arXiv subjects

Fernando Genis Mendoza

Publications and source records attributed to Fernando Genis Mendoza.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

A Coalitional Game for Demand-Side Management in a Micro-Grid with Multiple Electricity Retailers

This paper develops a demand-side management framework for electricity networks with multiple competing retailers. The interaction among retailers is formulated as a coalitional game, yielding a family of coupled mixed-integer optimisation problems in which retail prices, consumer power demands, and the network partition are jointly optimised. To solve this problem, we propose a coalition-formation algorithm based on multi-objective optimisation principles. The algorithm seeks to identify coalition structures that balance retailer profit and consumer welfare. We prove that the proposed algorithm converges in a finite number of steps and recovers a subset of weakly Pareto-efficient solutions of the coupled optimisation problems. The framework is further extended to a risk-sharing formulation, in which the objective is defined using conditional value-at-risk. Numerical simulations on an academic example demonstrate the method's behaviour and show that the resulting equilibrium partition set contains several admissible trade-offs between the competing objectives. The results provide a tractable approach for analysing competition, coalition formation, and risk-aware pricing in multi-retailer demand-side management systems.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2024

A Coalitional Game for Demand-Side Management in a Low-Voltage Resistive Micro-Grid with Multiple Electricity Retailers

An existing challenge in power systems is the implementation of optimal demand management through dynamic pricing. This paper encompasses the design, analysis and implementation of a novel on-line pricing scheme based on coalitional game theory. The setting consists of a network with multiple energy retailers competing to attract consumers by announcing a price in a hierarchical leader-follower structure. The process of coalition formation under such a pricing scheme can be viewed as a game for which we show that a Stackelberg equilibrium exists, \ie given a price, consumers will respond by conforming to a reciprocal power consumption quantity. We propose a coalition formation algorithm and perform a game-theoretic stability analysis on the resulting coalitions. We integrate the pricing setting with a resistive micro-grid dynamic model. In this context we analyse the behaviour of the integrated system, bridging the gap between market and physical layers of the problem. Simulations provide a comparison of profits generated by the proposed scheme against a more traditional single retailer scheme, while simultaneously showing convergence towards a steady-state equilibrium. Additionally, we shed light into the system's physical response when subject to our proposed pricing scheme.

math.OC↗