arXiv subjects

Faycal Ykhlef

Publications and source records attributed to Faycal Ykhlef.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Coalition Free Energy and Adaptive Precision in Multi-Agent Cooperation

Cooperative multi-agent systems require robust mechanisms for credit assignment under uncertainty. Here we introduce a variational framework, termed the Game-Theoretic Free Energy Principle (GT-FEP), that models coalition formation through a Gibbs distribution over interacting agents. Within this framework, we derive a precision-dependent formulation of cooperative credit assignment and show that an agent's Shapley value exhibits a non-monotonic relationship with sensory precision beta, reflecting a trade-off between noisy inference and overconfident local estimation. Motivated by this observation, we propose Adaptive Precision Control (APC), an online adaptation algorithm that dynamically adjusts observation precision using local estimates of cooperative contribution. We evaluate APC on real-world Swiss roundabout trajectory datasets and on a multi-agent control task derived from the same trajectories. Across both settings, APC adapts to changing noise conditions online and achieves performance comparable to the best fixed precision without prior tuning. Our results connect variational inference, cooperative game theory, and adaptive multi-agent coordination, and suggest that precision adaptation can improve robust cooperation under uncertainty.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

A Collective Variational Principle Unifying Bayesian Inference, Game Theory, and Thermodynamics

Collective intelligence emerges across biological, physical, and artificial systems without central coordination, yet a unifying principle governing such behaviour remains elusive. The Free Energy Principle explains how individual agents adapt through variational inference, while game theory formalises strategic interactions. Here we introduce the Game-Theoretic Free Energy Principle, a unified framework showing that multi-agent systems performing local free-energy minimisation implicitly implement a stochastic game. We prove that, under bounded rationality and local information constraints, stationary points of collective free energy correspond to approximate Nash equilibria of an induced game. Conversely, a broad class of cooperative games admits a variational representation in which equilibria arise as Gibbs distributions over coalitions, establishing a bridge between Bayesian inference and strategic interaction. To characterise higher-order effects, we introduce a free-energy formulation of the Harsanyi dividend, isolating irreducible multi-agent synergy. This yields a predictive theory of cooperation, including a falsifiable non-monotonic relationship between sensory precision and agent influence. We validate this prediction across neural, biological, and artificial multi-agent systems. These results identify a common variational principle underlying inference, thermodynamics, and game-theoretic equilibrium.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

NeuroGame Transformer: Gibbs-Inspired Attention Driven by Game Theory and Statistical Physics

Standard attention mechanisms in transformers are limited by their pairwise formulation, which hinders the modeling of higher-order dependencies among tokens. We introduce the NeuroGame Transformer (NGT) to overcome this by reconceptualizing attention through a dual perspective: tokens are treated simultaneously as players in a cooperative game and as interacting spins in a statistical physics system. Token importance is quantified using two complementary game-theoretic concepts -- Shapley values for global, permutation-based attribution and Banzhaf indices for local, coalition-level influence. These are combined via a learnable gating parameter to form an external magnetic field, while pairwise interaction potentials capture synergistic relationships. The system's energy follows an Ising Hamiltonian, with attention weights emerging as marginal probabilities under the Gibbs distribution, efficiently computed via mean-field equations. To ensure scalability despite the exponential coalition space, we develop importance-weighted Monte Carlo estimators with Gibbs-distributed weights. This approach avoids explicit exponential factors, ensuring numerical stability for long sequences. We provide theoretical convergence guarantees and characterize the fairness-sensitivity trade-off governed by the interpolation parameter. Experimental results demonstrate that the NeuroGame Transformer achieves strong performance across SNLI, and MNLI-matched, outperforming some major efficient transformer baselines. On SNLI, it attains a test accuracy of 86.4\% (with a peak validation accuracy of 86.6\%), surpassing ALBERT-Base and remaining highly competitive with RoBERTa-Base. Code is available at https://github.com/dbouchaffra/NeuroGame-Transformer.

cs.AI↗