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Fang-Yi Yu

Publications and source records attributed to Fang-Yi Yu.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Mixture of Complementary Agents for Robust LLM Ensemble

Multi-AI collaboration, such as ensembling or debating large language models (LLMs), is a promising paradigm for aggregating information and boosting performance. A foundational step in these pipelines is to feed the responses of several proposer LLMs into a summarizer LLM, which synthesizes a better answer. However, choosing which proposers to include is non-trivial. Existing approaches primarily focus either on accuracy (picking the strongest models) or diversity (ensuring variety), and often overlook the interactions among proposers and with the summarizer. We reframe proposer selection as a combinatorial selection problem akin to feature selection, where the value of an LLM lies in its complementarity with others. However, directly applying standard feature-selection algorithms is impractical in the LLM setting due to prohibitive time complexity. Motivated by this limitation, we explore an extensive range of computationally feasible, greedy-style selection algorithms that assess complementarity using a small labeled set. Our experiments validate complementarity as a guiding principle for proposer selection and identify methods that achieve the best performance-cost trade-offs in practice.

cs.LG

Optimally Auditing Adversarial Agents

Fraud can pose a challenge in many resource allocation domains, including social service delivery and credit provision. For example, agents may misreport private information in order to gain benefits or access to credit. To mitigate this, a principal can design strategic audits to verify claims and penalize misreporting. In this paper, we introduce a general model of audit policy design as a principal-agent game with multiple agents, where the principal commits to an audit policy, and agents collectively choose an equilibrium that minimizes the principal's utility. We examine both adaptive and non-adaptive settings, depending on whether the principal's policy can be responsive to the distribution of agent reports. Our work provides efficient algorithms for computing optimal audit policies in both settings and extends these results to a setting with limited audit budgets.

cs.GT

Packing Compact Subgraphs with Applications to Districting

Packing disjoint subgraphs in a given graph is a fundamental problem with many applications. Motivated by political districting, we focus on connected subgraphs that are compact (e.g., having constant radius from a single center vertex) and that satisfy additional composition requirements, such as a minimum population/weight threshold or balanced weight types (e.g., political affiliations). We aim to maximize coverage by disjoint districts that meet these requirements. In this work, we present new results that substantially improve the previously known bounds on balanced star districts for planar and minor-free graphs (Dharangutte et al. 2025). In particular, we improve the approximation factor from $O(\log n)$ to $O(1)$ for packing balanced star districts using the exact same algorithm, but with a refined analysis. We also extend the results beyond planar graphs to minor-free graphs and an even broader family of graphs of bounded expansion. Additionally, we obtain an $O(1)$ approximation for packing radius-$k$ districts (with a constant $k$) in planar and apex-minor-free graphs. In order to get a $(1+\varepsilon)$ approximation on the max coverage, we show that this can be achieved if we allow a slight relaxation of the balancedness parameters (by a factor that can be made arbitrarily close to $1$), for bounded radius-$k$ districts on planar and apex-minor-free graphs. We show that all of these results can also be obtained if we enforce a minimum weight threshold for each district as the composition requirement, rather than balancedness. We present various results on hardness and hardness of approximation for this variant, by graph and district types.

cs.DS

Data Reliability Scoring

How can we assess the reliability of a dataset without access to ground truth? We introduce the problem of reliability scoring for datasets collected from potentially strategic sources. The true data are unobserved, but we see outcomes of an unknown statistical experiment that depends on them. To benchmark reliability, we define ground-truth-based orderings that capture how much reported data deviate from the truth. We then propose the Gram determinant score, which measures the volume spanned by vectors describing the empirical distribution of the observed data and experiment outcomes. We show that this score preserves several ground-truth-based reliability orderings and, uniquely up to scaling, yields the same reliability ranking of datasets regardless of the experimen -- a property we term experiment agnosticism. Experiments on synthetic noise models, CIFAR-10 embeddings, and real employment data demonstrate that the Gram determinant score effectively captures data quality across diverse observation processes.

cs.LG

Hardness and Approximation Algorithms for Balanced Districting Problems

We introduce and study the problem of balanced districting, where given an undirected graph with vertices carrying two types of weights (different population, resource types, etc) the goal is to maximize the total weights covered in vertex disjoint districts such that each district is a star or (in general) a connected induced subgraph with the two weights to be balanced. This problem is strongly motivated by political redistricting, where contiguity, population balance, and compactness are essential. We provide hardness and approximation algorithms for this problem. In particular, we show NP-hardness for an approximation better than $n^{1/2-\delta}$ for any constant $\delta>0$ in general graphs even when the districts are star graphs, as well as NP-hardness on complete graphs, tree graphs, planar graphs and other restricted settings. On the other hand, we develop an algorithm for balanced star districting that gives an $O(\sqrt{n})$-approximation on any graph (which is basically tight considering matching hardness of approximation results), an $O(\log n)$ approximation on planar graphs with extensions to minor-free graphs. Our algorithm uses a modified Whack-a-Mole algorithm [Bhattacharya, Kiss, and Saranurak, SODA 2023] to find a sparse solution of a fractional packing linear program (despite exponentially many variables) and to get a good approximation ratio of the rounding procedure, a crucial element in the analysis is the \emph{balanced scattering separators} for planar graphs and minor-free graphs - separators that can be partitioned into a small number of $k$-hop independent sets for some constant $k$ - which may find independent interest in solving other packing style problems.

cs.DS

Designing Automated Market Makers for Combinatorial Securities: A Geometric Viewpoint

Designing automated market makers (AMMs) for prediction markets on combinatorial securities over large outcome spaces poses significant computational challenges. Prior research has primarily focused on combinatorial prediction markets within specific set systems (e.g., intervals, permutations). We introduce a framework for designing AMMs on arbitrary set systems by building a novel connection to the range query problem in computational geometry. This connection enables the analysis of computational complexity and the design of efficient AMMs. We first demonstrate the equivalence between price queries and trade updates under the popular combinatorial logarithmic market scoring rule market and the range query and range update problem. Building on this equivalence, we construct sublinear time algorithms when the VC dimension of the set system is bounded and show the non-existence of such algorithms for unbounded VC dimension cases. We then extend this approach to AMMs for combinatorial prediction markets with quadratic and power scoring rules. Finally, we show that the multi-resolution market design can be naturally integrated into the partition-tree scheme. Additionally, we introduce the combinatorial swap operation problem for automated market makers in decentralized finance and show that it can be efficiently reduced to range update problems.

cs.GT

Carrot and Stick: Eliciting Comparison Data and Beyond

Comparison data elicited from people are fundamental to many machine learning tasks, including reinforcement learning from human feedback for large language models and estimating ranking models. They are typically subjective and not directly verifiable. How to truthfully elicit such comparison data from rational individuals? We design peer prediction mechanisms for eliciting comparison data using a bonus-penalty payment. Our design leverages on the strong stochastic transitivity for comparison data to create symmetrically strongly truthful mechanisms such that truth-telling 1) forms a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and 2) yields the highest payment among all symmetric equilibria. Each individual only needs to evaluate one pair of items and report her comparison in our mechanism. We further extend the bonus-penalty payment concept to eliciting networked data, designing a symmetrically strongly truthful mechanism when agents' private signals are sampled according to the Ising models. We provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for our bonus-penalty payment to have truth-telling as a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Experiments on two real-world datasets further support our theoretical discoveries.

cs.GT

Algorithmic Robust Forecast Aggregation

Forecast aggregation combines the predictions of multiple forecasters to improve accuracy. However, the lack of knowledge about forecasters' information structure hinders optimal aggregation. Given a family of information structures, robust forecast aggregation aims to find the aggregator with minimal worst-case regret compared to the omniscient aggregator. Previous approaches for robust forecast aggregation rely on heuristic observations and parameter tuning. We propose an algorithmic framework for robust forecast aggregation. Our framework provides efficient approximation schemes for general information aggregation with a finite family of possible information structures. In the setting considered by Arieli et al. (2018) where two agents receive independent signals conditioned on a binary state, our framework also provides efficient approximation schemes by imposing Lipschitz conditions on the aggregator or discrete conditions on agents' reports. Numerical experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method by providing a nearly optimal aggregator in the setting considered by Arieli et al. (2018).

cs.LG

Seeding with Differentially Private Network Information

In public health interventions such as distributing preexposure prophylaxis (PrEP) for HIV prevention, decision makers often use seeding algorithms to identify key individuals who can amplify intervention impact. However, building a complete sexual activity network is typically infeasible due to privacy concerns. Instead, contact tracing can provide influence samples, observed sequences of sexual contacts, without full network reconstruction. This raises two challenges: protecting individual privacy in these samples and adapting seeding algorithms to incomplete data. We study differential privacy guarantees for influence maximization when the input consists of randomly collected cascades. Building on recent advances in costly seeding, we propose privacy-preserving algorithms that introduce randomization in data or outputs and bound the privacy loss of each node. Theoretical analysis and simulations on synthetic and real-world sexual contact data show that performance degrades gracefully as privacy budgets tighten, with central privacy regimes achieving better trade-offs than local ones.

cs.SI

A System-Level Analysis of Conference Peer Review

The conference peer review process involves three constituencies with different objectives: authors want their papers accepted at prestigious venues (and quickly), conferences want to present a program with many high-quality and few low-quality papers, and reviewers want to avoid being overburdened by reviews. These objectives are far from aligned, primarily because the evaluation of a submission is inherently noisy. Over the years, conferences have experimented with numerous policies to navigate the tradeoffs. These experiments include setting various bars for acceptance, varying the number of reviews per submission, requiring prior reviews to be included with resubmissions, and others. In this work, we investigate, both analytically and empirically, how well various policies work, and more importantly, why they do or do not work. We model the conference-author interactions as a Stackelberg game in which a prestigious conference commits to an acceptance policy; the authors best-respond by (re)submitting or not (re)submitting to the conference in each round of review, the alternative being a "sure accept" (such as a lightly refereed venue). Our main results include the following observations: 1) the conference should typically set a higher acceptance threshold than the actual desired quality; we call this the "resubmission gap". 2) the reviewing load is heavily driven by resubmissions of borderline papers - therefore, a judicious choice of acceptance threshold may lead to fewer reviews while incurring an acceptable loss in conference quality. 3) conference prestige, reviewer inaccuracy, and author patience increase the resubmission gap, and thus increase the review load for a fixed level of conference quality. For robustness, we further consider different models of paper quality and compare our theoretical results to simulations based on plausible parameters estimated from real data.

cs.GT

Integer Subspace Differential Privacy

We propose new differential privacy solutions for when external \emph{invariants} and \emph{integer} constraints are simultaneously enforced on the data product. These requirements arise in real world applications of private data curation, including the public release of the 2020 U.S. Decennial Census. They pose a great challenge to the production of provably private data products with adequate statistical usability. We propose \emph{integer subspace differential privacy} to rigorously articulate the privacy guarantee when data products maintain both the invariants and integer characteristics, and demonstrate the composition and post-processing properties of our proposal. To address the challenge of sampling from a potentially highly restricted discrete space, we devise a pair of unbiased additive mechanisms, the generalized Laplace and the generalized Gaussian mechanisms, by solving the Diophantine equations as defined by the constraints. The proposed mechanisms have good accuracy, with errors exhibiting sub-exponential and sub-Gaussian tail probabilities respectively. To implement our proposal, we design an MCMC algorithm and supply empirical convergence assessment using estimated upper bounds on the total variation distance via $L$-lag coupling. We demonstrate the efficacy of our proposal with applications to a synthetic problem with intersecting invariants, a sensitive contingency table with known margins, and the 2010 Census county-level demonstration data with mandated fixed state population totals.

cs.CR

Peer Prediction for Learning Agents

Peer prediction refers to a collection of mechanisms for eliciting information from human agents when direct verification of the obtained information is unavailable. They are designed to have a game-theoretic equilibrium where everyone reveals their private information truthfully. This result holds under the assumption that agents are Bayesian and they each adopt a fixed strategy across all tasks. Human agents however are observed in many domains to exhibit learning behavior in sequential settings. In this paper, we explore the dynamics of sequential peer prediction mechanisms when participants are learning agents. We first show that the notion of no regret alone for the agents' learning algorithms cannot guarantee convergence to the truthful strategy. We then focus on a family of learning algorithms where strategy updates only depend on agents' cumulative rewards and prove that agents' strategies in the popular Correlated Agreement (CA) mechanism converge to truthful reporting when they use algorithms from this family. This family of algorithms is not necessarily no-regret, but includes several familiar no-regret learning algorithms (e.g multiplicative weight update and Follow the Perturbed Leader) as special cases. Simulation of several algorithms in this family as well as the $ε$-greedy algorithm, which is outside of this family, shows convergence to the truthful strategy in the CA mechanism.

cs.GT

Optimal Local Bayesian Differential Privacy over Markov Chains

In the literature of data privacy, differential privacy is the most popular model. An algorithm is differentially private if its outputs with and without any individual's data are indistinguishable. In this paper, we focus on data generated from a Markov chain and argue that Bayesian differential privacy (BDP) offers more meaningful guarantees in this context. Our main theoretical contribution is providing a mechanism for achieving BDP when data is drawn from a binary Markov chain. We improve on the state-of-the-art BDP mechanism and show that our mechanism provides the optimal noise-privacy tradeoffs for any local mechanism up to negligible factors. We also briefly discuss a non-local mechanism which adds correlated noise. Lastly, we perform experiments on synthetic data that detail when DP is insufficient, and experiments on real data to show that our privacy guarantees are robust to underlying distributions that are not simple Markov chains.

cs.CR

Subspace Differential Privacy

Many data applications have certain invariant constraints due to practical needs. Data curators who employ differential privacy need to respect such constraints on the sanitized data product as a primary utility requirement. Invariants challenge the formulation, implementation, and interpretation of privacy guarantees. We propose subspace differential privacy, to honestly characterize the dependence of the sanitized output on confidential aspects of the data. We discuss two design frameworks that convert well-known differentially private mechanisms, such as the Gaussian and the Laplace mechanisms, to subspace differentially private ones that respect the invariants specified by the curator. For linear queries, we discuss the design of near-optimal mechanisms that minimize the mean squared error. Subspace differentially private mechanisms rid the need for post-processing due to invariants, preserve transparency and statistical intelligibility of the output, and can be suitable for distributed implementation. We showcase the proposed mechanisms on the 2020 Census Disclosure Avoidance demonstration data, and a spatio-temporal dataset of mobile access point connections on a large university campus.

cs.CR

Multi-agent Performative Prediction: From Global Stability and Optimality to Chaos

The recent framework of performative prediction is aimed at capturing settings where predictions influence the target/outcome they want to predict. In this paper, we introduce a natural multi-agent version of this framework, where multiple decision makers try to predict the same outcome. We showcase that such competition can result in interesting phenomena by proving the possibility of phase transitions from stability to instability and eventually chaos. Specifically, we present settings of multi-agent performative prediction where under sufficient conditions their dynamics lead to global stability and optimality. In the opposite direction, when the agents are not sufficiently cautious in their learning/updates rates, we show that instability and in fact formal chaos is possible. We complement our theoretical predictions with simulations showcasing the predictive power of our results.

cs.LG

Optimal Scoring Rule Design under Partial Knowledge

This paper studies the design of optimal proper scoring rules when the principal has partial knowledge of an agent's signal distribution. Recent work characterizes the proper scoring rules that maximize the increase of an agent's payoff when the agent chooses to access a costly signal to refine a posterior belief from her prior prediction, under the assumption that the agent's signal distribution is fully known to the principal. In our setting, the principal only knows about a set of distributions where the agent's signal distribution belongs. We formulate the scoring rule design problem as a max-min optimization that maximizes the worst-case increase in payoff across the set of distributions. We propose an efficient algorithm to compute an optimal scoring rule when the set of distributions is finite, and devise a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme that accommodates various infinite sets of distributions. We further remark that widely used scoring rules, such as the quadratic and log rules, as well as previously identified optimal scoring rules under full knowledge, can be far from optimal in our partial knowledge settings.

cs.GT

The Limits of Multi-task Peer Prediction

Recent advances in multi-task peer prediction have greatly expanded our knowledge about the power of multi-task peer prediction mechanisms. Various mechanisms have been proposed in different settings to elicit different types of information. But we still lack understanding about when desirable mechanisms will exist for a multi-task peer prediction problem. In this work, we study the elicitability of multi-task peer prediction problems. We consider a designer who has certain knowledge about the underlying information structure and wants to elicit certain information from a group of participants. Our goal is to infer the possibility of having a desirable mechanism based on the primitives of the problem. Our contribution is twofold. First, we provide a characterization of the elicitable multi-task peer prediction problems, assuming that the designer only uses scoring mechanisms. Scoring mechanisms are the mechanisms that reward participants' reports for different tasks separately. The characterization uses a geometric approach based on the power diagram characterization in the single-task setting ([Lambert and Shoham, 2009, Frongillo and Witkowski, 2017]). For general mechanisms, we also give a necessary condition for a multi-task problem to be elicitable. Second, we consider the case when the designer aims to elicit some properties that are linear in the participant's posterior about the state of the world. We first show that in some cases, the designer basically can only elicit the posterior itself. We then look into the case when the designer aims to elicit the participants' posteriors. We give a necessary condition for the posterior to be elicitable. This condition implies that the mechanisms proposed by Kong and Schoenebeck are already the best we can hope for in their setting, in the sense that their mechanisms can solve any problem instance that can possibly be elicitable.

cs.GT

Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Binary Actions

When can cooperation arise from self-interested decisions in public goods games? And how can we help agents to act cooperatively? We examine these classical questions in a pivotal participation game, a variant of public good games, where heterogeneous agents make binary participation decisions on contributing their endowments, and the public project succeeds when it has enough contributions. We prove it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a cooperative Nash equilibrium such that the project succeeds. We also identify two natural special scenarios where this decision problem is tractable. We then propose two algorithms to help cooperation in the game. Our first algorithm adds an external investment to the public project, and our second algorithm uses matching funds. We show that the cost to induce a cooperative Nash equilibrium is near-optimal for both algorithms. Finally, the cost of matching funds can always be smaller than the cost of adding an external investment. Intuitively, matching funds provide a greater incentive for cooperation than adding an external investment does.

cs.GT