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Filippo Fabiani

Publications and source records attributed to Filippo Fabiani.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Counter-example guided inductive synthesis of control Lyapunov functions for uncertain systems

We propose a counter-example guided inductive synthesis (CEGIS) scheme for the design of control Lyapunov functions and associated state-feedback controllers for linear systems affected by parametric uncertainty with arbitrary shape. In the CEGIS framework, a learner iteratively proposes a candidate control Lyapunov function and a tailored controller by solving a linear matrix inequality (LMI) feasibility problem, while a verifier either falsifies the current candidate by producing a counter-example to be considered at the next iteration, or it certifies that the tentative control Lyapunov function actually enjoys such feature. We investigate the Lipschitz continuity of the objective function of the global optimization problem solved by the verifier, which is key to establish the convergence of our method in a finite number of iterations. Numerical simulations confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

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Personalized incentives as feedback design in generalized Nash equilibrium problems

We investigate both stationary and time-varying, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems that exhibit symmetric interactions among the agents, which are known to be potential. As may happen in practical cases, however, we envision a scenario in which the formal expression of the underlying potential function is not available, and we design a semi-decentralized Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm. In the proposed two-layer scheme, a coordinator iteratively integrates the (possibly noisy and sporadic) agents' feedback to learn the pseudo-gradients of the agents, and then design personalized incentives for them. On their side, the agents receive those personalized incentives, compute a solution to an extended game, and then return feedback measurements to the coordinator. In the stationary setting, our algorithm returns a Nash equilibrium in case the coordinator is endowed with standard learning policies, while it returns a Nash equilibrium up to a constant, yet adjustable, error in the time-varying case. As a motivating application, we consider the ridehailing service provided by several companies with mobility as a service orchestration, necessary to both handle competition among firms and avoid traffic congestion, which is also adopted to run numerical experiments verifying our results.

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Generalized uncertain Nash games: Reformulation and robust equilibrium seeking -- Extended version

We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with linear coupling constraints affected by both local (i.e., agent-wise) and global (i.e., shared resources) disturbances taking values in polyhedral uncertainty sets. By making use of traditional tools borrowed from robust optimization, for this class of problems we derive a tractable, finite-dimensional reformulation leading to a deterministic ''extended game'', and we show that this latter still amounts to a GNEP featuring generalized Nash equilibria ''in the worst-case''. We then design a fully-distributed, accelerated algorithm based on monotone operator theory, which enjoys convergence towards a Nash equilibrium of the original, uncertain game under weak structural assumptions. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed distributed scheme through numerical simulations

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Proximal-like algorithms for equilibrium seeking in mixed-integer Nash equilibrium problems

We consider potential games with mixed-integer variables, for which we propose two distributed, proximal-like equilibrium seeking algorithms. Specifically, we focus on two scenarios: i) the underlying game is generalized ordinal and the agents update through iterations by choosing an exact optimal strategy; ii) the game admits an exact potential and the agents adopt approximated optimal responses. By exploiting the properties of integer-compatible regularization functions used as penalty terms, we show that both algorithms converge to either an exact or an $ε$-approximate equilibrium. We corroborate our findings on a numerical instance of a Cournot oligopoly model.

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Probabilistically robust stabilizing allocations in uncertain coalitional games

In this paper we consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertain value functions for which we establish distribution-free guarantees on the probability of allocation stability, i.e., agents do not have incentives to defect from the grand coalition to form subcoalitions for unseen realizations of the uncertain parameter. In case the set of stable allocations, the so called core of the game, is empty, we propose a randomized relaxation of the core. We then show that those allocations that belong to this relaxed set can be accompanied by stability guarantees in a probably approximately correct fashion. Finally, numerical experiments corroborate our theoretical findings.

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Reliably-stabilizing piecewise-affine neural network controllers

A common problem affecting neural network (NN) approximations of model predictive control (MPC) policies is the lack of analytical tools to assess the stability of the closed-loop system under the action of the NN-based controller. We present a general procedure to quantify the performance of such a controller, or to design minimum complexity NNs with rectified linear units (ReLUs) that preserve the desirable properties of a given MPC scheme. By quantifying the approximation error between NN-based and MPC-based state-to-input mappings, we first establish suitable conditions involving two key quantities, the worst-case error and the Lipschitz constant, guaranteeing the stability of the closed-loop system. We then develop an offline, mixed-integer optimization-based method to compute those quantities exactly. Together these techniques provide conditions sufficient to certify the stability and performance of a ReLU-based approximation of an MPC control law.

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Learning equilibria with personalized incentives in a class of nonmonotone games

We consider quadratic, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems with symmetric interactions among the agents. Albeit this class of games is known to admit a potential function, its formal expression can be unavailable in several real-world applications. For this reason, we propose a two-layer Nash equilibrium seeking scheme in which a central coordinator exploits noisy feedback from the agents to design personalized incentives for them. By making use of those incentives, the agents compute a solution to an extended game, and then return feedback measures to the coordinator. We show that our algorithm returns an equilibrium if the coordinator is endowed with standard learning policies, and corroborate our results on a numerical instance of a hypomonotone game.

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A stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium model for platforms competition in the ride-hail market

The presence of uncertainties in the ride-hailing market complicates the pricing strategies of on-demand platforms that compete each other to offer a mobility service while striving to maximize their profit. Looking at this problem as a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem (SGNEP), we design a distributed, stochastic equilibrium seeking algorithm with Tikhonov regularization to find an optimal pricing strategy. Remarkably, the proposed iterative scheme does not require an increasing (possibly infinite) number of samples of the random variable to perform the stochastic approximation, thus making it appealing from a practical perspective. Moreover, we show that the algorithm returns a Nash equilibrium under mere monotonicity assumption and a careful choice of the step size sequence, obtained by exploiting the specific structure of the SGNEP at hand. We finally corroborate our results on a numerical instance of the on-demand ride-hailing market.

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Pursuing robust decisions in uncertain traffic equilibrium problems

We evaluate the robustness of agents' traffic equilibria in randomized routing games characterized by an uncertain network demand with a possibly unknown probability distribution. Specifically, we extend the so-called hose model by considering a traffic equilibrium model where the uncertain network demand configuration belongs to a polyhedral set, whose shape is itself a-priori unknown. By exploiting available data, we apply the scenario approach theory to establish distribution-free feasibility guarantees for agents' traffic equilibria of the uncertain routing game without the need to know an explicit characterization of such set. A numerical example on a traffic network testbed corroborates the proposed theoretical results.

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Extremum seeking control of a class of constrained nonlinear systems

This paper studies the extremum seeking control (ESC) problem for a class of constrained nonlinear systems. Specifically, we focus on a family of constraints allowing to reformulate the original nonlinear system in the so-called input-output normal form. To steer the system to optimize a performance function without knowing its explicit form, we propose a novel numerical optimization-based extremum seeking control (NOESC) design consisting of a constrained numerical optimization method and an inversion based feedforward controller. In particular, a projected gradient descent algorithm is exploited to produce the state sequence to optimize the performance function, whereas a suitable boundary value problem accommodates the finite-time state transition between each two consecutive points of the state sequence. Compared to available NOESC methods, the proposed approach i) can explicitly deal with output constraints; ii) the performance function can consider a direct dependence on the states of the internal dynamics; iii) the internal dynamics do not have to be necessarily stable. The effectiveness of the proposed ESC scheme is shown through extensive numerical simulations.

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Probabilistic stabilizability certificates for a class of black-box linear systems

We provide out-of-sample certificates on the controlled invariance property of a given set with respect to a class of black-box linear systems. Specifically, we consider linear time-invariant models whose state space matrices are known only to belong to a certain family due to a possibly inexact quantification of some parameters. By exploiting a set of realizations of those undetermined parameters, verifying the controlled invariance property of the given set amounts to a linear program, whose feasibility allows us to establish an a-posteriori probabilistic certificate on the controlled invariance property of such a set with respect to the nominal linear time-invariant dynamics. The proposed framework is applied to the control of a networked multi-agent system with unknown weighted graph.

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Probabilistic feasibility guarantees for solution sets to uncertain variational inequalities

We develop a data-driven approach to the computation of a-posteriori feasibility certificates to the solution sets of variational inequalities affected by uncertainty. Specifically, we focus on instances of variational inequalities with a deterministic mapping and an uncertain feasibility set, and represent uncertainty by means of scenarios. Building upon recent advances in the scenario approach literature, we quantify the robustness properties of the entire set of solutions of a variational inequality, with feasibility set constructed using the scenario approach, against a new unseen realization of the uncertainty. Our results extend existing results that typically impose an assumption that the solution set is a singleton and require certain non-degeneracy properties, and thereby offer probabilistic feasibility guarantees to any feasible solution. We show that assessing the violation probability of an entire set of solutions, rather than of a singleton, requires enumeration of the support constraints that "shape" this set. Additionally, we propose a general procedure to enumerate the support constraints that does not require a closed form description of the solution set, which is unlikely to be available. We show that robust game theory problems can be modelling via uncertain variational inequalities, and illustrate our theoretical results through extensive numerical simulations on a case study involving an electric vehicle charging coordination problem.

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Lightning optimizes: a threshold mechanism ensures minimum-path flow

A well-known property of linear resistive electrical networks is that the current distribution minimizes the total dissipated energy. When the circuit includes resistors with nonlinear monotonic characteristic, the current distribution minimizes in general a different functional. We show that, if the nonlinear characteristic is a threshold-like function and the energy generator is concentrated in a single point, as in the case of lightning or dielectric discharge, then the current flow is concentrated along a single path, which is a minimum path to the ground with respect to the threshold. We also propose a dynamic model that explains and qualitatively reproduces the lightning transient behaviour: initial generation of several plasma branches and subsequent dismissal of all branches but the one reaching the ground first, which is the optimal one.

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The optimal transport paradigm enables data compression in data-driven robust control

A new data-enabled control technique for uncertain linear time-invariant systems, recently conceived by Coulson et\ al., builds upon the direct optimization of controllers over input/output pairs drawn from a large dataset. We adopt an optimal transport-based method for compressing such large dataset to a smaller synthetic dataset of representative behaviours, aiming to alleviate the computational burden of controllers to be implemented online. Specifically, the synthetic data are determined by minimizing the Wasserstein distance between atomic distributions supported on both the original dataset and the compressed one. We show that a distributionally robust control law computed using the compressed data enjoys the same type of performance guarantees as the original dataset, at the price of enlarging the ambiguity set by an easily computable and well-behaved quantity. Numerical simulations confirm that the control performance with the synthetic data is comparable to the one obtained with the original data, but with significantly less computation required.

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Local Stackelberg equilibrium seeking in generalized aggregative games

We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg equilibrium problem in aggregative games with coupling constraints. Specifically, we focus on a single-leader, multiple-follower problem, and after equivalently recasting the Stackelberg game as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC), we iteratively convexify a regularized version of the MPCC as inner problem, whose solution generates a sequence of feasible descent directions for the original MPCC. Thus, by pursuing a descent direction at every outer iteration, we establish convergence to a local Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, the proposed algorithm is tested on a numerical case study involving a hierarchical instance of the charging coordination of Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs).

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On the robustness of equilibria in generalized aggregative games

We address the problem of assessing the robustness of the equilibria in uncertain, multi-agent games. Specifically, we focus on generalized Nash equilibrium problems in aggregative form subject to linear coupling constraints affected by uncertainty with a possibly unknown probability distribution. Within a data-driven context, we apply the scenario approach paradigm to provide a-posteriori feasibility certificates for the entire set of generalized Nash equilibria of the game. Then, we show that assessing the violation probability of such set merely requires to enumerate the constraints that ``shape'' it. For the class of aggregative games, this results in solving a feasibility problem on each active facet of the feasibility region, for which we propose a semi-decentralized algorithm. We demonstrate our theoretical results by means of an academic example.

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A preconditioned Forward-Backward method for partially separable SemiDefinite Programs

We present semi-decentralized and distributed algorithms, designed via a preconditioned forward-backward operator splitting, for solving large-scale, decomposable semidefinite programs (SDPs). We exploit a chordal aggregate sparsity pattern assumption on the original SDP to obtain a set of mutually coupled SDPs defined on positive semidefinite (PSD) cones of reduced dimensions. We show that the proposed algorithms converge to a solution of the original SDP via iterations of reasonable computational cost. Finally, we compare the performances of the two proposed algorithms with respect to others available in the literature.

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Charging plug-in electric vehicles as a mixed-integer aggregative game

We consider the charge scheduling coordination of a fleet of plug-in electric vehicles, developing a hybrid decision-making framework for efficient and profitable usage of the distribution grid. Each charging dynamics, affected by the aggregate behavior of the whole fleet, is modelled as an inter-dependent, mixed-logical-dynamical system. The coordination problem is formalized as a generalized mixed-integer aggregative potential game, and solved via semi-decentralized implementation of a sequential best-response algorithm that leads to an approximated equilibrium of the game.

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