Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Fatemeh Seyedin

Publications and source records attributed to Fatemeh Seyedin.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Fair Fact-Checking: Closing the Cross-Lingual Gap in LLM Factual Judgement with RoSh

Misinformation on social media remains a critical problem, and more and more people settle it by asking a language model instead of a fact checker. Whether models judge such claims reliably is debated; whether they judge them equally well in every language people ask in has gone almost unasked. We test eight models from five families, 3B to 70B, on 1,500 encyclopedic factual claims that exist in identical form in eight languages. English is judged better than every other language on every model, and the gap is widest on the smallest ones, where Llama-3B on Arabic is no better than guessing. Existing remedies retrain on more multilingual data or fit an unconstrained map between language representations, and neither asks whether the model already holds the answer and simply fails to say it. It largely does: a linear probe recovers the truth from the very activations the model fails to express. We propose RoSh, a per-language shift and rotation of the residual stream, computed in closed form at three layers, with no training and no weight modified. It improves every model and closes 75% of the gap on average, helping most where the model was worst: Arabic on Llama-3B goes from chance to nearly the English level, and a fifth fewer of the claims answered correctly in English are lost in translation. What remains is no longer a read-out failure: afterwards the head recovers as much of what is encoded outside English as it does in English. An unconstrained map fitted on the same pairs falls below the untouched baseline, so the orthogonality constraint is doing the work, and every model clears a scrambled-correspondence control and ten further controls. On the two benchmarks of the closest inference-time method, latent-space intervention, run with its own data and metric code, RoSh's gains are five to thirteen times larger.

cs.CL↗

Social Behavior Among Autonomous AI: How Large Language Models Interact in Dynamic Networks

Cooperation is a cornerstone of human societies, enabling collective progress in dynamic and uncertain environments. With the advent of AI systems acting autonomously, it becomes crucial to understand not only human-AI cooperation but also AI-AI interactions in adaptive networks. In this work, we examine the interactions of AI using Large Language Models -- Mistral, Llama3, Gemma3, and Phi3 -- in a public goods game within dynamic network structures. Our experiments were conducted under single-model and mixed-model conditions across Watts-Strogatz (WS), Barabasi-Albert (BA), and Erdos-Renyi (ER) networks. We analyzed the impact of model architecture, network topology, and prompt design on cooperative behavior. Results show that Mistral and Llama3 offer high cooperation rates, while Phi3 shows defective tendencies. Additionally, the random structure of Erdos-Renyi networks dramatically improves cooperation. Prompt design also plays a key role; a society-benefits prompt leads to a higher cooperation level. These findings offer a preliminary framework for LLM-based simulations in adaptive social networks.

cs.SI↗

The Politician, the Liar, and the Obedient Worker: Emerging Behavior of LLM Agents in Hierarchical Games

LLMs are rapidly embedding themselves into daily life: drafting our emails, managing our schedules, and making decisions on our behalf. As they move from individual tools to participants in multi-agent organizations, an important question arises: do they reproduce the governance failures like free-riding, corruption, and entrenched leadership that plague human institutions? We introduce the Hierarchical Game (HG), a public goods game extended with managerial authority, democratic elections, and private communication. Testing six frontier models across twelve experiments that add institutions one at a time (speech, peers, government, wages, oversight, elections), we find distinct behavioral profiles: Qwen promises and lies (13.3\% broken promises); Grok refuses to cooperate on its own but becomes fully cooperative once a manager can punish it (16\%$\to$100\%); Claude and GPT-4o cooperate reliably at baseline. But honesty proves fragile. When the manager role comes with a salary, all models except GPT-4o start cutting private deals to win or keep the position. When punishment is made anonymous, honest models begin to cheat. When all agents share the same model family, the first elected manager stays in power indefinitely. Leadership change only happens in groups that mix different families.

cs.AI↗