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Feier Lian

Publications and source records attributed to Feier Lian.

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Game-Theoretic Mixed $H_2/H_{\infty}$ Control with Sparsity Constraint for Multi-agent Networked Control Systems

Multi-agent networked control systems (NCSs) are often subject to model uncertainty and are limited by large communication cost, associated with feedback of data between the system nodes. To provide robustness against model uncertainty and to reduce the communication cost, this paper investigates the mixed $H_2/H_{\infty}$ control problem for NCS under the sparsity constraint. First, proximal alternating linearized minimization (PALM) is employed to solve the centralized social optimization where the agents have the same optimization objective. Next, we investigate a sparsity-constrained noncooperative game, which accommodates different control-performance criteria of different agents, and propose a best-response dynamics algorithm based on PALM that converges to an approximate Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) of this game. A special case of this game, where the agents have the same $H_2$ objective, produces a partially-distributed social optimization solution. We validate the proposed algorithms using a network with unstable node dynamics and demonstrate the superiority of the proposed PALM-based method to a previously investigated sparsity-constrained mixed $H_2/H_{\infty}$ controller.

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Game-Theoretic Multi-Agent Control and Network Cost Allocation under Communication Constraints

Multi-agent networked linear dynamic systems have attracted attention of researchers in power systems, intelligent transportation, and industrial automation. The agents might cooperatively optimize a global performance objective, resulting in social optimization, or try to satisfy their own selfish objectives using a noncooperative differential game. However, in these solutions, large volumes of data must be sent from system states to possibly distant control inputs, thus resulting in high cost of the underlying communication network. To enable economically-viable communication, a game-theoretic framework is proposed under the \textit{communication cost}, or \textit{sparsity}, constraint, given by the number of communicating state/control input pairs. As this constraint tightens, the system transitions from dense to sparse communication, providing the trade-off between dynamic system performance and information exchange. Moreover, using the proposed sparsity-constrained distributed social optimization and noncooperative game algorithms, we develop a method to allocate the costs of the communication infrastructure fairly and according to the agents' diverse needs for feedback and cooperation. Numerical results illustrate utilization of the proposed algorithms to enable and ensure economic fairness of wide-area control among power companies.

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