arXiv subjects

Federico Cannerozzi

Publications and source records attributed to Federico Cannerozzi.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

On Mean-field Singular Stochastic Control Problems

We study a class of mean-field control (MFC) problems with singular controls over a finite horizon, allowing for general dependence of the cost functional on the measure argument. We derive an auxiliary mean-field game (MFG) with singular controls, which we refer to as a potential MFG, and show that, under suitable convexity assumptions, any solution to this potential MFG yields a solution to the original MFC problem. We apply this general result to a version of the classical Monotone Follower Problem by I. Karatzas and S. E. Shreve (SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 22(6), pp. 856-877, 1984) with scalar mean-field interaction. The associated potential MFG with singular controls is solved by exploiting its connection with optimal stopping for the optimization step and by a suitable application of the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point theorem. In the case of strategic complementarities, the mean-field equilibrium (and hence the optimal policy of the original MFC problem) is characterized by a continuous nonincreasing free boundary that uniquely solves a nonlinear integral equation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a complete characterization of the optimal policy in a finite-horizon mean-field singular stochastic control problem.

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arXiv2026

Optimal Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Mean Field Games: Linear Programming and No-Regret Learning

We introduce optimal coarse correlated equilibria for continuous-time mean field games. A coarse correlated equilibrium is a randomized recommendation scheme from which no player can gain by ignoring the recommendation and switching to an alternative strategy. The problem is as follows: a moderator selects, among all mean-field coarse correlated equilibria, one that optimizes a prescribed performance criterion, which may differ from the representative player's objective. After formulating the problem, we develop a linear programming (LP) formulation, prove the existence of optimal LP coarse correlated equilibria, and relate the LP characterization to the original probabilistic setting. Building on this characterization, we design a no-regret primal-dual algorithm, based on an equivalent Lagrangian formulation of the external-regret constraint, for learning such equilibria. We provide explicit convergence rates for the learning algorithm, and numerical examples illustrate the method.

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arXiv2026

Stationary Mean-Field singular control of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process

Motivated by continuous-time optimal inventory management, we study a class of stationary mean-field control problems with singular controls. The dynamics are modeled by a mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, and the performance criterion is given by a quadratic long-time average expected cost functional. The mean-field dependence is through the stationary mean of the controlled process itself, which enters the ergodic cost functional. We characterize the solution to the stationary mean-field control problem in terms of the equilibria of an associated stationary mean-field game, showing that solutions of the control problem are in bijection with the equilibria of this mean-field game. Finally, we solve the stationary mean-field game explicitly, thereby providing a solution to the original stationary mean-field control problem.

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arXiv2025

Optimal Policy Characterization for a Class of Multi-Dimensional Ergodic Singular Stochastic Control Problems

In ergodic singular stochastic control problems, a decision-maker can instantaneously adjust the evolution of a state variable using a control of bounded variation, with the goal of minimizing a long-term average cost functional. The cost of control is proportional to the magnitude of adjustments. This paper characterizes the optimal policy and the value in a class of multi-dimensional ergodic singular stochastic control problems. These problems involve a linearly controlled one-dimensional stochastic differential equation, whose coefficients, along with the cost functional to be optimized, depend on a multi-dimensional uncontrolled process Y. We first provide general verification theorems providing an optimal control in terms of a Skorokhod reflection at Y-dependent free boundaries, which emerge from the analysis of an auxiliary Dynkin game. We then fully solve two two-dimensional optimal inventory management problems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to establish a connection between multi-dimensional ergodic singular stochastic control and optimal stopping, and to exploit this connection to achieve a complete solution in a genuinely two-dimensional setting.

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arXiv2024

Cooperation, Correlation and Competition in Ergodic N-player Games and Mean-field Games of Singular Controls: A Case Study

We consider a class of $N$-player games and mean-field games of singular controls with ergodic performance criterion, providing a benchmark case for irreversible investment games featuring mean-field interaction and strategic complementarities. The state of each player follows a geometric Brownian motion, controlled additively through a nondecreasing process, while agents seek to maximize a long-term average reward functional with a power-type instantaneous profit, under strategic complementarity. We explore three different notions of optimality, which, in the mean-field limit, correspond to the mean-field control solution, mean-field coarse correlated equilibria, and mean-field Nash equilibria. We explicitly compute equilibria in the three cases and compare them numerically, in terms of yielded payoffs and existence conditions. Finally, we show that the mean-field control and mean-field equilibria can approximate the cooperative and competitive equilibria, respectively, in the corresponding $N$-player game when $N$ is sufficiently large. Our analysis of the mean-field control problem features a novel Lagrange multiplier approach, which proves crucial in establishing the approximation result, while the treatment of mean-field coarse correlated equilibria necessitates a new, specifically tailored definition for the stationary setting.

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arXiv2023

Coarse correlated equilibria in linear quadratic mean field games and application to an emission abatement game

Coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) are a good alternative to Nash equilibria (NE), as they arise more naturally as outcomes of learning algorithms and they may exhibit higher payoffs than NE. CCEs include a device which allows players' strategies to be correlated without any cooperation, only through information sent by a mediator. We develop a methodology to concretely compute mean field CCEs in a linear-quadratic mean field game framework. We compare their performance to mean field control solutions and mean field NE (usually named MFG solutions). Our approach is implemented in the mean field version of an emission abatement game between greenhouse gas emitters. In particular, we exhibit a simple and tractable class of mean field CCEs which allows to outperform very significantly the mean field NE payoff and abatement levels, bridging the gap between the mean field NE and the social optimum obtained by mean field control.

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arXiv2023

Coarse correlated equilibria for continuous time mean field games in open loop strategies

In the framework of continuous time symmetric stochastic differential games in open loop strategies, we introduce a generalization of mean field game solution, called coarse correlated solution. This can be seen as the analogue of a coarse correlated equilibrium in the $N$-player game, where a moderator randomly generates a strategy profile and asks the players to pre-commit to such strategies before disclosing them privately to each one of them; such a profile is a coarse correlated equilibrium if no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate. We justify our definition by showing that a coarse correlated solution for the mean field game induces a sequence of approximate coarse correlated equilibria with vanishing error for the underlying $N$-player games. Existence of coarse correlated solutions for the mean field game is proved by means of a minimax theorem. An example with explicit solutions is discussed as well.

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