arXiv subjects

Feraz Azhar

Publications and source records attributed to Feraz Azhar.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Probabilistic inference in very large universes

[Abridged] Some cosmological theories propose that the observable universe is a small part of a much larger universe in which parameters describing the low-energy laws of physics vary from region to region. How can we reasonably assess a theory that describes such a mostly unobservable universe? We propose a Bayesian method based on theory-generated probability distributions for our observations. We focus on basic principles, leaving aside concerns about practicality. (We also leave aside the measure problem, to discuss other issues.) We argue that cosmological theories can be tested by standard Bayesian updating, but we need to use theoretical predictions for "first-person" probabilities -- i.e., probabilities for our observations, accounting for all relevant selection effects. These selection effects can depend on the observer, and on time, so in principle first-person probabilities are defined for each observer-instant -- an observer at an instant of time. First-person probabilities should take into account everything the observer believes about herself and her surroundings -- i.e., her "subjective state". We advocate a "Principle of Self-Locating Indifference" (PSLI), asserting that any real observer should make predictions as if she were chosen randomly from the theoretically predicted observer-instants that share her subjective state. We believe the PSLI is intuitively very reasonable, but also argue that it maximizes the expected fraction of observers who will make correct predictions. Cosmological theories will in general predict a set of possible universes, each with a probability. To calculate first-person probabilities, we argue that each possible universe should be weighted by the number of observer-instants in the specified subjective state that it contains. We also discuss Boltzmann brains, the humans/Jovians parable of Hartle and Srednicki, and the use of "old evidence".

astro-ph.CO↗

arXiv2022

Flows into de Sitter space from anisotropic initial conditions: An effective field theory approach

For decades, physicists have analyzed various versions of a ``cosmic no-hair" conjecture, to understand under what conditions a spacetime that is initially spatially anisotropic and/or inhomogeneous will flow into an isotropic and homogeneous state. Wald's theorem, in particular, established that homogeneous but anisotropic spacetimes, if filled with a positive cosmological constant plus additional matter sources that satisfy specific energy conditions, will necessarily flow toward an (isotropic) de Sitter state at late times. In this paper we study the flow of homogeneous but anisotropic spacetimes toward isotropic states under conditions more general than those to which Wald's theorem applies. We construct an effective field theory (EFT) treatment for generic ``single-clock" systems in anisotropic spacetimes -- which are not limited to realizations compatible with scalar-field constructions -- and identify fixed points in the resulting phase space. We identify regions of this phase space that flow to isotropic fixed points -- including a de Sitter fixed point -- even in the absence of a bare cosmological constant, and for matter sources that do not obey the energy conditions required for Wald's theorem. Such flows into de Sitter reveal the emergence of an effective cosmological constant.

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arXiv2021

A Bayesian View on the Dr. Evil Scenario

In "Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief", Adam Elga proposes and defends a principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs: if an individual is confident that his world contains more than one individual who is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from his own, then he should assign equal credences to the hypotheses that he is any one of these individuals. Through a sequence of thought experiments, Elga in effect claims that he can derive the credence function that should apply in such situations, thus justifying his principle of indifference. Here we argue, using a Bayesian approach, that Elga's reasoning is circular: in analyzing the third of his thought experiments, he uses an assertion that is justifiable only if one assumes, from the start, the principle of indifference that he is attempting to justify. We agree with Elga that the assumption of equal credences is a very reasonable principle, in the absence of any reason to assign unequal credences, but we do not agree that the equality of credences can be so derived.

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arXiv2021

Spacetime singularities and a novel formulation of indeterminism

Spacetime singularities in general relativity are commonly thought to be problematic, in that they signal a breakdown in the theory. We address the question of how to interpret this breakdown, restricting our attention to classical considerations (though our work has ramifications for more general classical metric theories of gravity, as well). In particular, we argue for a new claim: spacetime singularities in general relativity signal indeterminism. The usual manner in which indeterminism is formulated for physical theories can be traced back to Laplace. This formulation is based on the non-uniqueness of future (or past) states of a physical system -- as understood in the context of a physical theory -- as a result of the specification of an antecedent state (or, respectively, of a subsequent state). We contend that for physical theories generally, this formulation does not comprehensively capture the relevant sense of a lack of determination. And, in particular, it does not comprehensively capture the sense(s) in which a lack of determination (and so, indeterminism) arises due to spacetime singularities in general relativity. We thus present a novel, broader formulation, in which indeterminism in the context of some physical theory arises whenever one of the three following conditions holds: future (and/or past) states are (i) not unique -- as for Laplacian notions of indeterminism; (ii) not specified; or (iii) `incoherent' -- that is, they fail to satisfy certain desiderata that are internal to the theory and/or imposed from outside the theory. We apply this formulation to salient features of singularities in general relativity and show that this broader sense of indeterminism can comprehensively account for (our interpretation of) the breakdown signaled by their occurrence.

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arXiv2019

Effective field theories as a novel probe of fine-tuning of cosmic inflation

The leading account of several salient observable features of our universe today is provided by the theory of cosmic inflation. But an important and thus far intractable question is whether inflation is generic, or whether it is finely tuned---requiring very precisely specified initial conditions. In this paper I argue that a recent, model-independent characterization of inflation, known as the 'effective field theory (EFT) of inflation', promises to address this question in a thoroughly modern and significantly more comprehensive way than in the existing literature. To motivate and provide context for this claim, I distill three core problems with the theory of inflation, which I dub the permissiveness problem, the initial conditions problem, and the multiverse problem. I argue that the initial conditions problem lies within the scope of EFTs of inflation as they are currently conceived, whereas the other two problems remain largely intractable: their solution must await a more complete description of the very early universe. I highlight recent work that addresses the initial conditions problem within the context of a dynamical systems analysis of a specific (state-of-the-art) EFT of inflation, and conclude with a roadmap for how such work might be extended to realize the promise claimed above.

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arXiv2019

Finely tuned models sacrifice explanatory depth

It is commonly argued that an undesirable feature of a theoretical or phenomenological model is that salient observables are sensitive to values of parameters in the model. But in what sense is it undesirable to have such 'fine-tuning' of observables (and hence of the underlying model)? In this paper, we argue that the fine-tuning can be interpreted as a shortcoming of the explanatory capacity of the model: in particular it signals a lack of explanatory depth. In support of this argument, we develop a schema -- for (a certain class of) models that arise broadly in physical settings -- that quantitatively relates fine-tuning of observables to a lack of depth of explanations based on these models. We apply our schema in two different settings in which, within each setting, we compare the depth of two competing explanations. The first setting involves explanations for the Euclidean nature of spatial slices of the universe today: in particular, we compare an explanation provided by the big-bang model of the early 1970s (where no inflationary period is included) with an explanation provided by a general model of cosmic inflation. The second setting has a more phenomenological character, where the goal is to infer from a limited sequence of data points, using maximum entropy techniques, the underlying probability distribution from which these data are drawn. In both of these settings we find that our analysis favors the model that intuitively provides the deeper explanation of the observable(s) of interest. We thus provide an account that relates two 'theoretical virtues' of models used broadly in physical settings -- namely, a lack of fine-tuning and explanatory depth -- and argue that finely tuned models sacrifice explanatory depth.

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arXiv2018

Gauging Fine-Tuning

We introduce a mathematical framework for quantifying fine-tuning in general physical settings. In particular, we identify two distinct perspectives on fine-tuning, namely, a local and a global perspective --- and develop corresponding measures. These measures apply broadly to settings characterized by an arbitrary number of observables whose values are dependent on an arbitrary number of parameters. We illustrate our formalism by quantifying fine-tuning as it arises in two pertinent astrophysical settings: (i) in models where a significant fraction of the dark matter in the universe is in the form of primordial black holes, and (ii) in scenarios that derive the fraction of protons in habitable dark-matter halos from underlying models of cosmic inflation.

astro-ph.CO↗

arXiv2018

Flows into inflation: An effective field theory approach

We analyze the flow into inflation for generic "single-clock" systems, by combining an effective field theory approach with a dynamical-systems analysis. In this approach, we construct an expansion for the potential-like term in the effective action as a function of time, rather than specifying a particular functional dependence on a scalar field. We may then identify fixed points in the effective phase space for such systems, order-by-order, as various constraints are placed on the $M$th time derivative of the potential-like function. For relatively simple systems, we find significant probability for the background spacetime to flow into an inflationary state, and for inflation to persist for at least 60 efolds. Moreover, for systems that are compatible with single-scalar-field realizations, we find a single, universal functional form for the effective potential, $V (\phi)$, which is similar to the well-studied potential for power-law inflation. We discuss the compatibility of such dynamical systems with observational constraints.

astro-ph.CO↗

arXiv2016

Three Aspects of Typicality in Multiverse Cosmology

Extracting predictions from cosmological theories that describe a multiverse, for what we are likely to observe in our domain, is crucial to establishing the validity of these theories. One way to extract such predictions is from theory-generated probability distributions that allow for selection effects---generally expressed in terms of assumptions about anthropic conditionalization and how typical we are. In this paper, I urge three lessons about typicality in multiverse settings. (i) Because it is difficult to characterize our observational situation in the multiverse, we cannot assume that we are typical (as in the 'principle of mediocrity'): nor can we ignore the issue of typicality, for it has a measurable impact on predictions for our observations. (ii) There are spectra of assumptions about both conditionalization and typicality, which lead to coincident predictions for our observations, leading to problems of confirmation in multiverse cosmology. And moreover, (iii) when one has the freedom to consider competing theories of the multiverse, the assumption of typicality may not lead to the highest likelihoods for our observations. These three entwined aspects of typicality imply that positive assertions about our typicality, such as the 'principle of mediocrity', are more questionable than has been recently claimed.

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arXiv2016

Scientific Realism and Primordial Cosmology

We discuss scientific realism from the perspective of modern cosmology, especially primordial cosmology: i.e. the cosmological investigation of the very early universe. We first (Section 2) state our allegiance to scientific realism, and discuss what insights about it cosmology might yield, as against "just" supplying scientific claims that philosophers can then evaluate. In particular, we discuss: the idea of laws of cosmology, and limitations on ascertaining the global structure of spacetime. Then we review some of what is now known about the early universe (Section 3): meaning, roughly, from a thousandth of a second after the Big Bang onwards(!). The rest of the paper takes up two issues about primordial cosmology, i.e. the very early universe, where "very early" means, roughly, much earlier (logarithmically) than one second after the Big Bang: say, less than $10^{-11}$ seconds. Both issues illustrate that familiar philosophical threat to scientific realism, the under-determination of theory by data---on a cosmic scale. The first issue (Section 4) concerns the difficulty of observationally probing the very early universe. More specifically, the difficulty is to ascertain details of the putative inflationary epoch. The second issue (Section 5) concerns difficulties about confirming a cosmological theory that postulates a multiverse, i.e. a set of domains (universes) each of whose inhabitants (if any) cannot directly observe, or otherwise causally interact with, other domains. This again concerns inflation, since many inflationary models postulate a multiverse. For all these issues, it will be clear that much remains unsettled, as regards both physics and philosophy. But we will maintain that these remaining controversies do not threaten scientific realism.

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arXiv2016

Spectra of conditionalization and typicality in the multiverse

An approach to testing theories describing a multiverse, that has gained interest of late, involves comparing theory-generated probability distributions over observables with their experimentally measured values. It is likely that such distributions, were we indeed able to calculate them unambiguously, will assign low probabilities to any such experimental measurements. An alternative to thereby rejecting these theories, is to conditionalize the distributions involved by restricting attention to domains of the multiverse in which we might arise. In order to elicit a crisp prediction, however, one needs to make a further assumption about how typical we are of the chosen domains. In this paper, we investigate interactions between the spectra of available assumptions regarding both conditionalization and typicality, and draw out the effects of these interactions in a concrete setting; namely, on predictions of the total number of species that contribute significantly to dark matter. In particular, for each conditionalization scheme studied, we analyze how correlations between densities of different dark matter species affect the prediction, and explicate the effects of assumptions regarding typicality. We find that the effects of correlations can depend on the conditionalization scheme, and that in each case atypicality can significantly change the prediction. In doing so, we demonstrate the existence of overlaps in the predictions of different "frameworks" consisting of conjunctions of theory, conditionalization scheme and typicality assumption. This conclusion highlights the acute challenges involved in using such tests to identify a preferred framework that aims to describe our observational situation in a multiverse.

astro-ph.CO↗

arXiv2015

Prediction and typicality in multiverse cosmology

In the absence of a fundamental theory that precisely predicts values for observable parameters, anthropic reasoning attempts to constrain probability distributions over those parameters in order to facilitate the extraction of testable predictions. The utility of this approach has been vigorously debated of late, particularly in light of theories that claim we live in a multiverse, where parameters may take differing values in regions lying outside our observable horizon. Within this cosmological framework, we investigate the efficacy of top-down anthropic reasoning based on the weak anthropic principle. We argue contrary to recent claims that it is not clear one can either dispense with notions of typicality altogether or presume typicality, in comparing resulting probability distributions with observations. We show in a concrete, top-down setting related to dark matter, that assumptions about typicality can dramatically affect predictions, thereby providing a guide to how errors in reasoning regarding typicality translate to errors in the assessment of predictive power. We conjecture that this dependence on typicality is an integral feature of anthropic reasoning in broader cosmological contexts, and argue in favour of the explicit inclusion of measures of typicality in schemes invoking anthropic reasoning, with a view to extracting predictions from multiverse scenarios.

astro-ph.CO↗

arXiv2015

Testing typicality in multiverse cosmology

In extracting predictions from theories that describe a multiverse, we face the difficulty that we must assess probability distributions over possible observations, prescribed not just by an underlying theory, but by a theory together with a conditionalization scheme that allows for (anthropic) selection effects. This means we usually need to compare distributions that are consistent with a broad range of possible observations, with actual experimental data. One controversial means of making this comparison is by invoking the 'principle of mediocrity': that is, the principle that we are typical of the reference class implicit in the conjunction of the theory and the conditionalization scheme. In this paper, I quantitatively assess the principle of mediocrity in a range of cosmological settings, employing 'xerographic distributions' to impose a variety of assumptions regarding typicality. I find that for a fixed theory, the assumption that we are typical gives rise to higher likelihoods for our observations. If, however, one allows both the underlying theory and the assumption of typicality to vary, then the assumption of typicality does not always provide the highest likelihoods. Interpreted from a Bayesian perspective, these results support the claim that when one has the freedom to consider different combinations of theories and xerographic distributions (or different 'frameworks'), one should favor the framework that has the highest posterior probability; and then from this framework one can infer, in particular, how typical we are. In this way, the invocation of the principle of mediocrity is more questionable than has been recently claimed.

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arXiv2015

Predicting single-neuron activity in locally connected networks

The characterization of coordinated activity in neuronal populations has received renewed interest in the light of advancing experimental techniques which allow recordings from multiple units simultaneously. Across both in vitro and in vivo preparations, nearby neurons show coordinated responses when spontaneously active, and when subject to external stimuli. Recent work (Truccolo, Hochberg, & Donoghue, 2010) has connected these coordinated responses to behavior, showing that small ensembles of neurons in arm related areas of sensorimotor cortex can reliably predict single-neuron spikes in behaving monkeys and humans. We investigate this phenomenon utilizing an analogous point process model, showing that in the case of a computational model of cortex responding to random background inputs, one is similarly able to predict the future state of a single neuron by considering its own spiking history, together with the spiking histories of randomly sampled ensembles of nearby neurons. This model exhibits realistic cortical architecture and displays bursting episodes in the two distinct connectivity schemes studied. We conjecture that the baseline predictability we find in these instances is characteristic of locally connected networks more broadly considered.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2010

When are correlations strong?

The inverse problem of statistical mechanics involves finding the minimal Hamiltonian that is consistent with some observed set of correlation functions. This problem has received renewed interest in the analysis of biological networks; in particular, several such networks have been described successfully by maximum entropy models consistent with pairwise correlations. These correlations are usually weak in an absolute sense (e.g., correlation coefficients ~ 0.1 or less), and this is sometimes taken as evidence against the existence of interesting collective behavior in the network. If correlations are weak, it should be possible to capture their effects in perturbation theory, so we develop an expansion for the entropy of Ising systems in powers of the correlations, carrying this out to fourth order. We then consider recent work on networks of neurons [Schneidman et al., Nature 440, 1007 (2006); Tkacik et al., arXiv:0912.5409 [q-bio.NC] (2009)], and show that even though all pairwise correlations are weak, the fact that these correlations are widespread means that their impact on the network as a whole is not captured in the leading orders of perturbation theory. More positively, this means that recent successes of maximum entropy approaches are not simply the result of correlations being weak.

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