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Fathima Mashood

Publications and source records attributed to Fathima Mashood.

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Can LLMs Reason About Brand Ownership? An Empirical Study of Domain Attribution Intelligence

When a new domain resembling a popular brand appears, defenders face a fundamental ambiguity: it may be an attacker-created squatting site for phishing, or it may be a domain the brand itself registered, either defensively, to block attackers, or legitimately, for a new product or service launch. Incorrectly flagging a brand-owned domain as malicious produces a false positive that harms end users and damages the brand's reputation. Resolving this ambiguity requires brand intelligence: the ability to determine, at scale, whether a given domain belongs to a brand. Large language models (LLMs), with their broad knowledge of brand domain relationships, offer a promising zero configuration approach to this problem, but their reliability for brand intelligence tasks remains unknown. We present the first systematic empirical evaluation of LLM brand intelligence across three tasks: domain enumeration (Q1), open ended brand attribution (Q2), and binary ownership classification (Q3). We evaluate four models, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3.5 Flash, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and Claude Sonnet 4.6, across four retrieval settings (in context, web search, WHOIS lookup, and combined) on 36 of the most phished brands. Our results reveal a stark dichotomy: models achieve up to 82% precision enumerating brand domains from memory alone, yet fail at ownership verification without external tools, with macro F1 at most 0.37 in ICL mode. WHOIS augmentation lifts Q3 macro F1 by up to 0.65 points, yielding near perfect precision (<= 0.99), dramatically reducing the false positive risk for defenders. We provide concrete recommendations for deploying LLMs in brand protection pipelines.

cs.CR

A Longitudinal Study of Recently Observed Malicious Domains: Characteristics, Infrastructure, and Abuse Patterns

We present a longitudinal study of approximately 1.52 million malicious domains observed on VirusTotal (VT) between January and May 2026. Domains were selected on the basis of detection by at least five independent VT scanning engines and a first-seen date within the study window. We group the dataset into compromised domains and attacker created domains, which account for approximately 89.3% of the dataset. Combining WHOIS registration records and passive DNS (PDNS) data with the VT dataset, we characterise attacker behaviour across eight dimensions: temporal distribution, compromisedvs.attack classification, domain age at first detection, registrar and TLD preferences, DNS query volume as a damage proxy, hosting infrastructure concentration (IP and ASN level), bulk registration patterns, and brand impersonation. Key findings include: the majority of attacker created domains are short lived registrations used within weeks of creation; a small number of registrars and TLDs account for most abuse; Cloudflare infrastructure is heavily exploited for domain fronting; bulk registration events involving thousands of domains from a single registrar on a single day are widespread; and several global brands, particularly WhatsApp and Google, are heavily impersonated. We share the annotated dataset in the GitHub repo https://github.com/mufimash/malicious_domains for further research.

cs.CR