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Fabio Roli

Publications and source records attributed to Fabio Roli.

At least 73 records · Page 4Linked to original sources

Can machines learn to see without visual databases?

This paper sustains the position that the time has come for thinking of learning machines that conquer visual skills in a truly human-like context, where a few human-like object supervisions are given by vocal interactions and pointing aids only. This likely requires new foundations on computational processes of vision with the final purpose of involving machines in tasks of visual description by living in their own visual environment under simple man-machine linguistic interactions. The challenge consists of developing machines that learn to see without needing to handle visual databases. This might open the doors to a truly orthogonal competitive track concerning deep learning technologies for vision which does not rely on the accumulation of huge visual databases.

cs.CV↗

Fast Minimum-norm Adversarial Attacks through Adaptive Norm Constraints

Evaluating adversarial robustness amounts to finding the minimum perturbation needed to have an input sample misclassified. The inherent complexity of the underlying optimization requires current gradient-based attacks to be carefully tuned, initialized, and possibly executed for many computationally-demanding iterations, even if specialized to a given perturbation model. In this work, we overcome these limitations by proposing a fast minimum-norm (FMN) attack that works with different $\ell_p$-norm perturbation models ($p=0, 1, 2, \infty$), is robust to hyperparameter choices, does not require adversarial starting points, and converges within few lightweight steps. It works by iteratively finding the sample misclassified with maximum confidence within an $\ell_p$-norm constraint of size $ε$, while adapting $ε$ to minimize the distance of the current sample to the decision boundary. Extensive experiments show that FMN significantly outperforms existing attacks in terms of convergence speed and computation time, while reporting comparable or even smaller perturbation sizes.

cs.LG↗

Fingerprint recognition with embedded presentation attacks detection: are we ready?

The diffusion of fingerprint verification systems for security applications makes it urgent to investigate the embedding of software-based presentation attack detection algorithms (PAD) into such systems. Companies and institutions need to know whether such integration would make the system more "secure" and whether the technology available is ready, and, if so, at what operational working conditions. Despite significant improvements, especially by adopting deep learning approaches to fingerprint PAD, current research did not state much about their effectiveness when embedded in fingerprint verification systems. We believe that the lack of works is explained by the lack of instruments to investigate the problem, that is, modeling the cause-effect relationships when two non-zero error-free systems work together. Accordingly, this paper explores the fusion of PAD into verification systems by proposing a novel investigation instrument: a performance simulator based on the probabilistic modeling of the relationships among the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) of the two individual systems when PAD and verification stages are implemented sequentially. As a matter of fact, this is the most straightforward, flexible, and widespread approach. We carry out simulations on the PAD algorithms' ROCs submitted to the most recent editions of LivDet (2017-2019), the state-of-the-art NIST Bozorth3, and the top-level Veryfinger 12 matchers. Reported experiments explore significant scenarios to get the conditions under which fingerprint matching with embedded PAD can improve, rather than degrade, the overall personal verification performance.

cs.CR↗

Do Gradient-based Explanations Tell Anything About Adversarial Robustness to Android Malware?

While machine-learning algorithms have demonstrated a strong ability in detecting Android malware, they can be evaded by sparse evasion attacks crafted by injecting a small set of fake components, e.g., permissions and system calls, without compromising intrusive functionality. Previous work has shown that, to improve robustness against such attacks, learning algorithms should avoid overemphasizing few discriminant features, providing instead decisions that rely upon a large subset of components. In this work, we investigate whether gradient-based attribution methods, used to explain classifiers' decisions by identifying the most relevant features, can be used to help identify and select more robust algorithms. To this end, we propose to exploit two different metrics that represent the evenness of explanations, and a new compact security measure called Adversarial Robustness Metric. Our experiments conducted on two different datasets and five classification algorithms for Android malware detection show that a strong connection exists between the uniformity of explanations and adversarial robustness. In particular, we found that popular techniques like Gradient*Input and Integrated Gradients are strongly correlated to security when applied to both linear and nonlinear detectors, while more elementary explanation techniques like the simple Gradient do not provide reliable information about the robustness of such classifiers.

cs.LG↗

The Hammer and the Nut: Is Bilevel Optimization Really Needed to Poison Linear Classifiers?

One of the most concerning threats for modern AI systems is data poisoning, where the attacker injects maliciously crafted training data to corrupt the system's behavior at test time. Availability poisoning is a particularly worrisome subset of poisoning attacks where the attacker aims to cause a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. However, the state-of-the-art algorithms are computationally expensive because they try to solve a complex bi-level optimization problem (the "hammer"). We observed that in particular conditions, namely, where the target model is linear (the "nut"), the usage of computationally costly procedures can be avoided. We propose a counter-intuitive but efficient heuristic that allows contaminating the training set such that the target system's performance is highly compromised. We further suggest a re-parameterization trick to decrease the number of variables to be optimized. Finally, we demonstrate that, under the considered settings, our framework achieves comparable, or even better, performances in terms of the attacker's objective while being significantly more computationally efficient.

cs.LG↗

Adversarial EXEmples: A Survey and Experimental Evaluation of Practical Attacks on Machine Learning for Windows Malware Detection

Recent work has shown that adversarial Windows malware samples - referred to as adversarial EXEmples in this paper - can bypass machine learning-based detection relying on static code analysis by perturbing relatively few input bytes. To preserve malicious functionality, previous attacks either add bytes to existing non-functional areas of the file, potentially limiting their effectiveness, or require running computationally-demanding validation steps to discard malware variants that do not correctly execute in sandbox environments. In this work, we overcome these limitations by developing a unifying framework that does not only encompass and generalize previous attacks against machine-learning models, but also includes three novel attacks based on practical, functionality-preserving manipulations to the Windows Portable Executable (PE) file format. These attacks, named Full DOS, Extend and Shift, inject the adversarial payload by respectively manipulating the DOS header, extending it, and shifting the content of the first section. Our experimental results show that these attacks outperform existing ones in both white-box and black-box scenarios, achieving a better trade-off in terms of evasion rate and size of the injected payload, while also enabling evasion of models that have been shown to be robust to previous attacks. To facilitate reproducibility of our findings, we open source our framework and all the corresponding attack implementations as part of the secml-malware Python library. We conclude this work by discussing the limitations of current machine learning-based malware detectors, along with potential mitigation strategies based on embedding domain knowledge coming from subject-matter experts directly into the learning process.

cs.CR↗

Functionality-preserving Black-box Optimization of Adversarial Windows Malware

Windows malware detectors based on machine learning are vulnerable to adversarial examples, even if the attacker is only given black-box query access to the model. The main drawback of these attacks is that: (i) they are query-inefficient, as they rely on iteratively applying random transformations to the input malware; and (ii) they may also require executing the adversarial malware in a sandbox at each iteration of the optimization process, to ensure that its intrusive functionality is preserved. In this paper, we overcome these issues by presenting a novel family of black-box attacks that are both query-efficient and functionality-preserving, as they rely on the injection of benign content - which will never be executed - either at the end of the malicious file, or within some newly-created sections. Our attacks are formalized as a constrained minimization problem which also enables optimizing the trade-off between the probability of evading detection and the size of the injected payload. We empirically investigate this trade-off on two popular static Windows malware detectors, and show that our black-box attacks can bypass them with only few queries and small payloads, even when they only return the predicted labels. We also evaluate whether our attacks transfer to other commercial antivirus solutions, and surprisingly find that they can evade, on average, more than 12 commercial antivirus engines. We conclude by discussing the limitations of our approach, and its possible future extensions to target malware classifiers based on dynamic analysis.

cs.CR↗

Are spoofs from latent fingerprints a real threat for the best state-of-art liveness detectors?

We investigated the threat level of realistic attacks using latent fingerprints against sensors equipped with state-of-art liveness detectors and fingerprint verification systems which integrate such liveness algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, only a previous investigation was done with spoofs from latent prints. In this paper, we focus on using snapshot pictures of latent fingerprints. These pictures provide molds, that allows, after some digital processing, to fabricate high-quality spoofs. Taking a snapshot picture is much simpler than developing fingerprints left on a surface by magnetic powders and lifting the trace by a tape. What we are interested here is to evaluate preliminary at which extent attacks of the kind can be considered a real threat for state-of-art fingerprint liveness detectors and verification systems. To this aim, we collected a novel data set of live and spoof images fabricated with snapshot pictures of latent fingerprints. This data set provide a set of attacks at the most favourable conditions. We refer to this method and the related data set as "ScreenSpoof". Then, we tested with it the performances of the best liveness detection algorithms, namely, the three winners of the LivDet competition. Reported results point out that the ScreenSpoof method is a threat of the same level, in terms of detection and verification errors, than that of attacks using spoofs fabricated with the full consensus of the victim. We think that this is a notable result, never reported in previous work.

cs.CV↗

Detecting Anomalies from Video-Sequences: a Novel Descriptor

We present a novel descriptor for crowd behavior analysis and anomaly detection. The goal is to measure by appropriate patterns the speed of formation and disintegration of groups in the crowd. This descriptor is inspired by the concept of one-dimensional local binary patterns: in our case, such patterns depend on the number of group observed in a time window. An appropriate measurement unit, named "trit" (trinary digit), represents three possible dynamic states of groups on a certain frame. Our hypothesis is that abrupt variations of the groups' number may be due to an anomalous event that can be accordingly detected, by translating these variations on temporal trit-based sequence of strings which are significantly different from the one describing the "no-anomaly" one. Due to the peculiarity of the rationale behind this work, relying on the number of groups, three different methods of people group's extraction are compared. Experiments are carried out on the Motion-Emotion benchmark data set. Reported results point out in which cases the trit-based measurement of group dynamics allows us to detect the anomaly. Besides the promising performance of our approach, we show how it is correlated with the anomaly typology and the camera's perspective to the crowd's flow (frontal, lateral).

cs.CV↗

Adversarial Detection of Flash Malware: Limitations and Open Issues

During the past four years, Flash malware has become one of the most insidious threats to detect, with almost 600 critical vulnerabilities targeting Adobe Flash disclosed in the wild. Research has shown that machine learning can be successfully used to detect Flash malware by leveraging static analysis to extract information from the structure of the file or its bytecode. However, the robustness of Flash malware detectors against well-crafted evasion attempts - also known as adversarial examples - has never been investigated. In this paper, we propose a security evaluation of a novel, representative Flash detector that embeds a combination of the prominent, static features employed by state-of-the-art tools. In particular, we discuss how to craft adversarial Flash malware examples, showing that it suffices to manipulate the corresponding source malware samples slightly to evade detection. We then empirically demonstrate that popular defense techniques proposed to mitigate evasion attempts, including re-training on adversarial examples, may not always be sufficient to ensure robustness. We argue that this occurs when the feature vectors extracted from adversarial examples become indistinguishable from those of benign data, meaning that the given feature representation is intrinsically vulnerable. In this respect, we are the first to formally define and quantitatively characterize this vulnerability, highlighting when an attack can be countered by solely improving the security of the learning algorithm, or when it requires also considering additional features. We conclude the paper by suggesting alternative research directions to improve the security of learning-based Flash malware detectors.

cs.CR↗

Adversarial Feature Selection against Evasion Attacks

Pattern recognition and machine learning techniques have been increasingly adopted in adversarial settings such as spam, intrusion and malware detection, although their security against well-crafted attacks that aim to evade detection by manipulating data at test time has not yet been thoroughly assessed. While previous work has been mainly focused on devising adversary-aware classification algorithms to counter evasion attempts, only few authors have considered the impact of using reduced feature sets on classifier security against the same attacks. An interesting, preliminary result is that classifier security to evasion may be even worsened by the application of feature selection. In this paper, we provide a more detailed investigation of this aspect, shedding some light on the security properties of feature selection against evasion attacks. Inspired by previous work on adversary-aware classifiers, we propose a novel adversary-aware feature selection model that can improve classifier security against evasion attacks, by incorporating specific assumptions on the adversary's data manipulation strategy. We focus on an efficient, wrapper-based implementation of our approach, and experimentally validate its soundness on different application examples, including spam and malware detection.

cs.LG↗

Deep Neural Rejection against Adversarial Examples

Despite the impressive performances reported by deep neural networks in different application domains, they remain largely vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e., input samples that are carefully perturbed to cause misclassification at test time. In this work, we propose a deep neural rejection mechanism to detect adversarial examples, based on the idea of rejecting samples that exhibit anomalous feature representations at different network layers. With respect to competing approaches, our method does not require generating adversarial examples at training time, and it is less computationally demanding. To properly evaluate our method, we define an adaptive white-box attack that is aware of the defense mechanism and aims to bypass it. Under this worst-case setting, we empirically show that our approach outperforms previously-proposed methods that detect adversarial examples by only analyzing the feature representation provided by the output network layer.

cs.CV↗

A novel classification-selection approach for the self updating of template-based face recognition systems

The boosting on the need of security notably increased the amount of possible facial recognition applications, especially due to the success of the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm. However, although handcrafted and deep learning-inspired facial features reached a significant level of compactness and expressive power, the facial recognition performance still suffers from intra-class variations such as ageing, facial expressions, lighting changes, and pose. These variations cannot be captured in a single acquisition and require multiple acquisitions of long duration, which are expensive and need a high level of collaboration from the users. Among others, self-update algorithms have been proposed in order to mitigate these problems. Self-updating aims to add novel templates to the users' gallery among the inputs submitted during system operations. Consequently, computational complexity and storage space tend to be among the critical requirements of these algorithms. The present paper deals with the above problems by a novel template-based self-update algorithm, able to keep over time the expressive power of a limited set of templates stored in the system database. The rationale behind the proposed approach is in the working hypothesis that a dominating mode characterises the features' distribution given the client. Therefore, the key point is to select the best templates around that mode. We propose two methods, which are tested on systems based on handcrafted features and deep-learning-inspired autoencoders at the state-of-the-art. Three benchmark data sets are used. Experimental results confirm that, by effective and compact feature sets which can support our working hypothesis, the proposed classification-selection approaches overcome the problem of manual updating and, in case, stringent computational requirements.

cs.CV↗

Towards Quality Assurance of Software Product Lines with Adversarial Configurations

Software product line (SPL) engineers put a lot of effort to ensure that, through the setting of a large number of possible configuration options, products are acceptable and well-tailored to customers' needs. Unfortunately, options and their mutual interactions create a huge configuration space which is intractable to exhaustively explore. Instead of testing all products, machine learning techniques are increasingly employed to approximate the set of acceptable products out of a small training sample of configurations. Machine learning (ML) techniques can refine a software product line through learned constraints and a priori prevent non-acceptable products to be derived. In this paper, we use adversarial ML techniques to generate adversarial configurations fooling ML classifiers and pinpoint incorrect classifications of products (videos) derived from an industrial video generator. Our attacks yield (up to) a 100% misclassification rate and a drop in accuracy of 5%. We discuss the implications these results have on SPL quality assurance.

cs.SE↗

Why Do Adversarial Attacks Transfer? Explaining Transferability of Evasion and Poisoning Attacks

Transferability captures the ability of an attack against a machine-learning model to be effective against a different, potentially unknown, model. Empirical evidence for transferability has been shown in previous work, but the underlying reasons why an attack transfers or not are not yet well understood. In this paper, we present a comprehensive analysis aimed to investigate the transferability of both test-time evasion and training-time poisoning attacks. We provide a unifying optimization framework for evasion and poisoning attacks, and a formal definition of transferability of such attacks. We highlight two main factors contributing to attack transferability: the intrinsic adversarial vulnerability of the target model, and the complexity of the surrogate model used to optimize the attack. Based on these insights, we define three metrics that impact an attack's transferability. Interestingly, our results derived from theoretical analysis hold for both evasion and poisoning attacks, and are confirmed experimentally using a wide range of linear and non-linear classifiers and datasets.

cs.LG↗

3D Face Mask Presentation Attack Detection Based on Intrinsic Image Analysis

Face presentation attacks have become a major threat to face recognition systems and many countermeasures have been proposed in the past decade. However, most of them are devoted to 2D face presentation attacks, rather than 3D face masks. Unlike the real face, the 3D face mask is usually made of resin materials and has a smooth surface, resulting in reflectance differences. So, we propose a novel detection method for 3D face mask presentation attack by modeling reflectance differences based on intrinsic image analysis. In the proposed method, the face image is first processed with intrinsic image decomposition to compute its reflectance image. Then, the intensity distribution histograms are extracted from three orthogonal planes to represent the intensity differences of reflectance images between the real face and 3D face mask. After that, the 1D convolutional network is further used to capture the information for describing different materials or surfaces react differently to changes in illumination. Extensive experiments on the 3DMAD database demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in distinguishing a face mask from the real one and show that the detection performance outperforms other state-of-the-art methods.

cs.CV↗

Explaining Vulnerabilities of Deep Learning to Adversarial Malware Binaries

Recent work has shown that deep-learning algorithms for malware detection are also susceptible to adversarial examples, i.e., carefully-crafted perturbations to input malware that enable misleading classification. Although this has questioned their suitability for this task, it is not yet clear why such algorithms are easily fooled also in this particular application domain. In this work, we take a first step to tackle this issue by leveraging explainable machine-learning algorithms developed to interpret the black-box decisions of deep neural networks. In particular, we use an explainable technique known as feature attribution to identify the most influential input features contributing to each decision, and adapt it to provide meaningful explanations to the classification of malware binaries. In this case, we find that a recently-proposed convolutional neural network does not learn any meaningful characteristic for malware detection from the data and text sections of executable files, but rather tends to learn to discriminate between benign and malware samples based on the characteristics found in the file header. Based on this finding, we propose a novel attack algorithm that generates adversarial malware binaries by only changing few tens of bytes in the file header. With respect to the other state-of-the-art attack algorithms, our attack does not require injecting any padding bytes at the end of the file, and it is much more efficient, as it requires manipulating much fewer bytes.

cs.CR↗

Is Data Clustering in Adversarial Settings Secure?

Clustering algorithms have been increasingly adopted in security applications to spot dangerous or illicit activities. However, they have not been originally devised to deal with deliberate attack attempts that may aim to subvert the clustering process itself. Whether clustering can be safely adopted in such settings remains thus questionable. In this work we propose a general framework that allows one to identify potential attacks against clustering algorithms, and to evaluate their impact, by making specific assumptions on the adversary's goal, knowledge of the attacked system, and capabilities of manipulating the input data. We show that an attacker may significantly poison the whole clustering process by adding a relatively small percentage of attack samples to the input data, and that some attack samples may be obfuscated to be hidden within some existing clusters. We present a case study on single-linkage hierarchical clustering, and report experiments on clustering of malware samples and handwritten digits.

cs.LG↗