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Federico Calandra

Publications and source records attributed to Federico Calandra.

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Redactable Blockchains: An Overview

Blockchains are widely recognized for their immutability, which provides robust guarantees of data integrity and transparency. However, this same feature poses significant challenges in real-world situations that require regulatory compliance, correction of erroneous data, or removal of sensitive information. Redactable blockchains address the limitations of traditional ones by enabling controlled, auditable modifications to blockchain data, primarily through cryptographic mechanisms such as chameleon hash functions and alternative redaction schemes. This report examines the motivations for introducing redactability, surveys the cryptographic primitives that enable secure edits, and analyzes competing approaches and their shortcomings. Special attention is paid to the practical deployment of redactable blockchains in private settings, with discussions of use cases in healthcare, finance, Internet of drones, and federated learning. Finally, the report outlines further challenges, also in connection with reversible computing, and the future potential of redactable blockchains in building law-compliant, trustworthy, and scalable digital infrastructures.

cs.CR

On the Operational Resilience of CBDC: Threats and Prospects of Formal Validation for Offline Payments

Information and communication technologies are by now employed in most human activities, including economics and finance. Modern computers have reached an extraordinary power in terms of information processing, storage, retrieval, and transmission. However, several results of theoretical computer science imply the impossibility of certifying software quality in general. With the exception of safety-critical systems, this has primarily concerned information processed by confined systems, with limited socio-economic consequences. In the emerging era of technologies for exchanging tokenized assets and digital money over the Internet, such as in particular central bank digital currency (CBDC), even a minor bug could trigger a financial collapse. Although the aforementioned impossibility results cannot be overcome in an absolute sense, there exist formal methods that can provide correctness assertions for software system models under suitable conditions. We advocate their use to validate the operational resilience of software infrastructures for CBDC by framing the offline payment problem, organizing its threat landscape, and outlining a formal methods methodology, illustrated by a minimal proof of concept, that we argue should underpin CBDC design and deployment.

cs.DC