arXiv subjects

Filip Valgimigli

Publications and source records attributed to Filip Valgimigli.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Demystifying VEINS: A Reality Check Against Living Lab Experiments

Safety applications in vehicle-to-everything communications and Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems rely on reliable and timely message exchange, which in turn depends on accurate modeling of wireless signal propagation. Simulation frameworks such as VEINS are widely adopted to design and evaluate such systems before deployment; however, their realism strongly depends on the validity of the underlying channel and antenna models. This work presents an empirical validation of the VEINS simulator against real-world data collected from the MASA living laboratory. Using the default configuration, we compare Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI), number of messages, and attenuation of the signal. The results show that VEINS systematically overestimates the RSSI value, while losing approximately 18% of the total number of messages received compared to the MASA, revealing inconsistencies between simulation and reality. The contribution of this study is a direct comparison between simulated and real world data, establishing a quantitative basis for future calibration of VEINS parameters to improve the fidelity of VANET simulations in C-ITS safety research.

cs.PF↗

arXiv2025

RADAR: a Radio-based Analytics for Dynamic Association and Recognition of pseudonyms in VANETs

This paper presents RADAR, a tracking algorithm for vehicles participating in Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) that exploits multiple radio signals emitted by a modern vehicle to break privacy-preserving pseudonym schemes deployed in VANETs. This study shows that by combining Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) and Wi-Fi probe request messages broadcast by the vehicle, it is possible to improve tracking over standard de-anonymization approaches that only leverage DSRC, especially in realistic scenarios where the attacker does not have full coverage of the entire vehicle path. The experimental evaluation compares three different metrics for pseudonym and Wi-Fi probe identifier association (Count, Statistical RSSI, and Pearson RSSI), demonstrating that the Pearson RSSI metric is better at tracking vehicles under pseudonym-changing schemes in all scenarios and against previous works. As an additional contribution to the state-of-the-art, we publicly release all implementations and simulation scenarios used in this work.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Finding (and exploiting) vulnerabilities on IP Cameras: the Tenda CP3 case study

Consumer IP cameras are now the most widely adopted solution for remote monitoring in various contexts, such as private homes or small offices. While the security of these devices has been scrutinized, most approaches are limited to relatively shallow network-based analyses. In this paper, we discuss a methodology for the security analysis and identification of remotely exploitable vulnerabilities in IP cameras, which includes static and dynamic analyses of executables extracted from IP camera firmware. Compared to existing methodologies, our approach leverages the context of the target device to focus on the identification of malicious invocation sequences that could lead to exploitable vulnerabilities. We demonstrate the application of our methodology by using the Tenda CP3 IP camera as a case study. We identified five novel CVEs, with CVSS scores ranging from 7.5 to 9.8. To partially automate our analysis, we also developed a custom tool based on Ghidra and rhabdomancer.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

HackCar: a test platform for attacks and defenses on a cost-contained automotive architecture

In this paper, we introduce the design of HackCar, a testing platform for replicating attacks and defenses on a generic automotive system without requiring access to a complete vehicle. This platform empowers security researchers to illustrate the consequences of attacks targeting an automotive system on a realistic platform, facilitating the development and testing of security countermeasures against both existing and novel attacks. The HackCar platform is built upon an F1-10th model, to which various automotive-grade microcontrollers are connected through automotive communication protocols. This solution is crafted to be entirely modular, allowing for the creation of diverse test scenarios. Researchers and practitioners can thus develop innovative security solutions while adhering to the constraints of automotive-grade microcontrollers. We showcase our design by comparing it with a real, licensed, and unmodified vehicle. Additionally, we analyze the behavior of the HackCar in both an attack-free scenario and a scenario where an attack on in-vehicle communication is deployed.

cs.CR↗