sorin [27] in order to analyze discrete-time models. It was proved by Cardaliaguet [4, 5] that the value of the games we consider is the unique solution of some Hamilton-Jacobi equation with convexity constraints. Our result provides therefore a new probabilistic representation for solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations with convexity constraints as values of stochastic differential games with unbounded control spaces and unbounded volatility.

math.OC↗

Continuous-time limit of dynamic games with incomplete information and a more informed player

We study a two-player, zero-sum, dynamic game with incomplete information where one of the players is more informed than his opponent. We analyze the limit value as the players play more and more frequently. The more informed player observes the realization of a Markov process (X,Y) on which the payoffs depend, while the less informed player only observes Y and his opponent's actions. We show the existence of a limit value as the time span between two consecutive stages goes to zero. This value is characterized through an auxiliary optimization problem and as the unique viscosity solution of a second order Hamilton-Jacobi equation with convexity constraints.

math.OC↗

The value of Markov Chain Games with incomplete information on both sides

We consider zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on both sides, where the states privately observed by each player follow independent Markov chains. It generalizes the model, introduced by Aumann and Maschler in the sixties and solved by Mertens and Zamir in the seventies, where the private states of the players were fixed. It also includes the model introduced in Renault \cite{R2006}, of Markov chain repeated games with lack of information on one side, where only one player privately observes the sequence of states. We prove here that the limit value exists, and we obtain a characterization via the Mertens-Zamir system, where the "non revealing value function" plugged in the system is now defined as the limit value of an auxiliary "non revealing" dynamic game. This non revealing game is defined by restricting the players not to reveal any information on the {\it limit behavior} of their own Markov chain, as in Renault 2006. There are two key technical difficulties in the proof: 1) proving regularity, in the sense of equicontinuity, of the $T$-stage non revealing value functions, and 2) constructing strategies by blocks in order to link the values of the non revealing games with the original values.

math.OC↗