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Fabio Gritti

Publications and source records attributed to Fabio Gritti.

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SeedSmith: LLM-Driven Seed Synthesis for Directed Fuzzing

Directed fuzzing steers fuzzers toward user-defined sink functions to identify vulnerabilities, but it frequently fails to trigger crashes even after long campaigns. We identify two challenges that prevent directed fuzzers from exposing crashes: incomplete static analysis of indirect calls, which leaves reachable paths invisible to distance-based guidance, and lack of semantic guidance for crash preconditions, which blind mutation cannot satisfy within practical time budgets. A natural intervention point is the initial seed corpus: seeds that encode the right control-flow path and satisfy key crash preconditions shift fuzzing from blind exploration to local refinement. Existing seed generation approaches address neither: grammar-based and format-driven methods produce structurally valid inputs with no sink awareness, while LLM-based methods either lack sink targeting or inherit static analysis limitations through one-shot prompting. We present SeedSmith, an agentic LLM pipeline that replicates a security analyst's workflow: starting from a sink, it iteratively explores the codebase, resolves indirect calls, identifies crash preconditions, and synthesizes concrete inputs that satisfy them. Because SeedSmith operates as a seed generation front-end, its seeds are fuzzer-agnostic and improve any downstream mutation-based fuzzer without modification. On Magma, fuzzers using SeedSmith seeds achieve geometric mean crash-time speedups of 11.51 times (AFL++) to 14.66 times (AFLGo) over default seeds. On ARVO, SeedSmith enables fuzzers to trigger 16 previously unreachable bugs spanning 10 projects with diverse input formats.

cs.CR

Exploiting Unfair Advantages: Investigating Opportunistic Trading in the NFT Market

As cryptocurrency evolved, new financial instruments, such as lending and borrowing protocols, currency exchanges, fungible and non-fungible tokens (NFT), staking and mining protocols have emerged. A financial ecosystem built on top of a blockchain is supposed to be fair and transparent for each participating actor. Yet, there are sophisticated actors who turn their domain knowledge and market inefficiencies to their strategic advantage; thus extracting value from trades not accessible to others. This situation is further exacerbated by the fact that blockchain-based markets and decentralized finance (DeFi) instruments are mostly unregulated. Though a large body of work has already studied the unfairness of different aspects of DeFi and cryptocurrency trading, the economic intricacies of non-fungible token (NFT) trades necessitate further analysis and academic scrutiny. The trading volume of NFTs has skyrocketed in recent years. A single NFT trade worth over a million US dollars, or marketplaces making billions in revenue is not uncommon nowadays. While previous research indicated the presence of wrongdoings in the NFT market, to our knowledge, we are the first to study predatory trading practices, what we call opportunistic trading, in depth. Opportunistic traders are sophisticated actors who employ automated, high-frequency NFT trading strategies, which, oftentimes, are malicious, deceptive, or, at the very least, unfair. Such attackers weaponize their advanced technical knowledge and superior understanding of DeFi protocols to disrupt trades of unsuspecting users, and collect profits from economic situations that are inaccessible to ordinary users, in a "supposedly" fair market. In this paper, we explore three such broad classes of opportunistic strategies aiming to realize three distinct trading objectives, viz., acquire, instant profit generation, and loss minimization.

q-fin.TR