arXiv subjects

Florent Meyniel

Publications and source records attributed to Florent Meyniel.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Fast Whole-Brain, Geometry-Aware Functional Alignment for Cross-Subject Decoding

Decoding brain activity is useful for characterizing brain processes and understanding the functional architecture underlying cognition. However, the inter-individual variability in brain response patterns limits the development of decoders that generalize across individuals. A solution to this challenge is functional alignment: aligning functional data across individuals before training population-level decoders. The core issue is to strike the balance between aligning functional features and preserving the anatomical structure, while maintaining computational efficiency. We introduce a new functional alignment method for fMRI, SpectralOT, that embeds cortical geometry into Laplace-Beltrami eigenmodes along functional data to regularize the alignment.

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arXiv2024

Clarifying the conceptual dimensions of representation in neuroscience

Despite the centrality of the notion of representation in neuroscience, the field lacks a unified framework for the concepts used to characterize representation, leading to disparate use of both terminology and measures associated with it. To offer clarification, we propose a core set of conceptual dimensions that characterize representations in neuroscience. These dimensions describe relations between a neural response, features that may be represented, and downstream effects of the neural response. A neural response may be shown to be sensitive or specific to a feature, invariant to other features, or functional (it is used downstream in the brain). We use information-theoretic measures to illustrate these conceptual dimensions and explain how they relate to data analysis methods such as correlational analyses, decoding and encoding models, representational similarity analysis, and tests of statistical dependence or adaptation. We consider several canonical examples, including models of the representation of orientation, numerosity, and spatial location, which illustrate how the evidence put forth in support or criticism of these models is systematized by our framework. By offering a unified conceptual framework to characterize representation in neuroscience, we hope to aid the comparison and integration of results across studies and research groups and to help determine when evidence for a neural representation is strong.

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arXiv2023

Studying the neural representations of uncertainty

The study of the brain's representations of uncertainty is a central topic in neuroscience. Unlike most quantities of which the neural representation is studied, uncertainty is a property of an observer's beliefs about the world, which poses specific methodological challenges. We analyze how the literature on the neural representations of uncertainty addresses those challenges and distinguish between "code-driven" and "correlational" approaches. Code-driven approaches make assumptions about the neural code for representing world states and the associated uncertainty. By contrast, correlational approaches search for relationships between uncertainty and neural activity without constraints on the neural representation of the world state that this uncertainty accompanies. To compare these two approaches, we apply several criteria for neural representations: sensitivity, specificity, invariance, functionality. Our analysis reveals that the two approaches lead to different, but complementary findings, shaping new research questions and guiding future experiments.

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arXiv2021

Biases and Variability from Costly Bayesian Inference

When humans infer underlying probabilities from stochastic observations, they exhibit biases and variability that cannot be explained on the basis of sound, Bayesian manipulations of probability. This is especially salient when beliefs are updated as a function of sequential observations. We introduce a theoretical framework in which biases and variability emerge from a trade-off between Bayesian inference and a cognitive cost of carrying out probabilistic computations. We consider two forms of the cost: a precision cost and an unpredictability cost; these penalize beliefs that are less entropic and less deterministic, respectively. We apply our framework to the case of a Bernoulli variable: the bias of a coin is inferred from a sequence of coin flips. Theoretical predictions are qualitatively different depending on the form of the cost. A precision cost induces overestimation of small probabilities on average and a limited memory of past observations, and, consequently, a fluctuating bias. An unpredictability cost induces underestimation of small probabilities and a fixed bias that remains appreciable even for nearly unbiased observations. The case of a fair (equiprobable) coin, however, is singular, with non-trivial and slow fluctuations of the inferred bias. The proposed framework of costly Bayesian inference illustrates the richness of a 'resource-rational' (or 'bounded-rational') picture of seemingly irrational human cognition.

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