arXiv subjects

Felix Kreuk

Publications and source records attributed to Felix Kreuk.

23 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2020

Self-Supervised Contrastive Learning for Unsupervised Phoneme Segmentation

We propose a self-supervised representation learning model for the task of unsupervised phoneme boundary detection. The model is a convolutional neural network that operates directly on the raw waveform. It is optimized to identify spectral changes in the signal using the Noise-Contrastive Estimation principle. At test time, a peak detection algorithm is applied over the model outputs to produce the final boundaries. As such, the proposed model is trained in a fully unsupervised manner with no manual annotations in the form of target boundaries nor phonetic transcriptions. We compare the proposed approach to several unsupervised baselines using both TIMIT and Buckeye corpora. Results suggest that our approach surpasses the baseline models and reaches state-of-the-art performance on both data sets. Furthermore, we experimented with expanding the training set with additional examples from the Librispeech corpus. We evaluated the resulting model on distributions and languages that were not seen during the training phase (English, Hebrew and German) and showed that utilizing additional untranscribed data is beneficial for model performance.

eess.AS↗

arXiv2020

Hide and Speak: Towards Deep Neural Networks for Speech Steganography

Steganography is the science of hiding a secret message within an ordinary public message, which is referred to as Carrier. Traditionally, digital signal processing techniques, such as least significant bit encoding, were used for hiding messages. In this paper, we explore the use of deep neural networks as steganographic functions for speech data. We showed that steganography models proposed for vision are less suitable for speech, and propose a new model that includes the short-time Fourier transform and inverse-short-time Fourier transform as differentiable layers within the network, thus imposing a vital constraint on the network outputs. We empirically demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed method comparing to deep learning based on several speech datasets and analyzed the results quantitatively and qualitatively. Moreover, we showed that the proposed approach could be applied to conceal multiple messages in a single carrier using multiple decoders or a single conditional decoder. Lastly, we evaluated our model under different channel distortions. Qualitative experiments suggest that modifications to the carrier are unnoticeable by human listeners and that the decoded messages are highly intelligible.

cs.SD↗

arXiv2020

Phoneme Boundary Detection using Learnable Segmental Features

Phoneme boundary detection plays an essential first step for a variety of speech processing applications such as speaker diarization, speech science, keyword spotting, etc. In this work, we propose a neural architecture coupled with a parameterized structured loss function to learn segmental representations for the task of phoneme boundary detection. First, we evaluated our model when the spoken phonemes were not given as input. Results on the TIMIT and Buckeye corpora suggest that the proposed model is superior to the baseline models and reaches state-of-the-art performance in terms of F1 and R-value. We further explore the use of phonetic transcription as additional supervision and show this yields minor improvements in performance but substantially better convergence rates. We additionally evaluate the model on a Hebrew corpus and demonstrate such phonetic supervision can be beneficial in a multi-lingual setting.

eess.AS↗

arXiv2019

Deceiving End-to-End Deep Learning Malware Detectors using Adversarial Examples

In recent years, deep learning has shown performance breakthroughs in many applications, such as image detection, image segmentation, pose estimation, and speech recognition. However, this comes with a major concern: deep networks have been found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are slightly modified inputs that are intentionally designed to cause a misclassification by the model. In the domains of images and speech, the modifications are so small that they are not seen or heard by humans, but nevertheless greatly affect the classification of the model. Deep learning models have been successfully applied to malware detection. In this domain, generating adversarial examples is not straightforward, as small modifications to the bytes of the file could lead to significant changes in its functionality and validity. We introduce a novel loss function for generating adversarial examples specifically tailored for discrete input sets, such as executable bytes. We modify malicious binaries so that they would be detected as benign, while preserving their original functionality, by injecting a small sequence of bytes (payload) in the binary file. We applied this approach to an end-to-end convolutional deep learning malware detection model and show a high rate of detection evasion. Moreover, we show that our generated payload is robust enough to be transferable within different locations of the same file and across different files, and that its entropy is low and similar to that of benign data sections.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2018

Fooling End-to-end Speaker Verification by Adversarial Examples

Automatic speaker verification systems are increasingly used as the primary means to authenticate costumers. Recently, it has been proposed to train speaker verification systems using end-to-end deep neural models. In this paper, we show that such systems are vulnerable to adversarial example attack. Adversarial examples are generated by adding a peculiar noise to original speaker examples, in such a way that they are almost indistinguishable from the original examples by a human listener. Yet, the generated waveforms, which sound as speaker A can be used to fool such a system by claiming as if the waveforms were uttered by speaker B. We present white-box attacks on an end-to-end deep network that was either trained on YOHO or NTIMIT. We also present two black-box attacks: where the adversarial examples were generated with a system that was trained on YOHO, but the attack is on a system that was trained on NTIMIT; and when the adversarial examples were generated with a system that was trained on Mel-spectrum feature set, but the attack is on a system that was trained on MFCC. Results suggest that the accuracy of the attacked system was decreased and the false-positive rate was dramatically increased.

cs.LG↗