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Fatemeh Borhani

Publications and source records attributed to Fatemeh Borhani.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

GPT-5 vs Other LLMs in Long Short-Context Performance

With the significant expansion of the context window in Large Language Models (LLMs), these models are theoretically capable of processing millions of tokens in a single pass. However, research indicates a significant gap between this theoretical capacity and the practical ability of models to robustly utilize information within long contexts, especially in tasks that require a comprehensive understanding of numerous details. This paper evaluates the performance of four state-of-the-art models (Grok-4, GPT-4, Gemini 2.5, and GPT-5) on long short-context tasks. For this purpose, three datasets were used: two supplementary datasets for retrieving culinary recipes and math problems, and a primary dataset of 20K social media posts for depression detection. The results show that as the input volume on the social media dataset exceeds 5K posts (70K tokens), the performance of all models degrades significantly, with accuracy dropping to around 50-53% for 20K posts. Notably, in the GPT-5 model, despite the sharp decline in accuracy, its precision remained high at approximately 95%, a feature that could be highly effective for sensitive applications like depression detection. This research also indicates that the "lost in the middle" problem has been largely resolved in newer models. This study emphasizes the gap between the theoretical capacity and the actual performance of models on complex, high-volume data tasks and highlights the importance of metrics beyond simple accuracy for practical applications.

cs.CL

A parsimonious theory of evidence-based choice

That an agent's possible evidential states form a Boolean algebra (on which it is natural to define a probability measure) is an assertion that ideally should be proved, rather than assumed, in justifying rational choice as a representation of expected utility. A more parsimonious, axiomatic characterization of evidence is provided here. Two primitive entities are evidential states and a relation, more specific than, between evidential states. The axioms specify that more-specific-than is a partial order, there is a minimally specific e-state, and more-specific-than is a separative order. Choice alternatives are another primitive entity. A plan is an assignment of a choice alternative to each evidential state. In general, plans satisfying a version of the sure-thing principle cannot be rationalized by expected utility. But there is such a rationalization if the evidential structure is a tree.

math.ST

Identifying the occurrence or non occurrence of cognitive bias in situations resembling the Monty Hall problem

People reason heuristically in situations resembling inferential puzzles such as Bertrand's box paradox and the Monty Hall problem. The practical significance of that fact for economic decision making is uncertain because a departure from sound reasoning may, but does not necessarily, result in a "cognitively biased" outcome different from what sound reasoning would have produced. Criteria are derived here, applicable to both experimental and non-experimental situations, for heuristic reasoning in an inferential-puzzle situations to result, or not to result, in cognitively bias. In some situations, neither of these criteria is satisfied, and whether or not agents' posterior probability assessments or choices are cognitively biased cannot be determined.

econ.EM