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Felix A. Sosa

Publications and source records attributed to Felix A. Sosa.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

CogGym: Towards Large-Scale Comparative Evaluation of Human and Machine Cognition

Understanding and modeling human intelligence are parallel goals shared by artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science. As AI systems grow increasingly capable, in what ways do model responses resemble human responses, and where do they systematically diverge? The sheer breadth and diversity of the tasks humans can perform and think about pose a challenge for scalable and rigorous comparison between humans and models. We introduce CogGym, a scalable, unified framework grounded in cognitive science for systematically comparing model and human behavior on matched experimental trials. CogGym uses a semi-automated, human-in-the-loop pipeline to standardize diverse experimental paradigms into a task-agnostic Experiment Markup Language (EML), enabling reproducible and faithful comparison at scale. For initial release, we curate and standardize 258 cognitive experiments from 100 papers that focuses on human commonsense reasoning, and evaluate 50 large language models against human responses. We find a clear scaling trend where larger and more recent AI models better reproduce human judgments. Yet AI models' improvement on such common reasoning tasks is considerably slower than the gains observed on formal-reasoning benchmarks like math and coding, and model--human fit remains well below human splithalf reliability ($R^2 = 0.93$ on text, $0.95$ on image, and $0.92$ on video) with the best models achieving $R^2 = 0.59$ on text, $0.58$ on image, and $0.43$ on video experiments. We intend for CogGym to provide a living evaluation framework that continually incorporates new cognitive science experiments to characterize where model behavior resembles human behavior, where it systematically diverges, and how those patterns change as models and experiments evolve.

cs.AI↗

Type theory in human-like learning and inference

Humans can generate reasonable answers to novel queries (Schulz, 2012): if I asked you what kind of food you want to eat for lunch, you would respond with a food, not a time. The thought that one would respond "After 4pm" to "What would you like to eat" is either a joke or a mistake, and seriously entertaining it as a lunch option would likely never happen in the first place. While understanding how people come up with new ideas, thoughts, explanations, and hypotheses that obey the basic constraints of a novel search space is of central importance to cognitive science, there is no agreed-on formal model for this kind of reasoning. We propose that a core component of any such reasoning system is a type theory: a formal imposition of structure on the kinds of computations an agent can perform, and how they're performed. We motivate this proposal with three empirical observations: adaptive constraints on learning and inference (i.e. generating reasonable hypotheses), how people draw distinctions between improbability and impossibility, and people's ability to reason about things at varying levels of abstraction.

cs.AI↗