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Felicia Nguyen

Publications and source records attributed to Felicia Nguyen.

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Contextual Visual Distinctiveness in Online Product Search

In online product search, returned alternatives often look alike. We investigate when a product's visual separation from its closest look-alike in a returned set increases its choice probability. We introduce two occasion-level constructs: contextual visual distinctiveness (image distance from the nearest similar alternative in the consideration set) and relative fit (compatibility with the search query). We hypothesize that distinctiveness favors selection and is highly contextual, yields a premium that rises with relative fit, and matters most when text descriptions fail to differentiate options. Analyzing over 800,000 e-commerce search events using dense representations, we apply search-event and product fixed effects to evaluate the exact same product alongside varying visual neighbors. Results show a product is significantly more likely to be clicked when it lacks a close look-alike. This distinctiveness premium increases with relative fit and roughly doubles when competing descriptions are highly similar. Consistent with a model where distinctiveness aids in standing out pre-evaluation rather than increasing inherent utility, the extra clicks distinctiveness recruits convert 5-7% less often downstream. Ultimately, the evidence characterizes visual differentiation as a local attention allocation mechanism whose value depends on query fit and information from competing cues.

econ.GN

Incentivizing High Quality Entrants When Creators Are Strategic

We study how a platform should design early exposure and rewards when creators strategically choose quality before release. A short testing window with a pass/fail bar induces a pass probability, the slope of which is the key sufficient statistic for incentives. We derive three main results. First, a closed-form ``implementability bounty'' can perfectly align creator and platform objectives, correcting for incomplete revenue sharing. Second, front-loading guaranteed impressions is the most effective way to strengthen incentives for a given attention budget. Third, when impression and cash budgets are constrained, the optimal policy follows an equal-marginal-value rule based on the prize spread and certain exposure. We map realistic ranking engines (e.g., Thompson sampling) into the model's parameters and provide telemetry-based estimators. The framework is simple to operationalize and offers a direct, managerially interpretable solution for platforms to solve the creator cold-start problem and cultivate high-quality supply.

econ.GN