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Fabio A. C. C. Chalub

Publications and source records attributed to Fabio A. C. C. Chalub.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Dynamical compatibility for finite and infinite population models used in genetics

Finite and infinite population models are frequently used in population dynamics. However, their interrelationship is rarely discussed. In this work, we examine the limits of large populations of the Moran process (a finite-population birth-death process) and the replicator equation (an ordinary differential equation) as paradigmatic examples of finite and infinite population models, respectively, both of which are extensively used in population genetics. Except for certain degenerate cases, we completely characterize when these models exhibit similar long-term dynamics, i.e., when there is a one-to-one relation between the stable attractors of the replicator equations and the metastable states of the Moran process. We will discuss our findings and the implications for an improved understanding of the famous Lewontin paradox. To achieve this goal, we first show that the asymptotic expression for the fixation probability in the Moran process, when the population size is large and individual interaction is almost arbitrary (including cases modeled through $d$-player game theory), is a convex combination of the asymptotic approximations obtained in the constant fitness case or 2-player game theory. We discuss several examples and the inverse problem, i.e., how to derive a Moran process that is compatible with a given replicator dynamics. In particular, we prove that modeling a Moran process with an inner metastable state may require the use of $d$-player game theory with possibly large $d$ values, depending on the precise location of the inner equilibrium. We finish by discussing possible connections between the newly introduced concepts and classical concepts of quasistationarity and metastability in the theory of stochastic processes.

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Kinetic formulation of compartmental epidemic models

We introduce a kinetic model that couples the movement of a population of individuals with the dynamics of a pathogen in the same population. We consider that transmission occurs when a susceptible and an infectious individual are sufficiently close for a sufficiently long time. We show that the model is formally compatible with the well-known SIRS model in mathematical epidemiology. Namely, after identifying an appropriate dimensionless variable and considering the limit when that variable is small, we introduce a partial differential equation model of advection-drift-diffusion type (mesoscopic model), which for spatially homogeneous solutions reduces to the SIRS model. We prove the existence and uniqueness of solutions in appropriate spaces for particular instances of the model. We finish with some examples and discuss possible applications and generalisation of this modelling approach, linking kinetic models, evolutionary game theory, and mathematical epidemiology.

math.AP↗

Group centrality in optimal and suboptimal vaccination for epidemic models in contact networks

The pursuit of strategies that minimize the number of individuals needing vaccination to control an outbreak is a well-established area of study in mathematical epidemiology. However, for certain diseases, public policy tends to prioritize immunizing vulnerable individuals over epidemic control. As a result, optimal vaccination strategies may not always be effective in supporting real-world public policies. A similar situation happens when a new vaccine is introduced and is in short supply, as target priority groups for vaccination have to be defined. In this work, we focus on a disease that results in long-term immunity and spreads through a heterogeneous population, represented by a contact network. We study four well-known group centrality measures and show that the GED-Walk offers a reliable means of estimating the impact of vaccinating specific groups of individuals, even in suboptimal cases. Additionally, we depart from the search for target individuals to be vaccinated and provide proxies for identifying optimal groups for vaccination. While the GED-Walk is the most useful centrality measure for suboptimal cases, the betweenness (a related, but different centrality measure) stands out when looking for optimal groups. This indicates that optimal vaccination is not concerned with breaking the largest number of transmission routes, but interrupting geodesic ones.

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Insuperable strategies in two-player and reducible multi-player games

Real populations are seldom found at the Nash equilibrium strategy. The present work focuses on how population size can be a relevant evolutionary force diverting the population from its expected Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of insuperable strategy, a strategy that guarantees that no other player can have a larger payoff than the player that adopts it. We show that this concept is different from the rationality assumption frequently used in game theory and that for small populations the insuperable strategy is the most probable evolutionary outcome for any dynamics that equal game payoff and reproductive fitness. We support our ideas with several examples and numerical simulations. We finally discuss how to extend the concept to multiplayer games, introducing, in a limited way, the concept of game reduction.

cs.GT↗

Social \textit{vs.} individual age-dependent costs of imperfect vaccination

In diseases with long-term immunity, vaccination is known to increase the average age at infection as a result of the decrease in the pathogen circulation. This implies that a vaccination campaign can have negative effects when a disease is more costly (financial or health-related costs) for higher ages. This work considers an age-structured population transmission model with imperfect vaccination. We aim to compare the social and individual costs of vaccination, assuming that disease costs are age-dependent, while the disease's dynamic is age-independent. A model coupling pathogen deterministic dynamics for a population consisting of juveniles and adults, assumed to be rational agents, is introduced. The parameter region for which vaccination has a positive social impact is fully characterized and the Nash equilibrium of the vaccination game is obtained. Finally, collective strategies designed to promote voluntary vaccination, without compromising social welfare, are discussed.

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Population dynamics and games of variable size

This work introduces the concept of Variable Size Game Theory (VSGT), in which the number of players in a game is a strategic decision made by the players themselves. We start by discussing the main examples in game theory: dominance, coexistence, and coordination. We show that the same set of pay-offs can result in coordination-like or coexistence-like games depending on the strategic decision of each player type. We also solve an inverse problem to find a $d$-player game that reproduces the same fixation pattern of the VSGT. In the sequel, we consider a game involving prosocial and antisocial players, i.e., individuals who tend to play with large groups and small groups, respectively. In this game, a certain task should be performed, that will benefit one of the participants at the expense of the other players. We show that individuals able to gather large groups to perform the task may prevail, even if this task is costly, providing a possible scenario for the evolution of eusociality. The next example shows that different strategies regarding game size may lead to spontaneous separation of different types, a possible scenario for speciation without physical separation (sympatric speciation). In the last example, we generalize to three types of populations from the previous analysis and study compartmental epidemic models: in particular, we recast the SIRS model into the VSGT framework: Susceptibles play 2-player games, while Infectious and Removed play a 1-player game. The SIRS epidemic model is then obtained as the replicator equation of the VSGT. We finish with possible applications of VSGT to be addressed in the future.

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A Markov chain model to investigate the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in hospitals

Ordinary differential equation (ODE) models used in mathematical epidemiology assume explicitly or implicitly large populations. For the study of infections in a hospital this is an extremely restrictive assumption as typically a hospital ward has a few dozen, or even fewer, patients. This work reframes a well-known model used in the study of the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in hospitals, to consider the pathogen transmission dynamics in small populations. In this vein, this paper proposes a Markov chain model to describe the spread of a single bacterial species in a hospital ward where patients may be free of bacteria or may carry bacterial strains that are either sensitive or resistant to antimicrobial agents. We determine the probability law of the \emph{exact} reproduction number ${\cal R}_{exact,0}$, which is here defined as the random number of secondary infections generated by those patients who are accommodated in a predetermined bed before a patient who is free of bacteria is accommodated in this bed for the first time. Specifically, we decompose the exact reproduction number ${\cal R}_{exact,0}$ into two contributions allowing us to distinguish between infections due to the sensitive and the resistant bacterial strains. Our methodology is mainly based on structured Markov chains and the use of related matrix-analytic methods. This guarantees the compatibility of the new, finite-population model, with large population models present in the literature and takes full advantage, in its mathematical analysis, of the intrinsic stochasticity.

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Entropy and the arrow of time in population dynamics

The concept of entropy in statistical physics is related to the existence of irreversible macroscopic processes. In this work, we explore a recently introduced entropy formula for a class of stochastic processes with more than one absorbing state that is extensively used in population genetics models. We will consider the Moran process as a paradigm for this class, and will extend our discussion to other models outside this class. We will also discuss the relation between non-extensive entropies in physics and epistasis (i.e., when the effects of different alleles are not independent) and the role of symmetries in population genetic models.

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Solution of the Neutral Kimura equation with two integral constraints

The Kimura equation is a degenerated partial differential equation of drift-diffusion type used in population genetics. Its solution is required to satisfy not only the equation but a series of conservation laws formulated as integral constraints. In this work, we consider a population of two types evolving without mutation or selection, the so-called neutral evolution. We obtain explicit solutions in terms of Gegenbauer polynomials. To satisfy the integral constraints it is necessary to prove new relations satisfied by the Gegenbauer polynomials. The long-term in time asymptotic is also studied.

math.AP↗

Gradient flow formulations of discrete and continuous evolutionary models: a unifying perspective

We consider three classical models of biological evolution: (i) the Moran process, an example of a reducible Markov Chain; (ii) the Kimura Equation, a particular case of a degenerated Fokker-Planck Diffusion; (iii) the Replicator Equation, a paradigm in Evolutionary Game Theory. While these approaches are not completely equivalent, they are intimately connected, since (ii) is the diffusion approximation of (i), and (iii) is obtained from (ii) in an appropriate limit. It is well known that the Replicator Dynamics for two strategies is a gradient flow with respect to the celebrated Shahshahani distance. We reformulate the Moran process and the Kimura Equation as gradient flows and in the sequel we discuss conditions such that the associated gradient structures converge: (i) to (ii) and (ii) to (iii). This provides a geometric characterisation of these evolutionary processes and provides a reformulation of the above examples as time minimization of free energy functionals.

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From fixation probabilities to d-player games: an inverse problem in evolutionary dynamics

The probability that the frequency of a particular trait will eventually become unity, the so-called fixation probability, is a central issue in the study of population evolution. Its computation, once we are given a stochastic finite population model without mutations and a (possibly frequency dependent) fitness function, is straightforward and it can be done in several ways. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the fixation probability is an important macroscopic property of the population, its precise knowledge does not give any clear information about the interaction patterns among individuals in the population. Here we address the inverse problem: From a given fixation pattern and population size, we want to infer what is the game being played by the population. This is done by first exploiting the framework developed in FACC Chalub and MO Souza, J. Math. Biol. 75: 1735, 2017., which yields a fitness function that realises this fixation pattern in the Wright-Fisher model. This fitness function always exists, but it is not necessarily unique. Subsequently, we show that any such fitness function can be approximated, with arbitrary precision, using $d$-player game theory, provided $d$ is large enough. The pay-off matrix that emerges naturally from the approximating game will provide useful information about the individual interaction structure that is not itself apparent in the fixation pattern. We present extensive numerical support for our conclusions.

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Fitness potentials and qualitative properties of the Wright-Fisher dynamics

We present a mechanistic formalism for the study of evolutionary dynamics models based on the diffusion approximation described by the Kimura Equation. In this formalism, the central component is the fitness potential, from which we obtain an expression for the amount of work necessary for a given type to reach fixation. In particular, within this interpretation, we develop a graphical analysis --- similar to the one used in classical mechanics --- providing the basic tool for a simple heuristic that describes both the short and long term dynamics. As a by-product, we provide a new definition of an evolutionary stable state in finite populations that includes the case of mixed populations. We finish by showing that our theory -- rigorous for two types evolution without mutations-- is also consistent with the multi-type case, and with the inclusion of rare mutations.

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Migrations, vaccinations and epidemic control

We consider three regions with different public health conditions. In the absence of migration among these regions, the first two have good health conditions and the disease free state is stable; for the third region, on the other hand, the only stable state is the endemic one. When migration is included in the model, we assume that the second region has a disease risk that makes its inhabitants prone to accept to be vaccinated, while the population in the first region tends to reject the vaccination, considered riskier that the disease. Therefore, the second region is a "buffer zone" between the two extremal regions. We study the basic reproductive ratio as a function of the vaccination in all regions and migration among them. This problem is studied numerically, showing explicit situations in which migration will have an overall positive effect in the disease dynamics, with and without vaccinations. We also find explicit formula in the limit of small ("closed borders") and high migration ("open borders").

q-bio.PE↗

On the stochastic evolution of finite populations

This work is a systematic study of discrete Markov chains that are used to describe the evolution of a two-types population. Motivated by results valid for the well-known Moran (M) and Wright-Fisher (WF) processes, we define a general class of Markov chains models which we term the Kimura class. It comprises the majority of the models used in population genetics, and we show that many well-known results valid for M and WF processes are still valid in this class. In all Kimura processes, a mutant gene will either fixate or become extinct, and we present a necessary and sufficient condition for such processes to have the probability of fixation strictly increasing in the initial frequency of mutants. This condition implies that there are WF processes with decreasing fixation probability --- in contradistinction to M processes which always have strictly increasing fixation probability. As a by-product, we show that an increasing fixation probability defines uniquely an M or WF process which realises it, and that any fixation probability with no state having trivial fixation can be realised by at least some WF process. These results are extended to a subclass of processes that are suitable for describing time-inhomogeneous dynamics. We also discuss the traditional identification of frequency dependent fitnesses and pay-offs, extensively used in evolutionary game theory, the role of weak selection when the population is finite, and the relations between jumps in evolutionary processes and frequency dependent fitnesses.

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Asymptotic expression for the fixation probability of a mutant in star graphs

We consider the Moran process in a graph called the "star" and obtain the asymptotic expression for the fixation probability of a single mutant when the size of the graph is large. The expression obtained corrects the previously known expression announced in reference [E Lieberman, C Hauert, and MA Nowak. Evolutionary dynamics on graphs. Nature, 433(7023):312-316, 2005] and further studied in [M. Broom and J. Rychtar. An analysis of the fixation probability of a mutant on special classes of non-directed graphs. Proc. R. Soc. A-Math. Phys. Eng. Sci., 464(2098):2609-2627, 2008]. We also show that the star graph is an accelerator of evolution, if the graph is large enough.

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Optimal Vaccination Strategies and Rational Behaviour in Seasonal Epidemics

We consider a SIR model with temporary immunity and time dependent transmission rate. We assume time dependent vaccination which confers the same immunity as natural infection. We study two types of vaccination strategies: i) optimal vaccination, in the sense that it minimizes the effort of vaccination in the set of vaccination strategies for which, for any sufficiently small perturbation of the disease free state, the number of infectious individuals is monotonically decreasing; ii) Nash-equilibria strategies where all individuals simultaneously minimize the joint risk of vaccination versus the risk of the disease. The former case corresponds to an optimal solution for mandatory vaccinations, while the second correspond to the equilibrium to be expected if vaccination is fully voluntary. We are able to show the existence of both an optimal and Nash strategies in a general setting. In general, these strategies will not be functions but Radon measures. For specific forms of the transmission rate, we provide explicit formulas for the optimal and the Nash vaccination strategies.

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Conservative parabolic problems: non-degenerated theory and degenerated examples from population dynamics

We consider partial differential equations (PDE) of drift-diffusion type in the unit interval, supplemented by either two conservation laws or by a conservation law and a further boundary condition. We treat two different cases: (i) uniform parabolic problems; (ii) degenerated problems at the boundaries. The former can be treated in a very general and complete way, much as the traditional boundary value problems. The latter, however, bring new issues, and we restrict our study to a class of forward Kolmogorov equations that arise naturally when the corresponding stochastic process has either one or two absorbing boundaries. These equations are treated by means of a uniform parabolic regularisation, which then yields a measure solution in the vanishing regularisation limit that is unique. Two prototypical problems from population dynamics are treated in detail.

math.AP↗

Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem

We study fixation in large, but finite, populations with two types, and dynamics governed by birth-death processes. By considering a restricted class of such processes, we derive a continuous approximation for the probability of fixation that is valid beyond the weak-selection (WS) limit. From the continuous approximations, we then obtain asymptotic approximations for evolutionary dynamics with at most one equilibrium, in the selection-driven regime, that does not preclude a weak-selection regime. As an application, we study the fixation pattern when the infinite population limit has an interior Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS): (i) we show that the fixation pattern for the Hawk and Dove game satisfies what we term the one-half law: if the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is outside a small interval around $\sfrac{1}{2}$, the fixation is of dominance type; (ii) we also show that, outside of the weak-selection regime, the long-term dynamics of large populations can have very little resemblance to the infinite population case; in addition, we also present results for the case of two equilibria. Finally, we present continuous restatements valid for large populations of two classical concepts naturally defined in the discrete case: (i) the definition of an $\textsc{ESS}_N$ strategy; (ii) the definition of a risk-dominant strategy. We then present two applications of these restatements: (i) we obtain an asymptotic definition valid in the quasi-neutral regime that recovers both the one-third law under linear fitness and the generalised one-third law for $d$-player games; (ii) we extend the ideas behind the (generalised) one-third law outside the quasi-neutral regime and, as a generalisation, we introduce the concept of critical-frequency; (iii) we recover the classification of risk-dominant strategies for $d$-player games.

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